IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

(1)	REPORTABLE: NO
(2)	OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)	REVISED: NO 
                
           DATE      09 FEBRUARY 2022                                  
          SIGNATURE ................................

        In the matter between:				Case Number: 3473/20

	A. RAE							APPLICANT

	AND

	ROAD ACCIDENT FUND					RESPONDENT 
	____________________________________________________________________
					JUDGMENT
	____________________________________________________________________
	KHWINANA AJ
	INTRODUCTION

[1]	This is an application for leave to appeal to the full bench of the above honourable court against my judgment granted on this the 27th day of September 2021. 

[2]	Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act, Act 10 of 2013 ("the Superior Courts Act"), 	regulates applications for leave to appeal and provides: 
'(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that- 
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or 
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration; 
(b) the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of section 
16(2)(a); and (c) where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt resolution of the real issues between the parties.'  
[3]	The test in an application for leave to appeal prior to the Superior Courts Act was whether 	there were reasonable prospects that another court may come to a different conclusion. Section 17(1) has raised the test, as Bertelsmann J, correctly pointed out in The Mont 	Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) at para :
'It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another court might come to a different conclusion, see Van Heerden v Cornwright & Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T) at 343H. The use of the word "would" in the new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against.'  

[4]	The applicant’s leave to appeal is on parts of my judgment, save to say the reasons have been given in my judgment.

[5]	In terms of Rule 42 (1) provides that a court may mero motu or on application, rescind or vary; 
(a) 	An order or judgment erroneously sought or erroneously granted in 	the absence of any party affected thereby; 
(b) 	An order or judgment in which there is an ambiguity, error or omission; 
(c) 	An order or judgment granted as a result of a mistake common to the parties.

[6]	I have noted an error on the draft order in relation to the percentage in favour of the plaintiff where it reads less 75% whereas it must read less 25% of the plaintiff’s proven or agreed claim.  I accordingly vary that portion of my judgment in terms of Rule 42 (1) (b) and rectify it to read less 25% on the draft order. I have therefore amended the draft order and marked it X.

	In the result: 
	1. Leave to appeal is refused. 
	2. Draft order is amended and marked X to read less 25%
	2. No order as to Costs.			
																		__________________________
ENB KHWINANA
ACTING JUDGE OF NORTH 	GAUTENG 
HIGH COURT, PRETORIA

DATE OF HEARING:     02 DECEMBER 2021
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09 FEBRUARY 2022