---

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

 

                                                                                                        CASE NUMBER:  32968/21

                                                                                                            DATE:    1 September 2021

 

EHLERS ATTORNEYS                                                                                             Applicant

V

THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND                                                                              Respondent

 

In re

THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND                                                                             Applicant

V

EHLERS ATTORNEYS                                                                                           First Respondent

THE LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL                                                                   Second Respondent

THE SHERIFF PRETORIA EAST                                                                        Third Respondent

ABSA BANK LIMITED                                                                                          Fourth Respondent

 

JUDGMENT

MABUSE J

[1]      Based on the founding affidavit of a certain Tonya Ehlers, its senior director, the Applicant, a firm of attorneys practising in Centurion applies to this Court in terms of s 18 of the Superior Courts Act 13 of 2010 (Superior Courts Act) on an urgent basis for the following order:

          “2.     That the operation and execution of the order of the Court under the above case number dated 28 July 2021 is not suspended pending:

                   2.1            the final determination of the appeal (in the event of the Court granting the Road Accident Fund’s application for leave to appeal);

                   2.2            any further applications for leave to appeal that may be brought by the Road Accident Fund or the final determination of any future appeal (in the event of the court dismissing the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal);

          3.       That the Road Accident Fund be ordered to forthwith make payment to Ehlers Attorneys within 180 days from the date of any court order in terms whereof payment of any capital amounts or settled or taxed party-and-party costs are to be made to the trust account of Ehlers Attorneys;

          4.       That no writ of execution based upon a court order that compels the Applicant to make payment to the First Respondent’s trust account or any attachment and removal of the Applicant’s assets by the Third Respondent pursuant thereto shall be suspended, provided that a period of 180 days have lapsed from the date of the order.

          5.       That Ehlers Attorneys shall be released from the obligation to enter into security for the restitution of any sum obtained upon such execution;

          6.       That the Applicant be ordered to pay the costs of this application including the costs of two counsel where so employed.”

 

[2]      The Applicant in the current matter is the First Respondent in the main application.  The Respondent is the Applicant in the main application.  The other Respondents are not involved in this matter though they have been cited. This matter involves only the Applicant and Respondent. This application is opposed by the Respondent.

 

[3]      On 28 July 2021 this Court delivered a judgment in the main application.  On 29 July 2021 the Applicant instructed the sheriff to attach and remove the Respondent’s assets.  On 29 July 2021 the Respondent delivered its notice of application for leave to appeal.  That stopped the execution of the Applicant’s writs of execution as envisaged in s 18(1) of the Superior Courts Act.

 

[4]      The Court may, in terms of s 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act, order that the Applicant may take further steps to execute the writs of execution based on court orders that compelled the Respondent to pay the Applicant, if the Applicant satisfies the following three requirements, namely:

          4.1          if there are exceptional circumstances;

          4.2     if the Applicant proves, on a balance of probabilities that it will suffer irreparable harm if the Court does not order so;

          4.3     if the Applicant proves, on a balance of probabilities that the Respondent will not suffer any irreparable harm if the Court so orders.

 

[5]      It is the Applicant’s case that the said requirements are met in the current case.  The Applicant has, in support of its case, referred the Court to the following circumstances in support of its case that the three requirements have been met:

 

          5.1          Exceptional circumstances

                        The Applicant contends that some of the findings that the Court made in its judgment are dismissive of the Respondent’s application.  The Applicant has quoted the following paragraphs of the judgment:

                        “32.1 there is no alleged impropriety in the First Respondent’s trust account;

                        32.2 there is no alleged impropriety in respect of any of the awards for                                     compensation listed in paragraph 4 of the First Respondent’s answering                                  affidavit;

32.3 the Applicant, inexplicably, failed to comply with the court order in paragraph 45(c) of the Full Court and pay the First Respondent what is due to it;

                        32.4 the Applicant failed to make payment arrangements with some of the firms of                             attorneys referred to in paragraph 3 supra, including the First Respondent;

                        32.5 there is no alleged impropriety in respect of anyone of the amounts                                  payable in respect of the settled or taxed party-and-party bills of costs listed in                                    paragraph 4 of the First Respondent’s answering affidavit;

                        32.6 according to the First Respondent, there is no risk that the Applicant will make               unlawful payments if such payments will be made in respect of the matters set out                             in paragraph 4 of the First Respondent’s answering affidavit or for that matter any                              outstanding amounts; all the Court orders were obtained, and bills of costs were                                 taxed, subject to the oversight of the Court;

32.7 the Courts ordered that payment of some amounts be made into the First          Respondent’s trust accounts.  In some instances, the First Respondent is required to establish a trust or trusts and other cases curator bonis were appointed. This kind of an order will defeat the Applicant’s desire to make some payments into the First     Respondent’s clients’ bank account directly.”

5.2     It was argued by Adv F Grobler SC, for the Applicant, that the said findings by the Court are unassailable and on their bases the conclusion is inescapable that the leave to appeal would have no reasonable prospects of success;

5.3     The fact that the Court made findings in its judgments that the Respondent’s unilateral suspension of payments to the Applicant’s trust account carried massive prejudice to the Applicant, all its employees who run the risk of losing their work, their only source of income;

5.4     the Respondent’s decision to act unilaterally was contrary to just administrative action and procedurally unfair. Their decision was found to be procedurally unfair in circumstances where a party was not given an opportunity to respond to the Respondent’s decision to withhold payments into the Applicant’s trust account.  That decision has materially and adversely affected the rights of the Applicant.  In the main application, the Applicant confirmed that, it has not received any payment from the Respondent since December 2020.  It also pointed out that the nature of its work is mainly RAF claims.  If the Respondent does not pay, that will amount to throttling of the main source of income of the Applicant.

 

[6]      The Respondent claims that the Applicant’s trust account is inflicted by imperfection or impropriety, as Mr Letsoalo put it, but has not proved these allegations.  There was no corroboration of these allegations.  It is the Applicant’s case that even if leave to appeal is granted and furthermore that even if the appeal is successful, the Respondent will remain liable for the payments of all the judgments’ debts, the settled or taxed party-and-party bills of costs.

 

[7]      The Applicant relies furthermore on the finding of the Court in the judgment that in executing the valid writs of execution, it was not conducting an illegal campaign or illegal activity against the Respondent.  In the Full Court judgment (see paragraphs 23 and 24 below), in paragraph [13] thereof, the Court stated that:

          “Section 9(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law;

          Section 34 affords everyone the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of the law decided in a fair public hearing before a court.  The right to exert an order is incidental to the rights afforded by s 34.”

          It then cited with approval the following passage by Mokgoro J, in Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank & Another 2000(1) SA 409 (CC).  The judge described the right of access to courts as follows:

“[11]  A trial or hearing before a Court or tribunal is not an end in itself.  It is the means of determining whether a legal obligation exists and whether the coercive power of the State can be invoked to enforce an obligation, or prevent an unlawful act being committed.  It serves other purposes as well, including that of institutionalising the resolution of disputes, and preventing remedies being sought through self-help.  No-one is entitled to take the law into her or his own hands.  Self-help, in this sense, is inimical to a society in which the rule of law prevails, as envisioned by s 1(c) of our Constitution, which provides:

“The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values; …

             (c)        supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law”.”

          Mokgoro J continued in paragraph [13] of the judgment and stated that:

“[13]  An important purpose of s 34 is to guarantee the protection of the judicial process to persons who have disputes that can be resolved by law.  Execution is a means of enforcing a judgment or order of court and is incidental to the judicial process.  It is regulated by statute and the rules of court and is subject to the supervision of the Court which has an inherent jurisdiction to stay the execution if the interest of justice so require.”

 

[8]      In paragraph [29] of the Full Court judgment the Court stated that:

“[29]  Payment of compensation by RAF under the Road Accident Fund Act is not only a statutory duty, but a mechanism whereby the State must comply with its constitutional duty in terms of s 12(1)(c) read with s 7(2) of the Constitution to protect road users against the right of infringement of the right to freedom and security of their persons.”

Quite clearly, and just like any other party, the Applicant is bound to comply with orders of the Court.  It has the duty to honour them whenever directed to do so.

“A deliberate non-compliance or disobedience of a court order by the State through its officials amounts to a breach of that constitutional duty.  Such conduct impacts negatively upon the dignity and effectiveness of the Courts.  An effective judiciary is an indispensable part of any democratic government.”

See in this regard Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 (4) SA 446, 452 C-H, a judgment by Jafta J, who was writing for the Full Court.  He continued at page 453 B-C and stated as follows:

“The constitutional right of access to courts would remain an illusion unless orders made by courts are capable of being enforced by those in whose favour such orders were made.  The process of adjudication and resolution of disputes in courts of law is not an end in itself but only a means thereto; the end being the enforcement of rights or obligations the courts order.”

 

[9]      The Respondent does not say that it is unable to fulfil its constitutional and statutory mandate to provide social security and health care services.  It is not its case that it has no money to settle or to pay the claims by the Applicant’s clients.  For the aforegoing reasons, it was submitted by Mr Grobler that exceptional circumstances do exist to order that the payment of capital awards and settled taxed party-and-party bills of costs to the Applicant be made. 

 

[10]    The Applicant will, on the balance of probabilities, suffer irreparable harm if the Court does not order that the Applicant may take further steps

10.1   According to the affidavit of Tonya Ehlers some of the claimants listed in paragraph 4 of the answering affidavit in the main application have been waiting for payment since 2015.  There is therefore an undue delay in the payment of their claims.  Currently there is no hope in sight that such claims will be paid.  The Respondent has no answer to the fact that some claims have not been paid since 2015.  The Respondent has not made any arrangements to pay them.  It goes without saying that they will not receive payment of their claims pending a further application for leave to appeal.

10.2   The Applicant’s practice may have to close.  The Applicant’s employees may have to resign because of non-payment of their salaries.

10.3        Based on the aforegoing, the Applicant may suffer irreparable harm if the Respondent does not pay it or does not make any arrangements to pay despite being able to do so or if the Applicant does not take steps to enforce payment by way of execution of the writs of execution.

 

[11]    On the balance of probabilities the Respondent will not suffer any irreparable harm if the Court orders that the Applicant should take further steps.

11.1   the oft repeated mantra of the Respondent is, as stated in the second paragraph of its answering affidavit that:

“The factual and legal issues raised in the application for leave to appeal involve the constitutional obligation of the Road Accident Fund to safeguard the RAF fuel levy.”

At the same time the Respondent has completely lost sight of his constitutional and statutory duties to compensate the Applicant’s clients.  Safeguarding the fuel levy is not the Respondent’s primary obligation.  The Road Accident Fund was established for a good purpose and that purpose is not to safeguard the fuel levy as it is to compensate people who sustain damage or injuries because of injuries caused by driving motor vehicles in public roads;

11.2   the Respondent has strongly expressed its preparedness to pay the claims, albeit into the Applicant’s various clients’ personal bank accounts.  Surely its preparedness to pay is an indication of its ability to settle the claims by the Applicant’s clients and is also an acknowledgement of the different clients’ claims;

11.3   the Respondent has reported a history 3.2 billion surplus for the period ending on 31 March 2021;

11.4   the Respondent has, according to the Full Court judgment, recovered some money from some of the firms of attorneys who had received double payments;

11.5   execution of the writs of execution is the only available avenue to give effect to the court orders; 

11.6   the Respondent refuses to pay the Applicant, notwithstanding the Court Orders;

11.7   the Respondent has never complained that it has no money to satisfy the claims of the Applicant’s clients;

11.8   it is still open for the Respondent to make acceptable arrangements with the Applicant to pay the Applicant’s clients’ claims which is what the Respondent has never considered. 

In the premises, it is my view that the Respondent will not suffer any irreparable harm if the Applicanst are allowed to take further steps to enforce payment of their clients’ claims.

 

[12]    On the other hand, the Respondent, for inexplicable reasons, insists on paying the claims into the bank accounts of the Applicant’s clients.  This is a clear indication of the ability of the Respondent to pay the Applicant’s clients’ claims.  The only problem with this method of payment, and something that has never been considered by the Respondent, is that the method the Respondent insists on using does not cater for the Applicant’s fees.  The Respondent does not explain how, in the amounts that it wants to pay into the First Respondent’s clients’ personal accounts, provision will be made for the Applicant’s fees.

 

[13]    It is not correct, as the Respondent contends, that this appeal engages significant legal issues that include what the RAF’s constitutional and statutory mandates are.  This proposition is farfetched and lacks merit.  The most crucial point in this matter is simply a statutory body ignoring its constitutional and statutory mandate and furthermore ignoring the Court’s orders and treating the Court orders with disdain. 

 

[14]    Again the Respondent relies, unreasonably so, on the judgments of Fisher J, Collis J and Basson J, without referring this Court to any specific aspects in those judgments or without drawing the Court’s attention to any relevant aspects in those judgments.  The Applicant is not listed in Annexure ‘A1’ of the judgment of Basson J.  The First Respondent was not party to those proceedings that resulted in the said Court order.  The Applicant was not part of the attorneys who were involved in the matter before Fisher J.  The order that Fisher J made at the conclusion of the proceedings does not in any way affect the Applicant.  Lastly, the issues involved in the judgment of Collis J are unrelated to the current matter.

 

          THE TEST

[15]    The test that must be applied in deciding whether to suspend any Court order based on the provisions of s 18(1) was clarified by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the judgment of University of the Free State v Afriforum 2018 (3) SA 428 SCA at paras 9-15.  The Supreme Court of Appeal had the following to say:

“[9]    In embarking upon an analysis of the requirements of s 18, it is firstly necessary to consider whether, if so, to what extent, the legislature has interfered with the common law principles articulated in South Cape Cooperation, and the now repealed uniform rule 49(11).  What is immediately discernible upon perusing of section 18(1) and (3) is that the legislature has proceeded from the well-established premise of the common law that the granting of relief of this nature constitutes an extra-ordinary deviation from the norm that, pending an appeal a judgment and its attendant orders are suspended. Section 18(1) thus states that an order implementing the judgments pending appeal shall only be granted ‘under exceptional circumstances. The exceptionality of an order to this effect is underscored by s 18(4), which provides that a Court granting the order must immediately record its reasons; that the aggrieved party has an automatic right of appeal; that the appeal must be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency; and that pending the outcome of the appeal the order is automatically suspended.

[10]    It is further apparent that the requirements introduced by s 18(1) and (3) are more onerous than those of common law.  Apart from the requirement of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in s 18(1), s 18(3) requires the applicant ‘in addition’ to prove on a balance of probabilities that he or she ‘will’ suffer irreparable harm if the order is not made, and that the other party ‘will not’ suffer irreparable harm if the order is made.  The application of Rule 49(11) required a weighing up of the potentiality of irreparable harm or prejudice being sustained by the respective parties and, where there was a potentiality of harm or prejudice to both of the parties, a weighing up of the balance of hardship or convenience, as the case may be, was required.  Section 18(3), however, has introduced a higher threshold, namely proof on a balance of probabilities that the Applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the order is not granted and conversely that the Respondent will not if the order is granted.”

 

[16]    The Court then referred to the judgment of Sutherland J in Incubeta Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Ellis & Another 2014 (3) SA 189 (GJ).  Sutherland had on occasion to consider the test to be applied when faced with an application in terms of s 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act.  He had the following to say:

          “A hierarchy of entitlement has been created, absent from the common law tests; two distinct findings of fact must now be made, rather to discern a preponderance of equities.”

          He held that s 18 introduced a new dimension to the test for granting the relief under Rule 49(11).  That test, according to him, is twofold, firstly, whether exceptional circumstances exist; and secondly, proof on a balance of probabilities by the Applicant of:

“(i)     the presence of irreparable harm to the Applicant who wants to put into operation and to execute a court order; and

(ii)      the absence of irreparable harm to the Respondent who seeks leave to appeal.”

 

[17]    Regarding the first requirement, that is, whether exceptional circumstances exist, exceptionality must in fact, be specific. This means that circumstances which are, or which may be exceptional must be located within the predicaments in which the litigants find themselves.  This first leg of the test does not change the common law position.  It is the second leg of the test that has somewhat stringent requirements of proof.  Section 18 introduces the requirement of proof on a balance of probabilities, that, firstly, the Applicant stands to suffer irreparable harm if the order is not granted and secondly, that if the order is granted, the Respondent will not suffer any such irreparable harm.

 

[18]    I have, in paragraph [5] supra set out factors that I regard as exceptional circumstances which favour the granting of the order.  I have also in paragraph [11] supra set out the reasons why, in my view, the Applicant, in the present matter, will not suffer any such irreparable harm.  There is, in my view, no potentially irreparable harm or prejudice to the Respondent.  The Court would refuse to grant the order if there existed irreparable harm or prejudice to both the Applicant and the Respondent in this matter.  If this Court is unable to balance the two in the interest of justice, it should refuse the application. 

 

[19]    In paragraph 15 of the Afriforum judgment the SCA agreed with the approach adopted by Binns-Ward in Minister of Social Development Western Cape and Others v Justice Alliance of South Africa and Another [2016] ZAWCHC 34 that prospects of success of appeal are relevant in deciding whether to grant the exceptional relief.  I find that the First Respondent has prospects of success in appeal than the Applicant.

 

[20]    It is correct that there is no definition or exceptional circumstances.  One factor or a combination of factors may constitute “exceptional circumstances”.  A Court must weigh the factors placed before it and decide whether such factors amount to, or constitute, what, in the mind the Court, are “exceptional circumstances”.  Judge Thring of the Western Cape Division had on occasion to define the term “exceptional circumstances” in MV Ais, Seatrans Maritime v Owners, MV Ais Mammas and Another 2002 (6) SA 150 C at page 156 to 157 and, relying on his own assessment of some authorities, he had the following to say at 156 H to 157 C:

          “What does emerge from an examination of the authorities, however, seems to me to be the following:

1.       What is ordinarily contemplated by the words “exceptional circumstances” is something out of the ordinary and of an unusual nature; something which is excepted in the sense that the general rule does not apply to it; something uncommon, rare, or different; “besonder”; “seldsaam”; “uitsonderlik”, or “in hoë mate ongewoon”.

2.       To be exceptional the circumstances concerned must arise out of, or be incidental to, the particular case.

3.       Whether or not exceptional circumstances exist is not a decision which depends upon the exercise of a judicial discretion; their existence or otherwise is a matter of fact which the Court must decide accordingly.

4.       Depending on the context in which it is used, the word ‘exceptional’ has two shades of meaning: the primary meaning is unusual or different; the secondary meaning is markedly unusual or specially different.

5.       Where, in a stature, it is directed that fixed rules shall be departed from only after exceptional circumstances, effect will, generally speaking, best be given to the intention of the Legislature by applying a strict rather than a liberal meaning to the phrase, and by carefully examining any circumstances relied on as allegedly being exceptional.”

He then continued as follows at p 157 E:

“… the phrase “exceptional circumstances” must, both for the specific reason mentioned by Jones J and by reason of the more general consideration adumbrated by Innes ACJ in Norwich Union Life Insurance Soc v Dobs 1912 AD 395 be given a narrow rather than a wide interpretation.”

In conclusion, he stated that:

“I conclude, to use the phraseology of Comrie J in S v Mohamed 1999 (2) SACR 507 (C), that to be exceptional within the meaning of the subparagraph the circumstances must be markedly ‘unusual’ or specially different; and that, in applying that test, the circumstances must be carefully examined.”

 

[21]    I have applied the principle of exceptional circumstances in paragraph [5] supra.  Coupled with the fact that the Respondent has openly exhibited a clear tendency to have no regard at all for the Court orders, as shown by its failure to implement the order of the Full Court, especially paragraphs [45] (b) and (c) thereof; and as shown further by its failure, on baseless grounds, to make payment to the Applicant in accordance with the Court orders, coupled furthermore with the fact that whether or not the Respondent’s appeal succeeds the Respondent will remain liable to pay the Applicant’s clients’ claims, I am inclined to grant the order that the Applicant seeks.

 

[22]    In the notice of motion, the Applicant seeks an order that the Respondent be ordered forthwith to make payment to it within 180 days from the date of the Court order in terms whereof payment of any capital amounts or settled or taxed party-and-party costs are to be made to its trust account.  I do not think that I am inclined to grant this order, seeing that the Applicant already has the order of the Full Court and the judgments in respect of the matters set out in paragraph 4 of the answering affidavit in the main application.  It will serve no useful purpose to grant such an order.

 

[23]    For record purposes “Full Court” in this judgment refers to the judgment in matter 58145/2020.  This was a matter heard by my brothers Meyer, Adams, and Van der Westhuizen JJ.  It was a matter between the Road Accident Fund, as the Applicant on one side and Legal Practice Council and 22 Others.

 

[24]    The order that the Court made at the end reads as follows:

          “[45]       In the result the following order is made:

(a)     The temporary order made by the full court of this Division on 9 December 2020, and extended by this court on 16 March 2021, is discharged.

(b)     All writs of execution and attachments against the applicant based on court orders already granted or settlements already reached in terms of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (the RAF Act) are suspended until 30 April 2021.

(c)     The applicant is to pay all claims based on court orders already granted or settlements already reached in terms of the RAF Act, which are older than 180 days as from the date of the court order or date of the settlement reached, on or before 30 April 2021, provided that the applicant has been notified by any attorneys who represent claimants that have such claims that are older than 180 days of the existence of such claims in accordance with paragraph 3 of this court’s order made on 16 March 2021.

(d)     All writs of execution and warrants of attachment against the applicant based on court orders already granted or settlements already reached in terms of the RAF Act, which are not older than 180 days as from the date of the court order or date of the settlement reached, are suspended from 1 May 2021 until 12 September 2021.

            (e)        The applicant is to take all reasonable steps to:

(i)      register court orders or settlement agreements for claims instituted in terms of the RAF Act against the applicant, on its list of payments in order of date that the court order was granted or the date of the settlement agreement;

(ii)     ensure that court orders or written settlement agreements for claims in terms of the RAF Act for payment are registered on the applicant’s payment list within 30 business days of receipt of the court order or settlement agreement;

(iii)     ensure that court orders or settlement agreements for claims as set out above that have not been captured on its payment list will be captured in historical chronological order from the date that the court order was granted by the court, or the written settlement agreement was entered into;

(iv)    provide all attorneys on its database of email addresses of attorneys involved in third-party matters against the Road Accident Fund with updated payment lists on a bi-monthly basis from April 2021 onwards.

(f)      The Applicant is to continue with its process of making payment of the oldest claims first by date of court order or date of written settlement agreement a priore tempore.

(g)     Any party may approach the court during September 2021 to vary, extend or amend this order.

(h)     This order and the order made by this court on 16 March 2021 shall forthwith be published by the applicant:

          (i)  to all practicing attorneys through the Legal Practice Council;

          (ii) by email to all the applicant’s list of attorneys on its database;

(iii)     to the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Finance by service on the State Attorney;

(iv)    by publication in two national newspapers.

(i)      No order is made in respect of each counter application, except that the applicant is to pay the costs of each counter application.

(j)      The applicant is to pay the costs of each opposing respondent’s opposition of the application, including all reserved costs and the costs of two counsel, one of whom a senior counsel, whenever so employed.”

 

 

[25]    Finally, the Applicant wants an order that no writ of execution based upon a court order that compels the Respondent to make payment to the Applicant’s trust account or any attachment and removal of the Respondent’s assets by the Applicant pursuant thereto shall be suspended provided that a period of 180 days has expired from the date of the order.  This relief cannot be granted as every matter depends on its own merits.  I have no intention to manacle another judge in deciding the merits of the case he would be dealing with.  The circumstances may be different to the present ones.

         

          In the result I make the following Order:    

 

[1]          Prayers 1 and 2 of the notice of motion are hereby granted.

[2]     The requirements pertaining to forms and service as set out in the Rules of this Court are hereby dispensed with in terms of Rule 6(12) and that this matter shall be heard in conjunction with the Respondent’s application for leave to appeal.

[3]     That the operation and execution of the order of Court under the above case number dated 28 July 2021 is not suspended pending:

          3.1            the final determination of the appeal; or

3.2    any further applications for leave to appeal that may be brought by the Road Accident Fund or the final determination of any future appeal (in the event of the Court dismissing the applicant’s application for leave to appeal).

[4]     The Respondent is hereby ordered to pay the costs of the application including the costs of two counsel.

 

         

 

PM MABUSE

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

 

     

 

                                                                                                                              

Appearances:

Counsel for the Applicant:                  Adv F Grobler (SC)

                                                            Adv J Bam

Instructed by:                                      VZLR Attorneys

Counsel for the Respondent:             Adv R Schoeman

                                                           Adv P Motsie

Instructed by:                                     Malatji & Co Attorneys           

Dates heard:                                       26 August 2021

Date of Judgment:                             1 September 2021

---