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[1988] ZASCA 163
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Mngomezulu and Others v City Council of Soweto (223/87) [1988] ZASCA 163 (30 November 1988)
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223/87 NvH
T M MNGOMEZULU & OTHERS / THE CITY COUNCIL OF SOWETO
SMALBERGER, JA :-
223/87
N v H
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter of
THEMBA MICHAEL MNGOMEZULU First Appellant
ISAAC MZONDEKI RADEBE Second Appellant
MXLOLISI ALFRED
MPHUNGWA Third Appellant
and
THE CITY COUNCIL OF SOWETO Respondent
CORAM: CORBETT, HOEXTER, GROSSKOPF,
SMALBERGER, et VIVIER, JJA
HEARD: 30 AUGUST 1988
DELIVERED: 30 NOVEMBER 1988
JUGDMENT
SMALBERGER, JA :-
The three appellants are residents of
Jabulani, Soweto. The respondent, the City Council of
Soweto, is, and has at all material times been, a local
authority as contemplated in the Black Local Authorities
Act, 102 of 1982. The appellants and their respective
.../2
2 families have for many years been the registered tenants or lawful
occupiers of houses in Jabulani owned by the respondent.
Section 65 of the
Housing Act, 4 of 1966 (the 1966 Housing Act) affords certain remedies to a
local authority against tenants who
fail to pay the rental due by them. The
section provides:-
"If the tenant of a dwelling constructed by a local authority fails to pay the rental payable by him on the due date, the local authority may-
(a) take steps to recover the amount of the rental due, by action in a competent court; (b) after having given seven day's notice by letter delivered either to the tenant personally or to some adult inmate of the dwelling or, if that letter cannot be so delivered, by letter affixed to the outer or principal door of the dwelling or by prepaid registered letter addressed to the tenant at the place where the
.../3
3
dwelling is situated, by an officer authorized in writing by it and without having obtained any judgment or order
of the court, enter upon and take possession of the dwelling in respect of which the rental is owing."
(Any future reference to "s 65" is to the above-quoted section.)
On 26
August 1986 the appellants, together with their families and possessions, were
ejected from their respective homes by officials
of the respondent, purporting
to act in terms of s 65 (b), for alleged non-payment of rental due. The
appellants forthwith sought
to have possession of their homes restored to them.
To this end they brought an urgent application against the respondent in the
Witwatersrand Local Division. By agreement between the parties possession of the
appellants' homes was restored to them pending the
hearing and determination of
the application. In due course the application was heard
.../4
4
by GOLDBLATT, AJ. He dismissed the application, but
granted the appellants
leave to appeal to this Court. As
the matter was regarded as being in the nature of a test
case the
respondent sought no order as to costs, and none
was made.
It will be convenient to commence by setting out
certain relevant facts which are either common cause or not
in dispute for the purposes of the present appeal. The
houses occupied by the appellants were constructed in or
about 1959 by the Johannesburg City Council, an urban local
authority which at the time exercised jurisdiction over
Soweto. The houses are situated in an area set apart as a
location in terms of section 2(1) of the Blacks (Urban
Areas) Consolidation Act, 25 of 1945. The construction of
the houses was financed by means of a private loan granted
to the Johannesburg City Councll by certain mining houses.
The powers and obligations of the Johannesburg City Council
in respect of Soweto were subsequently assumed by the West
.../5
5
Rand Administration Board under the Black Affairs
Administration Act, 45
of 1971, and were later in turn
assumed by the respondent by virtue of the
provisions of
Act 102 of 1982. The circumstances surrounding the
granting of the loan used to construct the houses occupied
by the appellants, and the legal provisions under which it
was acquired, are matters peculiarly within the knowledge
of the respondent as successor to the Johannesburg City
Council as the controller of Soweto. Various affidavits
were filed on behalf of the respondent by one Gerber, who
is employed as the respondent's township manager in charge
of the Jabulani area. In one of these affidavits Gerber
sets out the position as follows:-
"4.3 The Johannesburg City Council applied to
the Administrator for authority to erect 15,000 dwellings on land owned by it, the erection of such dwellings to be funded by means of a private loan.
.../6
6
4.4 The Administrator granted such approval in terms of the Housing Act on or about 30 January 1957 subject to the concurrence of the then Minister of Native Affairs.
4.5 The then Minister of Native Affairs approved the Council's application for the £3 million loan in terms of Section 16 of Act 25 of 1945.
4.6 The rent for the houses in question (detached dwellings) was approved by the then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development in terms of Section 20 of Act 25 of 1945.
In an earlier affidavit Gerber had stated that the loan for the construction of the houses occupied by the appellants "was approved by the then Minister of Native Affairs in terms of Section 16 of Act No 25 of 1945 and accordingly I am advised and submit that the house in question does fall within the ambit of the Housing Act and in particular within the ambit of Section 65 of the present Housing Act". The relevance of the above assertions by Gerber will become apparent later in this judgment.
.../7
7
At the time when the appellants were ejected from
their homes they were required by the respondent to pay a
monthly charge
of R54-45. This represented the total of
amounts levied in respect of house
rental, site rental,
electrification fund contribution, surcharge for water
and
sewerage and refuse removal. House rental was R3-25, as
published in Government Notice No 703 in Government
Gazette No 5529 of 29 April 1977. It was determined by
the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development (as he
then was) under the provisions of s 22(1) (b) of Act 45 of
1971. The site rental was R13-32 as published in
Government Gazette No 9918 of 6 September 1985 in terms of
by-laws of the respondent approved by the Minister of Co-
operation, Development and Education under the powers
vested in him by s 27 of Act 102 of 1982. The remaining
charges are not relevant to the present appeal as it is
conceded by the respondent that they do not form part of
the rental per se. It is not disputed that the appellants
.../8
8
were in arrears in respect of the monthly charges levied by
the respondent in the amounts of R357-20, R367-80 and R353-
90 respectively.
It is common cause that the house occupled by
each appellant falls within the definition of a "dwelling"
in s 1(a) of the 1966 Housing Act, and that each appellant
at all relevant cimes was a "tenant of a dwelling
constructed by a local authority" within the meaning of s
65. (I shall henceforth refer to the appellants' houses
as dwellings.) The respondent was only entitled to act in
terms of s 65(b) on failure by the appellants to pay "the
rental payable" by them (in the sense in which that term is
used) by due date. It is also common cause that if the
respondent has succeeded in esteblishing the appellants'
failure to pay "the rental payable", the ejectments in casu
were effected in the manner provided for in s 65(b), and
after compllance with the necessary pre-requisites with
regard to notice. Nor is it in dispute that the
.../9
9
"rental" would not be "payable" unless some
legal
obligation to pay rental had been imposed. Amounts
alleged to be
payable as rental, which were not determined
in the manner prescribed by the
governing statutory
provision would therefore not constitute "rental
payable"
in terms of s 65, and the failure to pay such amounts would
not
entitle the respondent to have recourse to the
provisions of s 65(b). The
word "rental" is not defined
in the 1966 Housing Act. In its ordinary
connotation it
means an amount paid as rent, usually by a tenant to
his
landlord f or the use and occupation of land and premises.
The
definitlon of "dwelling" in s 1 of the 1966 Housing
Act includes the site on which any dwelling has been or
is to be constructed. When s 6l(b) of the 1966
Housing Act
(to which I shall refer in more detail
later) therefore speaks of letting any
dwelling it includes
both the house and the site, and a single rental
could
normally be expected for the two (Duze v Eastern Cape
Administration Board and Another 1981(1) SA 827 (A) at 842
.../10
10
H - 843 A). For the purposes of the present appeal it is
not necessary to
decide what precisely is meant by the word
"rental" in the phrase "the rental payable" in s 65. I
shall assume that it refers to both house and site rentals,
whether determlned separately or together. It would not
include service and availability charges.
In the court a quo GOLDBLATT, AJ held that in
ejecting the appellants from their homes the respondent had
acted lawfully under the powers conferred upon it by s 65.
He came to the conclusion that the words "the rental
payable" as used in s 65 applied to any rental which a
local authority was entitled to charge, and a tenant
obliged to pay, whether under the provisions of the 1966
Housing Act or in terms of any other legislation. He
accordingly held that although the rental in respect of
which the appellants were admittedly in arrears had not
been determined under the 1966 Houslng Act, as it had been
lawfully determined under other applicable legislation it
.../11
11
constituted "rental payable" as contemplated by s 65.
Three main arguments were raised on appeal on
behalf of the appellants. The first related to the proper
meaning to be
ascribed to the words "rental payable" f or
the purposes of s 65. It was contended that in view of
the extraordinary and drastic remedies afforded by s 65 (cf
Magadi v
West Rand Administration Board 1981 (2) SA 352 (T)
at 355 A) the section should be restrictively interpreted,
and that properly interpreted within their contextual
setting the words mean rental fixed and payable pursuant to
the provisions of s 61 of the 1966 Housing Act. It will
be convenient to refer to s 61 at this stage. It
provides:-
"Any local authority may -
(a) out of advances made to it or moneys
borrowed by it under this Act, construct approved dwellings and carry out approved schemes -
(i) within the area under its jurisdiction; or
.../12
12
(ii) outside the area under its juris= diction, on land acquired by it in terms of section 66 or approved by the Administrator concerned; (b) sell or let any dwelling, constructed by it under the powers conferred by this Act, on such conditions as may be determined -(i) in the case of dwellings in respect of the construction whereof an advance has been made out of the fund, by the Commission; or (ii) in the case of other dwellings, by the Administrator concerned on the recommendation of the Commission."
It is common cause that the
"conditions" that fall to be
determined in terms of s 61(b)(i) and (ii) by
either the
Commission (the National Housing Commission), or
the
Administrator on the Commission's recommendation, as the
case may be, include the fixing of rentals. Also, that
there was no determination of rental by the Commission or
the Administrator in respect of the dwellings occupied by
the appellants.
.../13
13
The second argument advanced on behalf of
the
appellants was that insofar as the house and site rentals
claimed by
the respondent to be due by the appellants were
determined under s 22(l)(b)
of Act 45 of 1971 and s 27 of
Act 102 of 1982 respectively, on the authority
of Duze v
Eastern Cape Administration Board (supra) at
843 A - B such
determinations had to satisfy the requirements of s
61(b)
because the 1966 Housing Act is a special Act, whereas the
other two
are general ones. The appellants' third
contention was that, in any event, s
65(b) only permits a
local authority to re-possess a dwelling for non-payment
of
rental without an ejectment order where it has previously
sought to
recover the amount of the rental due by the
ordlnary process of law enjoined
in terms of s 65(a).
There seems to be little substance in the appellants' third contention if one has regard to the apparent purpose and wording of s 65. As far as the first
.../14
14
argument is concerned, there seem to be insufficient
indications in s 65,
or in the provisions of the 1966
Housing Act generally, to justify the limited meaning the
appellants seek to place upon the words "the rental
payable". They are words, given their ordinary grammatical
meaning, of fairly wide import. It must be borne in mind
that a local authority has the power to erect dwellings in
addition to that conferred by the 1966 Housing Act (see e g
s 23(1) of Act 102 of 1982 read with item 24 of the
schedule thereto), and that there are various other
legislative provisions under which rentals charged by local
authorities for houses in Black residential areas could
previously, and can now, be determined (see e g s 20(1)
and s 38(3)(o) of Act 25 of 1945; s 22(1)(b) of Act 45 of
1971; s 43 of the Black Communities Development Act, 4 of
1984). There would therefore appear to be litte justifi=
cation for restricting the application of the words "the
rental payable" in s 65 only to instances of rental
.../15
15
determined under s 61(b) of the 1966 Housing Act. The
second argument is
of doubtful validity in the unqualified
form stated above. But it does have a
bearing on a matter
touched upon by Mr Mahomed, for the appellants, for
the
first time in reply.
After judgment was reserved this Court requested
further written submissions from counsel in regard to
certain issues arising from the matter touched upon by Mr
Mahomed in reply. These were duly furnished, and we are
grateful to counsel for their assistance. The view I take
of these issues is such as to render it unnecessary to come
to a firm conclusion on the three main arguments advanced
on behalf of the appellants.
As I have mentioned previously, it is common
oause that the dwellings occupied by the appellants were
constructed in 1959 by one of the respondent's
predecessors, the Johannesburg City Council, and that such
construction was financed by means of a private loan
.../16
16
granted by certain mining houses. Approval for the
erection of the
dwellings and the funding thereof in the
manner aforesaid was, according to
the deponent Gerber,
granted by the Administrator on or about 30 January
1957
subject to the concurrence of the then Minister of Native
Affairs. The latter's epproval of the loan was duly given
under the provisions of s 16(1) of Act 25 of 1945. When
the loan was procured the provisions of the Housing Aot, 35
of 1920 (the 1920 Housing Act) were operative; by the time
the dwellings were erected the Housing Aot, 10 of 1957 (the
1957 Housing Act) had come into operation. The 1957
Housing Act was the immediate predecessor of the 1966
Housing Act. The dwellings in question fall within the
definition of a "dwelling" in s 1 of the 1920 Housing Act,
as well as under the corresponding definitions in the 1957
and 1966 Housing Acts.
Both in 1957 (when the loan was procured) and
1959 (when the dwellings were constructed) the provisions
.../17
17 of s 16(l)(b) of Act 25 of 1945 were in force. (The section has since been repealed by s 69(1) of Act 4 of 1984.) The section, as it read at the time, provided as follows:-
"16(1) For the purpose of providing, setting
apart, establishing, equipping and maintaining any location, native village or native hostel, whether under this Act or otherwise, any urban local authority may, subject to the approval of the Minister, after reference by him to the Administrator -
(a)
(b) borrow moneys on the security of
the urban local authority's
rates
or on the security of any
location, native village or
native
hostel or under any law to provide
facilities for the
construction o f
dwellingS . . , subject to
repayment upon such
terms and
conditions as may be approved."
(My emphasis.)
.../18
18
An urban local authorlty (such as the
Johannesburg City Council) was therefore empowered by the
provisions of s 16(1)(b) of Act 25 of 1945 to borrow moneys
for the purpose of providing housing for Blacks, The loan
had to be approved by the Minister of Native Affairs after
reference by him to the Administrator. Approval of the
loan by the Administrator was not required in terms of s
16(1)(b). Moneys could be borrowed in one of three ways.
In the present instance it is not contended that the loan
raised for the purpose of constructing the appellants'
dwellings was obtained on the security of either the rates
of the Johannesburg City Council (as the relevant urban
local authority) or "of any location, native village or
native hostel". Consequently, it must have been obtained
"under any law to provide facilities for the construction
of dwellings". The appllcable law would have been the
then operative Housing Act (the 1920 Housing Act). That
the loan in question was obtained under the provisions of
.../19
19 the 1920 Housing Act is confirmed by Gerber's affidavit where he states
that the Administrator granted approval for the loan "in
terms of the Housing
Act". Such approval
would have been granted under s 2 of the 1920 Housing Act
which at the time read as follows:-
"Anything to the contrary notwithstanding in any law prescribing or limiting the powers of any local authority, any local authority may borrow money for the purpose of enabling it, subject to the provisions of this Act -
(a) to construct approved dwellings: (b) to lend money for the construction of approved dwellings; (c) to carry out approved schemes; (d) to lend money to enable approved schemes to be carried out;
and such local authority may borrow the money for any of the purposes aforesaid either from the commission or the administrator in accordance with and on terms and conditions prescribed by this Act or from any other source whatever on terms and conditions prescribed by the administrator."
.../20
20
Unlike the corresponding provisions in the 1957 and 1966
Housing Acts (s
48 and s 61 respectively), s 2 does not
specifically provide f or a loan obtained "from any other
source" (such as the one we are dealing with) to be
approved by the Administrator, but the need for such
approval is implicit in the provisions of the section.
Because of the provisions of s 16(1)(b) of Act 25 of 1945,
before the Johannesburg City Council in 1957 could borrow
money under s 2 of the 1920 Housing Act for the provision
of housing for Blacks in Jabulani it also had to obtain the
approval of the Minister of Native Affairs. While the
authority to borrow money may initially have derived from
Act 25 of 1945, the loan raised was obtained under the
provisions of s 2 of the 1920 Housing Act. It was the
proceeds of this loan that were utilised f or the later
construction of the appellants' dwellings. Such dwellings
were accordingly constructed from the proceeds of a loan
procured under the provislons of the 1920 Housing Act, and
.../21
21
not under any other statutory provision.
As appears from s 2 of the 1920 Housing Act, the
Johannesburg City Council was only empowered to borrow
money for building
purposes if such money was to be used
for the construction of approved
dwellings or to carry out
approved schemes (a scheme, by definition, meant a
proposal
for the construction of several approved dwellings).
Section 5(a) of the 1920 Housing Act specifically limited
the power of a local authority to construct dwellings under
the Act to approved dwelllngs. An "approved dwelling" in
terms of the definition thereof in s 1 of the 1920 Housing
Act meant a dwelling approved by the Administrator (except
where the dwelling was funded by an advance made by the
Commission, in which case an "approved dwelling" meant one
approved by the Commission).
The 1957 Housing Act came into operation on 1
June 1957. When the appellants' dwellings were constructed
in 1959 the provisions of that Act applied. Section 78(2)
.../22
22
of the 1957 Housing Act contained a savings clause which
read as
follows:-
"All advances made or loans granted or contracts entered into or moneys spent or anything done under any provision of any law repealed by sub-section (1) or under any provision of any regulation made under any such law, shall be deemed to have been made, granted, entered into, spent or done under the corresponding provisions of this Act: Provided that ..."
(The proviso that followed is not relevant to the present
appeal.)
One of the laws repealed was the 1920 Housing
Act. The corresponding provisions in the 1957 Housing Act
to sections 2 and 5 of the 1920 Housing Act were sections
48 and 55 respectively. In terms of s 78(2) of the 1957
Housing Act the loan granted under s 2 of the 1920 Housing
Act was deemed to have been granted under s 48 of the 1957
Housing Act. Money borrowed by a local authority under s
48 read with s 55 of the 1957 Housing Act could also only
.../23
23
be used for the construction of approved dwellings. An
"approved dwelling"
in terms of s 1(ii) of the 1957 Housing
Act meant a dwelling approved by the
Commission. This
could not alter the character of the appellants'
dwellings.
They had been approved by the Administrator under the
1920
Housing Act, and in terms of s 78(2) of the 1957 Housing
Act,
"anything done" under the 1920 Housing Act was deemed
to have been done under the corresponding provision of the
1957 Housing Act. The necessary approval to constitute the
appellants' dwellings approved dwellings was therefore
deemed to have been givcn. The upshot of all this is that
when the appellants dwellings were constructed in 1959 they
were constructed as approved dwellings and remained such
under the 1957 Housing Act. And they retained their
character as approved dwellings when the 1966 Housing Act
came into operation, by virtue of the savlngs provisions of
s 91(2) of that Act which is of similar import to s 78(2)
of the 1957 Housing Act, although worded somewhat
.../24
24
differently. It is not necessary to quote s 91(2).
The effect thereof is
quite clearly that an approved
dwelling under the 1957 Housing Act remains such under the
1966 Housing Act.
The power of a local authority in terms of s
61(b) of the 1966 Housing Act to "sell or let any dwelling,
constructed by it under the powers conferred by this Act"
applies only to approved dwellings, f or under the 1966
Housing Act (as under the corresponding provisions of the
1920 and 1957 Housing Acts) a local authority is only
empowered to construct approved dwellings (see s 61(e)).
The letting of approved dwellings not constructed from
funds advanced by the National Housing Fund (which is the
case here) is required to be on such conditions as may be
determined (which by necessary implication would include
the fixing of rental) by the Administrator on the
recommendation of the Commission (s 61(b)(ii)). It
follows that in the absence of any overriding statutory
.../25
25
provisions to the contrary the rental f or the
appellants'
dwellings, in view of the provisions of s 61(b)(ii), had to
be
determined by the Administrator on the recommendation of
the Commission. It
is common cause that no such
determination was made.
Are there any such overriding statutory
provisions? The respondent seeks to rely upon s 20(1) of
Act 25 of 1945. (That section has also been repealed by s
69(1) of Act 4 of 1984, but there is a savings provision in
s 69(2) which preserves anything previously done under it).
Section 20(1) empowered the Minister, after consultation
with the Commission, to determine a fair and reasonable
rental for the occupation i a of any house in a location.
(The section referred to the Black Housing Board, but the
Commisaion took over the functions and duties originally
conferred on the Black Housing Board under the 1966 Act.
The latter Board was abolished by Act 109 of 1979 as from
1 October 1979 - see Duze v Eastern Cape Administration
.../26
26 Board (supra) at 834 H). However, s 20(1) has no application in the present matter because neither the house nor site rentals currently being charged were determined under its provisions. Even if they had been so determined, such determination would not have been lawful as it is common cause that the Commission was not consulted when the rentals were fixed.
The house rental, as I have mentioned previously, was determined in 1977 by the Minister under the powers vested in him by section 22(1) (b) of Act 45 of 1971. Section 11(1) of that Act provided that an Administration Board shall, in addition to any other powers vested in it under the Act:
"(e) within its administration area be vested and charged with -
(i) all the rights, powers, functions, duties and obligations -(aa) of an urban local authority in
terms of the Blacks (Urban Areas)
.../27
27
Consolidation Act, 1945 (Act No 25 of 1945), the Black Services Levy Act, 1952 (Act No 64 of 1952), the Urban Black Councils Act, 1961 (Act No 79 of 1961), and Black Labour Act, 1964 (Act No 67 of 1964); (bb) ... (cc) ...
(dd) in so far as they relate to
Blacks
only, of an urban local authority
or a local government body or
a
Commissioner in terms of such laws
as may from time to time
be
specified by the Minister by
notice in the Gazette, but subject
to
such conditions, modifications
or exceptions as may be
so
specified;
(ii) such rights, powers, functions, duties
and
obligations, in so far as they
relate to Blacks only, of an urban
local
authority or a local government
body in terms of the relevant
ordinance
establishing local authority
or in terms of any other ordinance as
.../28
28
the Minister may from time to time after consultation with the Administrator specify by notice in the Gazette, but subject to such conditions, modifications or exceptions as may be specified in the notice."
Notwithstanding the above-quoted provisions, s
22(1)(a) of Act 45 of 1971 deprived an Administration Board
of the power
to make regulations under any law mentioned or
contemplated therein, and in
terms of s 22(1)(b) vested
such power in the Minister. The Minister was
therefore
given the power to make regulations which a local authority
previously had under the provisions of s ll(l)(e) set out
above (Duze v
Eastern Cape Administration Board (supra) at
837 E; Durban (Ningizuma) Community Council and Another v
Minister of Co-operation and Development and Another
1985(3) SA 667 (A) at 673 H - I.) Section 22(l)(b) of
Act 45 of 1971 was also repealed by s 69(1) of Act 4 of
1984, but in terms of s 66(3) of the latter Act "(a)ny
.../29
29
regulation made under a law repealed by this Act shall be
deemed to have
been made under subsection (1) and shall
continue to apply notwithstanding
the repeal of such law".
The respondent does not contend that there are
any provisions in either the Black Services Levy Act, the
Urban Black
Councils Act or the Black Labour Act referred
to in s 11(1)(e)(i)(aa), or in any of the laws referred to
in s 11(1)(e)(i)(dd), or in the relevant Ordinance
referred to in s 11(1)(e)(ii) (the Transvaal Local
Government Ordinance,
17 of 1939) which either deal with
rent determinations, or empower a local authority to make
regulations (or by-laws) in respect of rent. This brings
me back to Act 25 of 1945. It contains two provisions with
regard to rental. The first of these is contained in s
20(1), to which reference has already been made. A local
authority had no power to determine rental under that
section. The powers conferred on the Minister under s
22(l)(b) of Act 45 of 1971 therefore did not encompass s
.../30
30
20(1) of Act 25 of 1945. The second provision is contained
in s 38(3)(o).
That section entitled a local authority, upon
compliance with certain
prescribed requirements, to make
regulations i a in respect of tariffs of
fees and charges for
rent f or inhabitants of a Black residencial area.
The
Minister's determination of house rental in 1977 was
therefore purportedly made under the powers conferred on him
by s 22(l)(b)
of Act 45 of 1971 read with s 38(3)(o) of Act
25 of 1945. Insofar as the power to determine rentals under
s 22(1)(b) in respect of Black residential areas generally
differs or is inconsistent with that under s 61(b)(ii) of the
1966 Housing Act, which applies specifically to approved
dwellings, the general powers in s 22(1)(b) of Act 45 of 1971
must yield to the special, particular powers in s 61(1)(b) of
the 1966 Houslng Act in respect of approved dwellings
constructed under the latter Act (Duze v Eastern Cape
Administration Board (supra) at 843 A - B. This is in
keeping with the oft-referred to passage in R v Gwantshu 1931
/31
31
EDL 29 at 31 that "The general maxim is, generalia
specialibus
non derogant. 'When the Legislature has given
attention to a separate
subject and made provision for it the
presumption is that a subsequent
general enactment is not
intended to interfere with the special provision, unless it
manifests that
intention very clearly ...' per Lord HOBHOUSE
delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Barker v
Edger (1898) A C at p 754" and further "In such cases it is
presumed to have only general cases in view and not
particular cases which have been already otherwise provided
for by the special Act". The same holds true in respect of
the site rentals. The power of a local authority in terms of
s 27(1) of Act 102 of 1982 to make by-laws with the approval
of the Minister, under which power the site rental for the
appellants' dwellings was determined, must also yield to the
special powers of s 61(1)(b) of the 1966 Housing Act.
It follows that in respect of approved dwellings
constructed under one or other of the Housing Acta there are
/32
32 no statutory provisions which override those of s 61(1)(b) of the
1966 Housing Act. As the rentals for the appellants' dwellings
were not lawfully
fixed and determined in the prescribed manner they did not constitute rental
payable under s 65. In the circumstances
the appellants' failure to pay the
amounts the respondent required them to pay as rental did not entitle the
respondent to have recourse
to the provisions of s 65. The respondent's
purported ejectment of the appellant was accordingly unlawful.
In the result the appeal succeeds, with costs, including the costs of two counsel. The order of the court a quo is set aside. As the appellants' possession of their dwellings was previously restored to them pending their application and subsequent appeal, there ls substituted for the order of the court a quo the following order:-
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"1) It is hereby declared that the respondent
was not entitled to eject the applicants from their respective dwellings on 26 August 1986 pursuant to section 65 of the Housing Act 4 of 1966.
2) The respondent is ordered to pay the
applicants' costs, including the costs of two counsel."
J W SMALBERGER JUDGE OF APPEAL
CORBETT, JA )
HOEXTER, JA )
GROSSKOPF, JA ) CONCUR
VIVIER, JA )