

## IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

## **GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA**



Case no: 29972/2019

In the matter between:

THE MINISTER OF POLICE	1 <sup>st</sup> Applicant
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS	2 <sup>nd</sup> Applicant
and	
THAMSANQA RONNY MIYA	Respondent

## JUDGMENT

Mazibuko AJ

- 1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against the Judgment and the order of this court delivered on 4 August 2022, where the first applicant's special plea was dismissed.
- 2. In the special plea, the issue was whether the service of summons issued against the first applicant, the Minister of Police, upon the State Attorney only was proper and effective service of summons on the first applicant. Whether

the omission to serve on the first applicant rendered the plaintiff's summons void. Alternatively, an order that the respondent's claim against the first applicant has prescribed.

- 3. The application for leave to appeal is mainly against the court *a quo*'s purposive approach in interpreting Section 2 of the State Liability Act (the SLA), Section 5(1)(a) of the Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs Of State Act, 40 of 2002 (the Legal Proceedings Act) and Section 15(1) of the Prescription Act, 68 of 1969 (the Prescription Act). The applicant argues that the provisions in this legislation are peremptory; therefore, the legislature intended that they be complied with.
- 4. In essence, the submission on behalf of the first applicant is that despite the first applicant becoming aware of the summons and defending same by filing all necessary and relevant court processes and readying itself for trial. The fact that the summons was not served on them rendered it void. Reference was made to specific paragraphs of the Judgment that are appealed against, which are; 13, 19, 31, 32 to 34 and 36 to 38.
- 5. The first applicant submitted that the case of the Minister of Police and others v Samuel Molokwane (730/2021)(2022) ZASCA 111, which was considered in the Judgment, is distinguishable in that in Molokwane, the debtor was served. In contrast, in *casu* the debtor, the Minister of Police, was not served. Further, the case of Rauwane v MEC for Health Gauteng Provincial Government (19009/14) (2018) ZAGPJHC 518 is persuasive but not binding on this court. In Rauwane, Mahalelo J held that *the purpose of section 2(2) of the SLA is to ensure that the State Attorney obtains notice or is informed of all the legal proceedings instituted against an organ of state.*
- 6. It was argued that there exist compelling circumstances as envisaged by Section 17(1)(a)(ii) of the Superior Courts Act. In that (a) the matter requires the attention of the SCA for clarity concerning the interpretation of the

provisions of the SLA, Legal Proceedings Act and the Prescription Act in relation to the service of court processes and the interruption of prescription. (b) The matter has an important question of law. It is of public importance, not only to the first applicant but to all organs of state who will be impacted by future disputes regarding the provisions of the Acts of parliament in question.

7. Another issue raised on behalf of the first applicant against the Judgment is that the court erroneously failed to deal with the issue in relation to the alternative prayer of the special plea, which reads:

"Alternatively that the plaintiff's claim *against the first defendant has prescribed on or about 20 December 2020."* 

- 8. The first applicant's submission in this regard is that this was pleaded, and the court not determining it will close doors for them as it renders the issue to be *res judicata*, in that they would not be able to raise same in the future.
- 9. The court *a*lready held that when the appellants filed their notice of intention to defend in July 2019 through the State Attorney, it could be accepted that the first applicant was aware of the court process, *viz*, the summons. Therefore, the issue of the prescription of the respondent's claim cannot arise.
- 10. The respondent filed no cross-appeal. It argued in favour of the Judgment and mainly that the Prescription Act does not prescribe the modality of how the service on the debtor of any process should be to interrupt prescription. It emphasized that the purposive approach in interpreting the legislation is correct as it also recognizes the provisions of the Constitution, especially the right to access courts.
- 11. Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge concerned is of the opinion that '*the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success*'<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Section 17(1)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013

- 12. I do not believe the court was wrong in interpreting the provisions of the said acts the way it did, especially in adopting the purposive approach as it was referred to in the Judgment. However, I am persuaded that the issues raised by the applicant in its application for leave to appeal are issues in which another court is likely to reach conclusions different to those I reached. Those issues include my interpretation of the relevant provisions of the State Liability Act, Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs Of State Act, 40 of 2002 and the Prescription Act. There are reasonable prospects of another court reaching a legal conclusion dissent from mine. Leave to appeal has a reasonable prospect of success and should be granted.
- 13. The issues of interpreting the relevant provisions of the Acts and the considerable importance of this matter, not only to the first applicant but also to other Organs of State, are persuasive to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. In my view, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal is justified.
- 14. In the circumstances, the following order is made:

Order

- 1. The applicant's application for leave to appeal succeeds
- 2. The applicant is granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
- 3. The costs of this application for leave to appeal shall be costs in the appeal.

Mazibuko

Acting Judge of the High Court of South Africa Gauteng, Pretoria

This Judgment is digitally submitted by uploading it onto Caselines and emailing it to the parties.

## Representation

Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr TC Kwinda
Instructed by:	The State Attorney, Pretoria
Counsel for Respondents:	Mr RM Maphutha
Instructed by:	Makhafola & Verster Incorporated, Pretoria
Date of hearing:	4 November 2022
Judgment delivered on:	11 November 2022