REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 32001A/2013
DATE: 3 NOVEMBER 2014
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
In the matter between:
CORNELIUS VAN NIEKERK..........................................................................................................Applicant
(Applicant in the application for leave to appeal)
vs
PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEEP SEA..............................................................Respondent
ANGLING ASSOCIATION (SADSAA)
(Respondent in the application for leave to appeal)
JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against my judgment and order in terms of Rule 48(1) of the Uniform Rules of the High Court in respect of a review of the Taxing Master’s decision to tax all of the costs of the (main) application and not only the wasted costs occasioned by the arguing of the urgent application.
[2] Before I turn to the merits of the application it is necessary to deal with the point raised on behalf of the respondent namely that no appeal lies against the judgment and order of this Court in chambers. In support of this contention the Court was referred to the decision of Menzies Birse &  Chiddy v Hall1 where the Court held that, save as specifically provided by statute, there is no appeal from a judgment or order given by a judge sitting in chambers:
“Under the rule now in question, the Judge sits purely as a Judge in chambers, and does not purport (whether in time or in vacation) to exercise the functions of the Court, and there is, in my opinion, no appeal from his decision... That is was competent to take away that right of appeal by the new rule is, I think, clear from the fact that there is no inherent right to a litigant to review “the taxation of the Taxing Master -which is in the nature of a ruling by an administrative official - save, naturally, for a gross irregularity or some other reason which makes is per se reviewable. Here, he is given a right of “review”, which is in reality a revision, on the merits, of that ruling, and is in no sense a proceeding of the Court. It was consequently competent, by this rule, to make such revision the last work on this subject."
[3] Mullins, J in Vaaltyn v Goss &  Another2 held a contrary view and held that the Supreme Court Act does not preclude a litigant from appealing against a judgment or order of a Judge in chambers. However, in Weaving v Reck and Others3 the Court agreed with the approach in the Menzies-case that, in terms of Rule 48, the review is the �last work on the subject”.4 The Court in Weaving therefore declined to follow the reasoning in Vaaltyn. In Brown &  Others v Papadakis &  Others5 the Court similarly held that it was bound by the Menzies decision and consequently also followed the decision in Weaving.
[4] The applicant referred to the full bench in City of Cape Town v Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd and Another6 as authority for the proposition that the decision of this Court is appealable. The Court in Brown v Papadakis, however, disagreed as follows:7
“[13] In any event, I am bound by the decision in Menzies supra, since it pronounced on the provisions of rule 48 itself, and it is trite that a single judge is bound by the decision of the full bench of the same division on the same issue. Fourie J also considered himself to be so bound in his judgment handed down on 23 April 2010 in the as yet unreported matter of Weaving v Reck and 3 Others (Western Cape High Court Case No: 11579/06).
[14] It should however be mentioned that a full bench of this division in the matter of City of Cape Town v Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd and Another 2009 (5) SA 227 (CPD) in fact heard an appeal arising from the dismissal by a judge in chambers of an application for review of taxation It is clear though from a reading of the judgment that the court was not called upon to consider whether the leave granted by the judge a quo to appeal her order was competent or not. Accordingly I do not believe that the City of Cape Town case can be regarded as authority for the proposition that a review of taxation is appealable. ”
[5] I have perused the case law referred to and I am not persuaded that an appeal lies against my judgment and order. The appeal is therefore struck from the roll with costs.
[6] However, even if this Court had the authority to grant leave to appeal in this matter, I would refuse to grant leave to appeal as I am not persuaded that the applicant has reasonable prospects of success on appeal. The scope of review under Rule 48 of the Uniform Rules of Court a Court8 has to be satisfied that the Taxing Master was clearly wrong before interfering with its decision.9 The Taxing Master ruled that whereas the application had not been set down for a period of 5 months, the costs should cover the full costs of the application. I am not persuaded that the Taxing Master was clearly wrong. The general rule is, as was correctly submitted by the applicant, to �indemnify him for the expense to which he has been put through having unjustly compelled either to initiate or to defend as the case may be.�10
[7] I have indicated in my judgment that, although the matter was struck from the roll, the matter was never re-enrolled again. Furthermore, the application has been overtaken by subsequent events. It is trite that the Taxing Master should be guided by the general precept that the fees allowed reasonable remuneration for necessary work properly done. The applicant’s compelled the respondent to file answering affidavits. In these circumstances, I am not persuaded that there exists any reason to interfere with the Taxing Master’s discretion.
Order
[8] In the event the following order is made:
The application for leave to appeal is struck from the roll with costs.
AC BASSON
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT