

# IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

# CASE NO: 2015/08456

(1) REPORTABLE: NO(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO(3) REVISED: YES

DATE: 19 October 2020

In the matter between:

KADER: HEIDI JOY

And

SWARTZ: MERVYN ISRAEL N.O. KADER: STUART WAYNE First Respondent Second Respondent

JUDGMENT ON LEAVE TO APPEAL

FOULKES-JONES AJ

Applicant

- I handed down judgment in this matter in December 2019. I gave various orders against the First Respondent and ordered him to pay the costs of the application.
- First Respondent now seeks leave to appeal against my judgment, citing sections 17(1), (2)(a) and (6).
- 3. No doubt if one reads those sections of the Superior Courts Act No. 10 of 2013 (with Uniform Rule 49) I would have to refer the matter to the Full Court of the Gauteng Local Division. The appeal does not involve a question of law of importance, is not of general application and does not involve differences of opinion (section 17(1), (2)(a) and (6)).
- But I could in terms of section 17(1)(a) only grant leave to appeal if I am of the opinion that the appeal <u>would</u> have a reasonable prospect of success. (My underlining).
- I have been referred to the judgment of Bertelsmann J in the matter of *The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others* 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) at paragraph (b) where he held as follows:

"It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another court might come to a different conclusion ... The use of the word "would" in the new statute that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against."

- 6. I am thus obliged to determine whether another Court would (not might) come to a different conclusion. Notwithstanding the able argument of Mr Badenhorst SC, I am not convinced that another Court <u>would</u> come to a conclusion other than that which I have made.
- 7. I cannot therefore grant the First Respondent leave to appeal. I make the following order:
  - 7.1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

# **K I FOULKES-JONES**

### ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

## GAUTENG DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT, JOHANNESBURG

#### Electronically submitted

Delivered: This judgement is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their legal representatives by email. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 19 October 2020.

Date of hearing: 23 July 2020

Date of judgment: 19 October 2020

## **Appearances:**

Sian Richardson Attorneys: Attorneys for the Applicant Counsel for the Applicant: Adv. W Davel

Keith H Lang Attorneys: Attorneys for the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent Counsel for the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent: Adv. S M Katzew

Yosef Shishler Attorneys: Attorneys for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent Counsel for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent: N/A (not opposed)