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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

CASE NO: 2018/15129

NOT REPORTABLE

NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES

REVISED

In the matter between:

LEWRAY INVESTMENTS (PTY) LIMITED                                                      First Applicant

URBAN TASK FORCE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LIMITED                           Second Applicant

and

MTHUNZI, S & 38 UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF

PLETTENBURG, LISTED IN ANNEXURE ‘A’

TO THE NOTICE OF MOTION                                                      First to 39^th Respondents

FURTHER UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF PLETTENBERG                       40^th Respondent

JUDGMENT

ADAMS J:

[1]. This is an urgent application by the applicants for the eviction of the respondents and all other occupiers from a block of flats, known as Plettenberg, in Bruce Street, Hillbrow, Johannesburg (‘the premises’). The second applicant is the managing agent of the first applicant and it lets out the premises to the respondents on behalf of the first applicant, who is the owner of the block of flats. The respondents are lessees of the first applicant, who lets to the respondents units in the block of flats in terms of monthly tenancies governed by written lease agreements. The applicants require the respondents to vacate the building as they intend renovating and refurbishing the building and the individual residential units.

[2]. On the 1^st of January 2018 the applicants commenced the process of relocating the occupiers by giving them notice in terms of regulation 8(1) of the Unfair Practice Regulations to the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999. Since then the parties have been engaged in continuous discussions and negotiations with a view to ensuring that the vacating of the premises and the relocation of the occupiers proceed in a lawful, organised and dignified manner. There was a long trail of correspondence to and fro between the parties and their legal representatives. The disputes between the parties also served before the Gauteng Rental Housing Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’), and on the 5^th of March 2018 the Tribunal ruled that the notice to vacate issued on the 1^st of January 2018 by the applicants to the respondents is lawful and does not amount to unfair practice.

[3]. After the ruling by the Tribunal one would have hoped and expected that the vacating of the premises would proceed smoothly. However, that was not to be. Instead further disputes between the parties arose. I do not believe that it is necessary to deal in detail with those disputes, suffice to say that the parties were in constant and continuous discussions with a view to resolving the remaining issues between them, the most vexed of which related to the provision of alternative accommodation to the respondents whilst the premises were being renovated. I interpose here to note that the applicants have at all times understood and appreciated their duty to ensure that the eviction of the respondents should not result in any one occupier being rendered homeless as a result of them being evicted from the premises. It has always been the stance of the applicants that they would ensure that any and / or all occupiers of the building would be accommodated in other buildings owned by them in the area. In their notice to vacate of the 1^st of January 2018 and on numerous subsequent occasions, the applicants have tendered such alternative accommodation. They are repeating that tender in their notice of motion. The provision of alternative accommodation itself gave rise to disputes between the parties relating to that aspect of the matter, with the respondents making demands, which, in my view, demonstrate, as submitted by Mr Van der Merwe on behalf of the applicants, that the respondents are not bona fide in their settlement negotiations. I will shortly return to that aspect of the matter.

[4]. On the 5^th of April 2018 the parties and their legal representatives attended at and inspected the alternative accommodation. By the 12^th of April 2018, that is some three odd months after the notice to vacate had been issued by the applicants, it became apparent that the matter would not be resolved amicably, and it was at that stage that the applicants, in consultation with their attorneys, decided to approach this court on an urgent basis to obtain an eviction order.

[5]. The applicants contend that this matter is urgent for the simple reason that there is a dire need to commence with the renovations. The applicants are suffering irreparable harm in that they presently have a half empty building, which means that they are suffering substantial daily losses in addition to the damages they will suffer as a result of the delay in the commencement of the renovations. Furthermore, the applicants allege that the occupiers of the premises are at present not paying rental pursuant to the monthly tenancies / lease agreements, and there is accordingly a substantial amount in respect of arrear rental payable by the respondents. This is disputed by the respondents. There is a mortgage bond of R19 million registered over the property and the first applicant remains liable to service the bond whilst faced with the non – or late payment of rent.

[6]. In sum, Mr Van der Merwe submitted that applicants have illustrated that they are suffering damages in the form of financial losses as a result of the failure by the respondents to vacate. The damages are accumulating as time passes and flow from the non / late – payment of rental, the continued obligation on the applicants to pay for municipal services, the delay in the initiation and finalisation of the renovations and the fact that the applicants have to house and subsidise the occupation by previous occupiers, who had already been relocated.

[7]. It is trite, as submitted by Mr Van der Merwe, that commercial urgency warrants the relaxation of the Uniform Rules of Court in terms of Rule 6(12). In this matter, the applicants have afforded the respondents sufficient time and opportunity to oppose the application and to fully present their case to court. The respondents in fact availed themselves of this opportunity and, in my view, any and / or all facts relevant to the adjudication of the application have been placed before me. This means that, as contended for by the applicants, the relaxation from the normal time parameters is commensurate to the urgency of the matter. It is indeed so that the respondents have not alleged prejudice as a result of this application being launched on an urgent basis. This supports Mr Van der Merwe’s conclusion that there is no possible prejudice suffered by the respondents as a result of this application being launched on an urgent basis.

[8]. In that regard, I was referred to and have had regard to what is said by the court in Luna Meubel Vervaardigers v Makin Furniture Manufacturers, 1977 (4) SA 135 (W) at pg 137E-F:

‘Practitioners should carefully analyse the facts of each case to determine, for the purposes of setting the case down for hearing, whether a greater or lesser degree of relaxation of the Rules and of the ordinary practice of the Court is required. The degree of relaxation should not be greater than the exigency of the case demands. It must be commensurate therewith. Mere lip service to the requirements of Rule 6 (12) (b) will not do and an applicant must make out a case in the founding affidavit to justify the particular extent of the departure from the norm, which is involved in the time and day for which the matter be set down’.

[9]. I find myself in agreement with the submissions made by Mr Van der Merwe relative to the urgency issue. The point is this that it has been more than four months since the applicants issued the notice to vacate, which have been held by the Tribunal to be lawful and valid, and the matter is no closer to being resolved. Therefore, in my judgment, the applicants have made out a case for urgency and for a truncation of the time periods as provided for in Uniform Rule 6(12).

[10]. The main contention by the respondents in relation to urgency is that an urgent application for eviction has to be brought within the confines of s 5 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from, and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (‘the PIE Act’). Mr Wilson, Counsel for the respondents, contended that the mechanism for an urgent eviction is section 5 of the PIE Act, and not section 4. The applicants have applied for eviction in terms of section 4, which, according to Mr Wilson, is wrong. An urgent application for eviction, so the argument goes, can only be launched in terms of section 5 and a court can only grant the eviction if it is satisfied that the requirements of section 5 have been met. A final eviction order cannot be granted on an urgent basis, so Mr Wilson submitted.

[11]. The PIE Act expressly makes provision for and deals specifically with procedures for the eviction of unlawful occupiers. Section 5 of the PIE Act provides as follows:

‘5 Urgent proceedings for eviction

(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4, the owner or person in charge of land may institute urgent proceedings for the eviction of an unlawful occupier of that land pending the outcome of proceedings for a final order, and the court may grant such an order if it is satisfied that-

(a) there is a real and imminent danger of substantial injury or damage to any person or property if the unlawful occupier is not forthwith evicted from the land;

(b) the likely hardship to the owner or any other affected person if an order for eviction is not granted, exceeds the likely hardship to the unlawful occupier against whom the order is sought, if an order for eviction is granted; and

(c) there is no other effective remedy available.

(2) Before the hearing of the proceedings contemplated in subsection (1), the court must give written and effective notice of the intention of the owner or person in charge to obtain an order for eviction of the unlawful occupier to the unlawful occupier and the municipality in whose area of jurisdiction the land is situated.

(3) The notice of proceedings contemplated in subsection (2) must-

(a) state that proceedings will be instituted in terms of subsection (1) for an order for the eviction of the unlawful occupier;

(b) indicate on what date and at what time the court will hear the proceedings;

(c) set out the grounds for the proposed eviction; and

(d) state that the unlawful occupier is entitled to appear before the court and defend the case and, where necessary, has the right to apply for legal aid.

[12]. Mr Wilson relies on the Constitutional Court decision in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes & Others, 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC), for his contention firstly that a final eviction order can never be applied for and granted on an urgent basis. Only an interim eviction order can be granted on an urgent basis. Secondly, Mr Wilson relies on the Joe Slovo case for his submission that an urgent application can only be brought in terms of section 5 of the PIE Act. At par [90] the Constitutional Court (Yacoob J) has this to say on the issue.

‘[90] It is apparent that s 5(1) sets out certain very stringent requirements to obtain an urgent eviction pending the determination of proceedings for a final order of eviction of the applicants. In proceedings in terms of s 5 therefore, any issue in relation to whether an order for eviction should be granted, and, in particular, whether it is just and equitable to grant the eviction order, would be entirely irrelevant. The PIE Act contemplates that urgent proceedings in terms of s 5 will be separate, independent and distinct from the substantial eviction proceedings contemplated in s 6.

The High Court found that 'the applicants had clearly complied with the procedure laid down in s 5 of PIE' on the basis of certain notices that had been issued by that court. One would ordinarily have expected an urgent eviction order to have been obtained upon proof of the stringent requirements of s 5 of the PIE Act, including the existence of a real and imminent danger of substantial injury or damage to any person or property. In the event, although an urgent order in terms of s 5 was applied for, no order was in fact obtained.

[91] What happened was this. Although the application was initially a s 5 application, the order asked for was not a s 5 order but one for a final eviction and relocation, competent only in terms of s 6 of the PIE Act. The notice to residents had in the meantime made it plain that a final eviction order would be asked for. It will be seen that s 6 issues, that have nothing to do with an interim eviction order and which are relevant to a grant of a final order of eviction, were dealt with in the papers. These issues include whether the eviction should be ordered in all the circumstances and whether it is just and equitable to evict. Argument was heard on whether a final eviction order should be granted, and that order was in fact granted.

[92] The High Court would have put form above substance if it heard the case on the ultimate date of hearing as a s 5 case. By the time the matter was heard about three months after the application had been filed, much water had passed. Notices of intention to oppose had been filed and the parties had dealt in detail with the s 6 issues in the papers. The urgent s 5 application had been overtaken by events. In the circumstances the High Court was right to deal with the case as one which started as a s 5 case and which, by the time it was argued, had matured into a fully-fledged s 6 application. In my view, there could indeed have been no opposition of substance had the respondents applied for an amendment in the High Court shortly before the date of hearing, an amendment to regularise the matter and to make explicit what was already implicit, that an eviction was, at the date of hearing, being sought in terms of s 6. In the circumstances the question whether the stringent requirements of s 5 had been met was not material before the High Court as at the date on which the matter was finally heard. Indeed, the s 5 issues were never material because no order in terms of s 5 had ever been sought. It is therefore unnecessary for me to decide in this case whether the stringent s 5 requirements had been complied with.

[93] The High Court was undoubtedly right in ultimately deciding the case, and making an order, in terms of s 6 of the PIE Act. I conclude therefore that the occupants enjoyed no right of occupation. It was therefore not necessary for the City to terminate that right. The essentially technical defence by the applicants that they had a right of occupation which had not been terminated fails. That does not mean that they can be evicted or relocated without more. The requirements of the PIE Act must be complied with. I must say immediately that the most important of the requirements of the PIE Act for present purposes is the requirement that their eviction must be just and equitable. I come to that later. First, however, certain essentially technical objections based on the PIE Act and taken by the applicants must be carefully considered.’

[13]. I deemed it necessary to cite as extensively as I did from the Joe Slovo judgment so as to place in context my view on the interpretation to be given to section 5. My reading of the Joe Slovo judgment, and in particular the long extract from that judgment cited immediately above, does not, in my view, support the contentions of Mr Wilson. I do not read the judgment to say that any and / or all urgent applications for eviction should be brought in terms of section 5 of the PIE Act. This section of the act most certainly does not expressly provide that urgent eviction applications shall only be brought in terms of section 5. Moreover, the opening phrase of the section 5 provides as follows:

‘Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4, the owner or person in charge of land may institute urgent proceedings for the eviction of an unlawful occupier …’

[14]. Of significance in my view is the use of the phrase ‘notwithstanding the provisions of section 4’ and the use of the word ‘may’ in the section. This construction, in my judgment, affords an applicant the option of applying for an interim eviction order pending an application for a final order, without in any way depriving the applicant of its right to launch an urgent application in terms of section 4. I am strengthened in my finding in that regard by the wording of section 4, which provides as follows in subsection (3);

‘(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the procedure for the serving of notices and filing of papers is as prescribed by the rules of the court in question’.

[15]. I therefore interpret these provisions to mean that the applicants were fully within their rights to urgently apply for an eviction order in terms of section 4 of the PIE Act, read with Uniform Rule of Court 6(12), because that is exactly what section 4(3) of the PIE Act says. I cannot find anything in the Joe Slovo judgment, which in the end dealt with an application for eviction which in effect was not brought on an urgent basis, which contradicts my aforesaid view. I reiterate that, in my judgment, the Joe Slovo judgment is not authority for the propositions that an urgent application for eviction can only be brought in terms of section 5 of the PIE Act and that pursuant to an urgent application for eviction the court can only grant an interim eviction order pending the final order for eviction.

[16]. That means that the jurisdictional point of the applicants relating to whether or not the applicants should have brought the application in terms of section 4 or section 5 of the PIE Act, stands to be dismissed, which brings us back to my earlier finding that the applicants have demonstrated that the application is urgent and warrants a deviation from the time limits prescribed in the rules of court. I interpose here to make the comment that I find it rather peculiar that the respondents adopted the stance, rather forcefully, that section 5 of the PIE Act should have been complied with. This is so because one of the other defences of the respondents is that they are not unlawful occupiers, and therefore the PIE Act is not applicable. In motion proceedings this, in my view, is impermissible because in effect what the respondents have done was to go on oath and to verify two mutually exclusive versions of the defence. Again, this is in my view indicative of the bona fides, or rather the lack thereof, of the respondents.

[17]. The respondents’ opposition to the eviction application is based primarily on two grounds. Firstly, the respondents contend that they cannot be evicted in terms of the provisions of the PIE Act as they are not ‘unlawful occupiers’ as defined in that Act. They are, so they submit, rent – paying tenants and occupy the premises in terms of valid lease agreements. The fact that they have been served with notices to vacate, does not mean that the lease agreements have been cancelled and that they no longer have a right to occupy the property. Secondly, the respondents contend that, on the basis of the contractual relationship between them and the applicants, they are entitled to make certain demands, such as a remission in the rental payable by them for the alternative accommodation provided by the applicants, before they vacate the premises.

[18]. As regards the issue whether or not the respondents are unlawful occupiers, there is no merit in the submissions by Mr Wilson. On the 1^st of January 2018, the applicants gave the respondents two months’ notice to vacate the premises by the 28^th February 2018. The Rental Housing Tribunal on the 5^th of March 2018 ruled that the notice to vacate is lawful and valid and did not amount to an unfair practice. In my view, this means that the respondents occupy the property without the consent of the owner, being the first applicant. Also, in view of the fact that they have lawfully been given notice to vacate the premises, it cannot be said that the respondents have a right in law to occupy the premises. This makes the respondents unlawful occupiers as defined in the PIE Act.

[19]. The point is this: If regard is had to the notice to vacate of the 1^st of January 2018, read with the ruling of the Tribunal, the respondents should not be in occupation of the premises. This makes them unlawful occupiers as they are occupying the premises against the wishes of the owner and without a valid right to be there.

[20]. The defence relating to the terms and conditions which should govern the relocation to alternative accommodation is similarly devoid of any merit. The respondents say that the applicants have not complied with their obligations in terms of Regulation 8(2)(a) of the Gauteng Unfair Practice Regulations of 2001 (‘the regulations’), promulgated under and in terms of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 (‘the Rental Housing Act’), in that they have failed to allow the tenants remission of rental for the period during which they are not in occupation of the premises. The respondents allege that the ‘temporary alternative accommodation’ is substantially smaller than their present accommodation, which means that they are entitled to a remission of the rental as provided for in regulation 8(2)(a).

[21]. At this juncture it may be appropriate to cite the provisions of regulation 8, which reads as follows:

‘8. (1) A landlord may only-

(a) request a tenant to vacate the dwelling if any repairs, conversions or refurbishment are necessary and cannot be properly done while the tenant remains in occupation;

(b) cancel lease and repossess the dwellings, without being liable for damages in terms of these lease, these regulations, the Act or any other law, in circumstances where the dwelling is in an uninhabitable condition.

(2) In the circumstances referred to in paragraph (a) of sub regulation (1), the landlord must-

(a) allow the tenant remission of rental for the period during which the tenant is not in occupation;

(b) effect the repairs, conversion or refurbishment within a reasonable time so as to cause the tenant as little inconvenience as possible; and

(c) ensure that the tenant is able to return to the dwelling as soon as possible after the completion of the repairs; conversion or refurbishment.

(3) where a landlord is required to make necessary repairs, conversions or refurbishment only to a part of the dwelling and a tenant continues to occupy the remaining part, a tenant is entitled to a remission in rental, the amount of which is proportionate to actual area from which a tenant has been deprived.

(4) if a tenant, having been requested to vacate the dwelling, does not do so, a tenant has no claim against the landlord for injuries suffered while the dwelling is being repaired, converted or refurbished.

[22]. There are two difficulties with the submissions on behalf of the respondents in relation to the remission of rental. The second applicant’s notice to vacate of the 1^st of January 2018, read with the ruling of the Housing Tribunal dated the 3^rd of March 2018, makes no mention of any remission of rental. In fact, the notice to vacate, which have been ruled to be lawful and valid, provides that alternative accommodation would be provided and the respondents would pay the same rental as they are presently paying. It is for this reason that the respondents rely solely on the provisions of section 8(2)(a) of the regulations. The first difficulty is however that the wording of this regulation envisages a situation where the tenant is requested to vacate the leased premises without alternative accommodation being offered. Therefore, regulation 8(2)(a) does not find application in casu. In any event, the remission cannot possibly be based solely on a consideration of the size of the leased premises. I agree with the submission by Mr Van der Merwe that the quality of the alternative accommodation may very well make up for the reduction in square meterage, which would mean that it is fair that the respondents continue paying the same rental.

[23]. The second difficulty with the respondents’ insistence on a reduction in the rental before they vacate the premises is that this is an issue which falls outside of the vacating of the premises and the relocation of the respondents. It is common cause that the respondents should vacate the property, and I should make an order to that effect. Any other issue, such as a remission in the rental can conveniently be dealt with by referring same to the Housing Tribunal after the relocation.

[24]. The next issue which the respondents raised in the opposition to the eviction order is the fact that the applicants are not prepared to give them an undertaking not to subdivide their present units in the building. They say that this forms part of the ruling of the Housing Tribunal. This is factually incorrect. A thorough reading of the ruling reveals that no such ruling was made. It is also inconceivable that the owner of a property can be prevented from effecting changes to its property as it deems necessary because its present tenants who occupy the premises in terms of monthly tenancies say so. The ruling of the Housing Tribunal say no more than that the respondents should be able to return to their dwellings after completion of the renovations and refurbishments. For these reasons, I am of the view that the second ground of objection should fail.

[25]. The last ground on which the respondents oppose the application for eviction, and which obviously relates to the requirement in eviction matters that in terms of section 4(7) of the PIE Act that the eviction should be just and equitable, is a claim that some of the occupiers of the property would, for a number of reasons, notably the fact that they would not be able to afford the alternative accommodation offered by the applicants, be rendered homeless. In their opposing papers the respondents list nine tenants who, according to them cannot afford the alternative accommodation, which, so they claim, would render these people homeless. The fallacy in this claim is self – evident. The applicants have offered and tendered alternative accommodation to all the present occupiers of the property. All the occupiers would be relocated to other buildings. How then, I ask rhetorically, can it be said that they will be rendered homeless. The fact that a dispute may arise after they take occupation of the alternative accommodation and face possible eviction does not mean that they would be rendered homeless. That, in my view, is a dispute for another day, but in itself there is no merit in this contention.

[26]. On the point of the ‘just and equitable’ requirement, it requires emphasising that however one assesses this matter, the risk of any one occupier being rendered homeless is non – existent. In The Occupiers, Berea v De Wet NO and Another, 2017 (5) SA 346 (CC), the Constitutional Court remarks as follows at par [48]:

‘[48] The court will grant an eviction order only where: (a) it has all the information about the occupiers to enable it to decide whether the eviction is just and equitable; and (b) the court is satisfied that the eviction is just and equitable, having regard to the information in (a). The two requirements are inextricable, interlinked and essential. An eviction order granted in the absence of either one of these two requirements will be arbitrary. I reiterate that the enquiry has nothing to do with the unlawfulness of occupation. It assumes and is only due when the occupation is unlawful.’  

[27]. The applicants are offering the respondents alternative accommodation. Therefore, prima facie the eviction cannot be said to be unjust and in iniquitous. The respondents should be given sufficient time to vacate the premises bearing in mind that the alternative accommodation is available as we speak. I am accordingly of the view that it would be just and equitable to afford the respondents until the end of May to relocate or vacate the premises. One other aspect which weighs heavily on  my mind in relation to the ‘just and equitable’ requirement is the undisputed fact that the applicants are committed to urban renewal and the upgrade of the Johannesburg inner – city. It is my view that, in the long run, it would be the very same respondents in this matter, as well as the general population of the city as a whole, who would benefit from the renovation and refurbishment of Plettenberg. 

[28]. I am satisfied that the urgent application of the applicants for the eviction of the respondents should succeed. Accordingly, I intend granting the relief prayed for by the applicants in their notice of motion, read with the ruling of the Tribunal.

[29]. Mr Van der Merwe has asked me to order that the respondents pay the applicants’ cost of the urgent application on the basis of the general rule that the successful litigant is entitled to the cost of suit. However, in this case, the dispute raises important issues and the impact of this decision will be felt beyond the parties to this litigation. In the circumstances, I make no order as to costs.

ORDER

Accordingly, I make the following order:

1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 below, the respondents, together with any and / or all members of their families and any other persons who are in occupation of the property (‘the unlawful occupiers’), are to vacate the property, known as Plettenberg, being portion 1 of Erf 3968, Johannesburg Township, Registration Division I.R., Gauteng Province, situate at the 34 Bruce Street, Hillbrow, Johannesburg (‘the property’), no later than the 31^st May 2018.

2. The respondents are to vacate the property on or before the 31^st of May 2018 on the following terms and conditions:

2.1 The applicants shall make alternative accommodation situate in properties owned and managed by the applicants (‘the alternative accommodation’) available to the respondents for the duration of the refurbishment of the property;

2.2 The terms of the respondents occupation of their alternative accommodation shall be as follows:

2.2.1 The respondents shall pay rental in respect of the alternative accommodation in the same amount for which they are currently liable.

2.2.2 The respondents shall be liable for services charges to the extent that they are currently so liable, or the equivalent dependant on the system applicable in the relocation building.

2.3 Payment of an amount of R2500 relocation fee shall be paid by the applicants to the respondents once they have moved and relocated to the alternative accommodation provided by the applicants.

2.4 Should the respondents or any one or more of them wish to vacate the property and not be relocated to alternative accommodation provided by the applicants, payment of the amount of R5000 shall be made to them once they have completely vacated the property.

2.5 The applicants shall effect and complete the renovations and the refurbishment of the premises within a reasonable time and without any unnecessary delays, so as to cause the respondents as little inconvenience as possible.

2.6 On completion of the renovations and refurbishment of the property, the respondents shall be given the right of first refusal to return to the premises and to re – occupy their units.

2.7 On completion of the renovations and the refurbishment of the property, the applicants shall ensure that the respondents are able to return, if they so wish, to the property and their units as soon as possible as provided for in terms of regulation 8(1)(c) of the Gauteng Unfair Practice Regulations of 2001 (‘the regulations’), promulgated under and in terms of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 (‘the Rental Housing Act’).

3. In the event that the respondents do not relocate to the alternative property or fail to vacate the property on or before 31^st May 2018, the sheriff of the court or his lawfully appointed deputy be and is hereby authorised and directed to evict the respondents from the property.

4. The respondents are interdicted and restrained from entering the property at any time after they have vacated the property or have been evicted therefrom by the sheriff of the court or his lawfully appointed deputy.

5. In the event that any of the unlawful occupiers contravene the order in para 4 above, the sheriff of the court or his lawfully appointed deputy, is authorised and directed to remove them from the property as soon as possible after their reoccupation thereof.

6. There shall be no order as to cost.

_________________________________

L R ADAMS

Judge of the High Court

Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg

 

HEARD ON:	17th May 2018
JUDGMENT DATE: FOR THE APLICANTS:	23rd May 2018 Adv C Van der Merwe
INSTRUCTED BY:	Vermaak & Partners
FOR THE RESPONDENTS:	Adv Stuart Wilson, with Adv Irene De Vos
INSTRUCTED BY:	Seri Law Clinic

 

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