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IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

CASE NO: D1288/2018

In the matter between:

 

SHOPRITE CHECKERS                                                               APPLICANT

 

And

 

COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION,

MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION                                                FIRST RESPONDENT  

 

RAVITHA MAHARAJ N.O.                                                           SECOND RESPONDENT

 

THABILE MILLICENT NGCOBO.                                                THIRD RESPONDENT

 

Heard: 3 November 2021

 

Delivered:  This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal representatives by email, publication on the Labour Court’s website and released to SAFLII. The date and time of the hand-down is deemed to be 10h00 on 24 March 2022.

 

JUDGMENT

 

Hiralall AJ

 

Introduction

[1]          This is an application in which the applicant seeks an order reviewing and setting aside the arbitration award dated 28 May 2018 under case number KNDB 578-17 issued by the second respondent under the auspices of the CCMA. The application is opposed by the third respondent.

 

Background

[2]          The third respondent was employed as an Admin Manager at the time of her dismissal for alleged misconduct. At the time, she had 10 years’ service with the applicant, Shoprite Checkers. She was charged with gross negligence in that it was alleged that her banking was reported to be short by R10 000.00 on 9 December 2016, such shortage causing a financial loss to the company. She attended a disciplinary enquiry, was found guilty and dismissed.

 

The arbitration hearing

[3]          The following witnesses testified in support of the applicant: Yvonne Mavundla, the Regional Admin Manager; Zanele Lwandle, the cash office controller; Kershini Govender, an employee of Standard Bank; Andile Mvumbi, the chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry; and Eric Ngidi, the Human Resources manager. The third respondent, Thabile Millicent Ngcobo testified and she called no witnesses. Both parties were represented by attorneys.

 

[4]          The cashing up and banking procedures of the applicant, which were common cause, were testified to by Ms Mavundla:

 

4.1         The cashiers take their takings for the day to the cash office. They would have counted their cash and entered the figures on a cashing out slip with denominations which they would have signed. The cashier clerk receives the cash and verifies that the cash so counted is the same as the physical cash handed to her. She fills out her own cashing up slip which she signs. The cashier and cashier clerk then exchange their cashing up slips and double check whether they have the same amounts and if they agree, they sign in confirmation of this.

 

4.2         A third person, who is the cash office clerk, then checks the cash and completes the same controls. She counts all of the cash on her table and checks the documentation accompanying it. She completes a slip confirming the count. She captures the takings for each cashier. She separates the cash into the various denominations. Once the cash has balanced, she would write out a deposit slip and the drop safe control document. On the drop safe report she confirms that she has double checked the amount and records the details. She completes the banking control and enters the deposit slip number and how much is in each bag, as well as the bag number to be used for that particular deposit. She signs confirming that all of the cash is there, captures the total amount of the cash and hands it over to the admin manager.

 

4.3         The Admin Manager double checks the cash to see whether what is written on the deposit slip, OCB (office cash balance), the drop safe control and banking control is the same as the physical cash on the table. If she is happy with the reporting and that everything balances, she will firstly sign the deposit where it says ‘checked by’. She also signs as the second person on the drop safe control. She enters the date, surname, staff number and the bag that she will put the money in. The cash office clerk would have given her the G4S cash bag which has a number which goes in sequence. The cash office clerk writes the number of the G4S cash bag she is going to give to the manager.

 

4.4         Once the admin manager is satisfied that all the cash is correctly counted, that all the controls are correct, and that there are no monies over or under, she takes the deposit slip and the cash and places it inside the G4S bag and seals the bag. Once the G4S bag is sealed nobody can open it. If it is tampered with, it will say ‘STOP’, and G4S would not take the cash bag nor would the bank accept it.

 

4.5         Once the G4S bag is sealed it is dropped into the drop safe. There are two keys to the top of the drop safe and two for the bottom. The keys for the top are kept in the store. For the bottom, the store has one key and G4S security has one key. Once the cash is dropped it cannot be taken out. All the keys are controlled by being kept in bags with seals. There is a closing seal and an opening seal, and both seals have to correspond when the safe is opened the next day.  No problems were experienced with the controlling of the keys. 

 

4.6         When the cash is collected, the G4S security guard arrives with his own key. The admin manager would be the first person to remove the G4S bags from the drop safe and she places them onto the table. She also signs as the first person stating that she took the G4S bags out and checked all of them, that all the bags were there and that she handed them over to the cash office clerk to write down the controls and hand them over to the G4S guard. All the G4S bags are scanned by the G4S security guard, and when he scans the bags a list is printed on his machine. The cash office clerk writes the numbers of the bags going with G4S security. They would then sign that the G4S security had taken the bags.

 

[5]          Ms Lwandle confirmed that the above procedures were followed. However, she did not watch the third respondent when she was verifying the banking and the cash. She was facing her computer. She did however see when she did the drop in the drop safe. Those present in the room during the final cash up were the third respondent, Ms Lwandle and Nicole, a cash office clerk. She confirmed that there were no issues with the cash bags when G4S security arrived to pick up the cash deposit.

 

[6]          Ms Govender testified that she is employed at the Automated Cash Processing Center at Standard Bank which ensures minimal human interaction during deposit handling. The deposits are received at CIT, the deposits and stock loss bags are scanned at the receiving area and loaded into a black tote box. The tote boxes have serial numbers on them for tracking purposes. They also have an interlocking system which can only be unlocked once the box is dropped at the teller’s workstation. The tote boxes are then systematically transported from the receiving area via conveyor to a vault storage which is access controlled until a teller is available to process it. This process is in terms of the applicant's service level agreement with Standard Bank which allows the bank to process the deposit as a QDP which means quick deposit processing. This process allows a teller to process the deposit with a PCD card which then gets verified and validated in her machine. The PCD card has a unique barcode on it which allows a teller to scan the information. All information pertaining to that specific deposit is stored on the PCD card for audit trail purposes.

 

[7]          Govender received a report that upon verification of the cash deposit in question by the teller there was a discrepancy of R10 000.00. In her investigation of the matter, she obtained the video footage, a copy of the deposit slip, and a breakdown of the notes that were verified at the bank. Once the video footage was viewed, it was concluded that all their processes and procedures had been adhered to and the applicant was contacted in order to view the video footage.

 

[8]          The third respondent and Ms Mavundla attended at the bank to view the video footage. They were not happy that the footage did not show the numbers on the deposit slip and G4S cash bag, they felt it was pointless to continue watching the footage and left. Ms Govender stated that the purpose of video footage in the bank was only to ensure that there was nothing untoward in the conduct of the tellers. Otherwise, the bank relied on the audit trail.

 

[9]          In cross-examination of Govender, the third respondent’s attorney questioned where the G4S cash bags had been between the time that they left the store and when they arrived at the bank, who handled the bags in that time and who had access to the bags at the time. It was contended, without substantiation, that in some instances where money was reported to be short, the G4S guards were said to be involved in the money going missing. Govender had no knowledge of this stating that the G4S cash bags had arrived intact at the bank.

 

[10]       It was also contended, without substantiation, that there was an instance where the bank reported a shortage but it was later found that there was no shortage. Ms Govender had no knowledge of this.

 

[11]       Ms Govender could not comment on the applicant's version that she had placed the full amount of R33 276.00 in the bag before it was sealed and dropped into the drop safe. She could only comment or answer for the cash that was verified at the bank.

 

[12]       She agreed that the numbers on the deposit slip and the G4S cash bag numbers were not visible from the video footage.

 

[13]       The third respondent, Thabile Millicent Ngcobo, testified that the cash was checked and captured on the computer system prior to her arrival in the cash office. She would usually only come in after the banking had been checked. Ms Lwandle paged her to do a second check once she had performed her own checks. She received the cash from Ms Lwandle in an ice-cream container and she counted the cash whilst Mrs Lwandle was seated next to her. Mrs Lwandle was supposed to be present and she was watching her. All the documents were on the table. There was no reason for Ms Lwandle to be on the computer. Everything had balanced and was recorded accordingly. She wrapped the deposit slip and the cash in a rubber band and placed it in the G4S cash bag. She placed the G4S cash bag in the drop safe, closed it and recorded the number in the key control register. Handbags were not allowed in the cash office. The three of them had left together as Mrs Lwandle carried the keys. She was searched by the security guard and she left for home.

 

[14]       The next day, she removed the G4S cash bags from the safe and handed them to Ms Lwandle to confirm that they were the correct bags. Once this was done, all three of them signed for the handing over of the bags and that they were sealed. She denied that she had been negligent. To her knowledge, her duties ended at the workplace. She was under the impression that when the cash left the store, it went straight to the bank. She had not known that it was kept overnight at G4S security.

 

[15]       In cross examination she denied that Ms Lwandle was turned away facing her computer and could not see what she was doing. She confirmed that when she and the others left the bank, they were unhappy with the video footage. She confirmed that when G4S collected the cash bags, they were intact and that the video footage showed that only two bundles of cash fell out of the one bag instead of three. She said that she could not be certain that the cash bag which was seen to be opened on the video footage belonged to the applicant. She confirmed that the bank had an audit trail and a quick deposit process in terms of a service level agreement but she did not know of the bank's operating systems. She denied that the security guard had not checked her handbag.

 

[16]       The arbitrator found that the dismissal of the applicant was substantively and procedurally unfair.

 

The grounds of review

[17]       The applicant contended that the commissioner handed down an award which was not an award of a reasonable and objective decision maker. She failed to apply her mind, misconducted herself, committed a gross irregularity and exceeded her powers by acting unreasonably or unjustifiably in the following respects:

 

17.1         Having heard the evidence, the commissioner found that the applicant had failed to prove its case against the third respondent simply because the G4S bag appeared to have been sealed prior to it being dropped in the safe and further that all documents had been completed. This finding however ignored the fact that notwithstanding that the bag had been sealed prior to it being dropped in the safe and notwithstanding that the requisite documentation had been completed R10,000 was still missing from the banking and at a time when the third respondent had been accountable for it.

 

17.2         The commissioner further found that Ms Lwandle had confirmed that she had seen the third respondent drop the money into the safe. However, this was not evidence which served before the commissioner as Ms Lwandle only confirmed that she had seen that the third respondent dropped the G4S bag into the safe.

 

17.3         Further, the commissioner accepted that although the third respondent might have been seated next to Ms Lwandle, she had still been declaring non-bankable’s and accordingly had been facing the computer. Notwithstanding her acceptance of this evidence, she then stated that Joyce also confirmed that she did not see her do anything out of the ordinary . It was apparent that the commissioner did not take into account that the reason Ms Lwandle did not see the third respondent do anything out of the ordinary was because she was facing the computer. No arbitrator faced with the same facts would have made the same finding as that of the commissioner in this regard.

 

17.4         The commissioner then made a finding that in deciding what constitutes negligence in terms of the circumstances of the case, negligence entailed an investigation into whether or not by failing to comply with the policy and procedure for banking the monies, the employee failed to exercise reasonable care. The commissioner’s finding disregarded the proven factual evidence to the effect that all monies had been handed to the third respondent by Ms Lwandle and further that the monies had not gone missing at a time when they were in the possession of either  G4S or Standard Bank. Therefore, notwithstanding that the required documents may have been completed by the third respondent, the fact remained that R10,000 was missing from the banking and based on the evidence led could only have gone missing at a time when they were in the possession of the third respondent .

 

17.5         The applicant was not required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on the evidence led and appropriate case law, the most reasonable inference to be drawn was that it was more probable than not that the third respondent was grossly negligent. 

 

Legal principles

Review

[18]       It is trite that the requirements for the review of an award under the Act are stringent and that the applicable test in reviews is that of reasonableness: an award of a commissioner of the CCMA or a Bargaining Council is reviewable if the decision reached by the commissioner was one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.[1]

 

[19]       In Herholdt v Nedbank Limited[2] , the Supreme Court of Appeal stated as follows:

 

‘[25] … For a defect in the conduct of proceedings to amount to a gross irregularity as contemplated by section 145(2)(a)(ii), the arbitrator must have misconceived the nature of the inquiry or arrived at an unreasonable result. A result will only be unreasonable if it is one that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach on all the material that was before the arbitrator. Material errors of fact, as well as weight and relevance to be attached to particular facts, are not in and of themselves sufficient for an award to be set aside, but are only of any consequence if their effect is to render the outcome unreasonable.’ (my emphasis)

 

[20]       In Gold Fields Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others[3], it was stated that ‘in short, a reviewing court must ascertain whether the arbitrator considered the principal issue before him/her; evaluated the facts presented at the hearing and came to a conclusion that is reasonable.’ The Labour Appeal Court went on to state per Waglay JP as follows:

 

‘[20] The questions to ask are these: (i) In terms of his or her duty to deal with the matter with the minimum of legal formalities, did the process that the arbitrator employed give the parties a full opportunity to have their say in respect of the dispute? (ii) Did the arbitrator identify the dispute he was required to arbitrate (this may in certain cases only become clear after both parties have led their evidence)? (iii) Did the arbitrator understand the nature of the dispute he or she was required to arbitrate? (iv) Did he or she deal with the substantial merits of the dispute? and (v) Is the arbitrator’s decision one that another decision-maker could reasonably have arrived at based on the evidence?’

 

[21]       The applicant in this case is required to establish that the award was one that could not have been made by a reasonable decision-maker on the evidence presented.

 

[22]       The applicant’s contentions as stated in its grounds of review are to some extent justified. It was not possible to conclude that Ms Lwandle did not see the third respondent do anything out of the ordinary, as if Ms Lwandle was watching her, if it was accepted by the commissioner that Ms Lwandle was busy declaring non-bankables and facing her computer. Ms Lwandle could not have seen the third respondent do anything out of the ordinary if she was facing her computer. Furthermore, despite the fact that all of the required documents had been completed, R10 000.00 was missing from the cash deposit. Except for the third respondent’s version, there was no direct evidence as to what might have become of the missing cash.

 

[23]       However, the contention that it was not Ms Lwandle’s evidence that she had seen the third respondent ‘drop the money’ into the safe requires clarification. Ms Lwandle was asked ‘whether she saw the third respondent drop the money into the safe’ to which she responded that she did. She later stated that she saw the third respondent take the cash bag and drop it into the safe. In any event, more pertinent is the fact that it was Ms Lwandle’s evidence that she was not watching the third respondent all the time. It was only when she dropped the cash bag into the safe that she saw her do so.

 

Circumstantial evidence

[24]       The approach to be adopted when an inference is sought to be drawn from other facts was stated in Cooper and Another NNO v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd[4] to be as follows:

 

‘[7] It is not incumbent upon the party who bears the onus of proving an absence of an intention to prefer to eliminate by evidence all possible reasons for the making of the disposition other than an intention to prefer. This is so because the court, in drawing inferences from the proved facts, acts on a preponderance of probability. The inference of an intention to prefer is one which is, on a balance of probabilities, the most probable, although not necessarily the only inference to be drawn. In a criminal case, one of the “two cardinal rules of logic” referred to by Watermeyer JA in R v Blom is that the proved facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference from them save the one to be drawn. If they do not exclude other reasonable inferences then there must be a doubt whether the inference sought to be drawn is correct. This rule is not applicable in a civil case. If the facts permit of more than one inference, the court must select the most “plausible” or probable inference. If this favours the litigant on whom the onus rests he is entitled to judgment. If on the other hand an inference in favour of both parties is equally possible, the litigant will have not discharged the onus of proof.’ (footnotes omitted)(my emphasis)

 

[25]       In Ngidi v Relyant Trading (Pty) Ltd and others[5], the court stated as follows with regard to the evaluation of circumstantial evidence:

 

‘[21]  The legal principles governing reliance on circumstantial received attention from this Court in the decisions of National Union of Mine Workers &Others v Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (2007) 28 ILJ 1614 (LC) and National Union of Metal Workers & Another v Kia Motors (2007) 28 ILJ 2283 (LC). In those decisions the Court in relying on the authority of Hoffman & Zeffert, SA Law of Evidence (5ed) at 93, held that the inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence must be consistent with all the proven facts because if it is not then the inference cannot be drawn. In the Kia Motor’s case the Court, held that a distinction should be drawn between a permissible inference, a mere conjuncture and speculation. It was further held in that case that the onus is discharged if the inference advanced is the most readily apparent  and acceptable from a number of other possible inferences. See also AA Onderlinge Assuransie- Assosiasie BPK v De Beer 1982 (2) SA 603 (A).’ (my emphasis)

 

Evaluation

[26]       It was common cause, despite continuous references to ‘a cash bag’, that on the day in question the cash deposit was made up of four separate G4S cash bags as follows:

 

(i)      R39 635.00 which was made up of four bundles of notes

(ii)    R48 137.00 which was made up of four bundles of notes

(iii)   R47 000.00 which was made up of four bundles of notes

(iv)   R33 276.50 which was made up of 3 bundles of notes

 

[27]       It was common cause that the takings for 9 December 2016 were collected from the cashiers by the cashiers’ clerk, and verified and balanced in accordance with the applicant’s procedures by Ms Lwandle. The cash, once balanced, was handed to the third respondent for verification and placing into the G4S cash deposit bags. The G4S cash bags were given to the third respondent by Ms Lwandle.

 

[28]       It was common cause that the third respondent performed her functions in accordance with the applicant’s procedures, and that she sealed cash and deposit slips into the G4S cash bags that she was given, and dropped the bags into the drop safe. She dropped 4 G4S cash bags into the drop safe. There is only a dispute as to whether the fourth cash bag which should have contained 3 bundles of notes totalling R33 276.50 contained all the bundles, or whether it was short by one bundle of notes totalling R10 000.00.

 

[29]       It was also common cause that when the G4S security arrived to collect the cash deposit the next day, the third respondent removed all four G4S cash deposit bags from the drop safe and they were intact.

 

[30]       The third respondent’s attorney raised issues such as the amount of time between collection of the cash deposit until it was delivered to the bank, whether it was accessible to anyone else during that time, whether the cash bags were intact when they arrived at the bank, and whether the teller had properly scrutinized the bag in question to see whether it had been tampered with.

 

[31]       These issues came to naught since it was established in evidence that the G4S cash bags were intact when they arrived at the bank, and the one in question was in fact free from any evidence of tampering, save for the cut made by the teller, even when it was presented in evidence at the arbitration hearing. It was not in dispute that the cash bag presented at the arbitration hearing was the same bag that the third respondent had placed the cash in.

 

[32]       The third respondent’s counsel submitted that the cash bag could have been tampered with at the G4S premises since it was their bag. In this regard, it is noted that it was not disputed that if the bag was tampered with, it would say ‘stop’. In other words, this would show that the security of the bag had been breached. This evidence was not disputed. The evidence that the seal was intact was accepted.

 

[33]       Further issues which arose from speculation by Ms Mavundla, such as that the third respondent might not have sealed the bag, were put to rest by the undisputed evidence that it was the third respondent who removed the cash bags from the drop safe when the G4S security were collecting the cash deposit the next day. It was common cause that the cash bags were intact at that time. There was no evidence that any of them had been found unsealed.

 

[34]       The only issue that remains is whether the G4S cash bag in question contained only two bundles of cash instead of the three that were supposed to be there.

 

[35]       In this regard, Ms Govender’s evidence was that once the video footage was viewed with the deposit slip, it was concluded that the bank’s processes and procedures had been adhered to. The purpose of video footage at the bank was to monitor whether there was anything untoward in the conduct of the tellers but otherwise the bank relied on the audit trail. Her evidence of the bank’s processes and procedures was not challenged or disputed.

 

[36]       The video footage showed the bank teller opening the G4S cash bag, and that there were only two bundles of cash instead of the three that were supposed to be in the cash bag. She agreed that the video footage did not show the numbers on the deposit slip and the G4S cash bag seen to be emptied by the teller on the video footage. However, it was not disputed that the G4S cash bag presented in the arbitration hearing was the same bag.  Furthermore, Ms Govender took the arbitration hearing through the video footage. She commented and pointed out on the footage when four G4S bags and a brown envelope containing the deposit slip were removed from the tote bag. With each bag, she pointed out the number of cash bundles that were removed and these coincided with the deposit slips, except for the cash bag which contained 2 bundles of cash instead of 3 bundles. At no stage was it suggested to her in cross-examination that she might have presented the incorrect video footage. It was only pointed out that the numbers on the deposit slip and G4S bags were not visible. Ms Govender’s responses were sufficient considering the nature of the questions put to her. Had it been put to her that this might have been the incorrect video footage, no doubt she would have had to present evidence to prove that it was the correct one. The third respondent’s evidence, when she testified, was that she was not satisfied that the cash bag which was seen to be opened on the video footage belonged to the applicant. This was not put to Ms Govender for her to respond to when she was cross-examined.

 

[37]       I have no reason to doubt that it was the same bag which the third respondent had used and which was seen on the video footage and that was subsequently presented at the arbitration hearing.

 

[38]       An inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence must be consistent with all the proven facts because if it is not then the inference cannot be drawn.

 

[39]       Having regard to the evidence in its totality, the only plausible inference to be drawn, which is consistent with all the proven facts, is that the cash was short of one bundle of R100 notes totalling R10 000.00 when it was received by the teller. On the proven facts, the only plausible inference is that the cash was short of one bundle of R100 notes totalling R10 000.00 when it was placed by the third respondent in the G4S cash bag. The other inferences are

 

(a)       that all three bundles of cash were in the G4S cash bag when it was collected by the G4S security but that one bundle was removed without detection whilst the cash deposit was in the possession of the G4S security. This is, however, implausible when one considers that the G4S bag would reflect that it has been tampered with, and this evidence was not disputed.

 

(b)       that all three bundles of cash were in the G4S cash bag when it arrived at the bank and somehow went missing at the bank. This is, however, also implausible if one considers the security chain and the system of least human interaction by the bank’s employees, that the G4S bags remained in a tote box with an interlocking system until opened by the teller, that the bags were intact and not tampered with when they arrived at the teller, that the teller’s activities are monitored by CCTV, and the video footage itself showed only two bundles of cash falling out of the G4S bag in question.

 

(c)       Much has been made as to whether Ms Lwandle was facing the third respondent or looking at her during the cash up process and when she sealed the bags and dropped them in the drop safe. She stated that she was busy on her PC facing away from the third respondent. However, she saw her when she did the drop into the drop safe. Ms Lwandle had no reason to lie if she had been watching the third respondent and seen her place all three bundles into the G4S cash bag.

 

(d)       The third respondent stated that she had been searched by the security guard when she left. In cross-examination she stated that her bag was also searched. This evidence was not disputed. However, it was not the contention of the bank that the applicant had stolen the cash. The cash was missing and there was no explanation for it by the person who last handled it.

 

(e)       The applicant presented evidence through Ms Mavundla that the third respondent’s conduct had broken the trust relationship since she was in charge of keys and opened and closed the store. This is a fair reason to terminate employment.

 

(f)        The second respondent misconceived the nature of the inquiry and as a result arrived at an unreasonable result, one that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach on all the material that was before the arbitrator.

 

(g)       With regard to procedural fairness, it was common cause that it was after the conclusion of presentation of evidence by both sides, and when the third respondent was awaiting the outcome of the disciplinary enquiry, that the applicant sought to introduce evidence of the polygraph result. It is not known why this was necessary seeing that the result was inconclusive. Although this is highly unusual and certainly not condoned, it is noted that the chairperson did not take the polygraph evidence into account. In any event, if the final result had been considered it would have favoured the third respondent. Furthermore, this was a domestic enquiry. The requirement is that an accused employee must have a fair opportunity to state his or her case and this requirement was met. The second respondent misdirected herself in concluding that there was bias on the part of the chairperson merely on account of him allowing the evidence.

 

Conclusion

 

(h)          Accordingly, the applicant’s review application must succeed, and the arbitration award of the third respondent must be set aside. The applicant’s review application is therefore granted.

 

Costs

 

(i)            I see no reason to burden the third respondent with a costs order since costs do not necessarily follow the result in labour matters.

 

Order

 

[1]          In the result the following order is made:

 

1.         The application for review of the second respondent’s award is granted.

 

2.         The second respondent’s award under case number KNDB 578-17 is reviewed and set aside.

 

3.         The award is substituted with a finding that the dismissal of the third respondent by the applicant was substantively and procedurally fair.

 

4.         There is no order as to costs.

 

Narini Hiralall  

Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa

 

 

APPEARANCES

 

For the Applicant:                  Ms Q Majam

Instructed by:                        MacGregor Erasmus Attorneys

 

 

For the Respondent:              Adv S. Tshangana

Instructed by:                         Ntshalintshali Attorneys

 

 

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