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[1993] ZASCA 118
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Minister of Law and Order v Mthembu (698/91) [1993] ZASCA 118 (14 September 1993)
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Case Number 698/91 /al
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter between:
THE MINISTER OF LAW AND
ORDER Appellant
and
PETROS MTHEMBU Respondent
CORAM: BOTHA, VAN HEERDEN, NESTADT, GOLDSTONE JJA
et KRIEGLER AJA
DATE OF HEARING: 7 SEPTEMBER 1993
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KRIEGLER AJA/
2
KRIEGLER AJA:
The determination of this appeal turned on a narrow factual issue. Therefore,
having heard counsel for the appellant, and being unpersuaded
that the court
a quo had erred, the appeal was there and then dismissed with costs. In
accordance with the intimation at the time the reasons for the
order are now
furnished.
The appeal was directed at an award of damages for bodily injury
made in favour of the respondent against the appellant by Hugo J
in the Durban
and Coast Local Division. The respondent's case was that his right eye had been
blinded by a shotgun pellet fired by
a policeman. His particulars of claim
advanced a variety of grounds for holding the appellant liable for the damages
he had allegedly
suffered in consequence. The plea in turn joined issue on
various bases. The evidence adduced at the trial therefore ranged fairly
wide.
But
3 ultimately the essential facts were largely common cause and the real
issues within a narrow compass.
The evidence established that the respondent
had sustained the injury alleged on the afternoon of Saturday 15 November 1986
at Currie's
Fountain sports stadium in Durban. He had attended the annual
general meeting of a national trade union in the stadium that day.
Many
thousands of members had come from far and wide and when the meeting ended at
approximately 4 p.m. the crowd started dispersing.
Some were served a meal
inside the stadium while others started streaming out. Whether some or all of
the latter were heading for
buses parked along the lane outside the stadium or
whether they were intent on causing havoc in an area beyond the buses remained
unresolved at the trial. What was common cause though was that they were
confronted by a contingent of six policemen under the command
of a Constable
Meeker. He had
4 been instructed to monitor the crowd unobtrusively from a
distance and to report anything untoward to his superior by radio. A task-force
was standing by to lend reinforcements within a few minutes if required. The
conduct of a section of the crowd emerging from the
stadium led Meeker to
believe he had to intervene without delay. Whether that opinion was well-founded
and whether the action he
took was justified remained hotly contested to the
end. The trial judge did not arrive at any conclusion in that regard.
Nor was
it necessary for him to do so. The respondent's primary cause of action was that
the policeman who shot him had acted unlawfully
and intentionally or
negligently. The crux of the appellant's defence was that the firing of the
particular shot had been justified.
More particularly it was contended that the
respondent had been shot lawfully, either because he had been
5 involved in hurling stones and other projectiles at the police or because
others in his vicinity had been doing so. In either event,
so the appellant
contended, such shots as had been fired by the police had been discharged
lawfully in the reasonable and necessary
exercise of their duty to maintain law
and order.
The trial judge held (i) that the onus to justify the shooting of
the respondent rested on the appellant, and (ii) that such onus
had not been
discharged. On appeal it was conceded on the appellant's behalf that the finding
as to the incidence of the onus was
correct. (The concession was rightly made -
see Mabaso v Felix 1981 (3) SA 865 (A) 876E.) The factual finding was
challenged however. The view I take of the matter renders it unnecessary to
detail the various
submissions made in support of the argument.
The appellant's case stood or fell with
6 Meeker's evidence,
which established that it must have been he who had fired the shot that injured
the respondent. Yet, according
to Meeker, he had not fired any shot which could
possibly have struck a person standing in the vicinity of the stadium entrance.
He was adamant that, while in an area some 80 metres to the south of the
entrance, he had fired four shots, three to the east and
one to the south. He
had not been threatened by anyone to the north of him, had no reason to fire in
that direction and had not done
so. It follows that if the respondent had been
to the north of Meeker at the time, there was no evidence to justify his being
shot.
And the evidence indeed established as a preponderant probability that
the respondent had been hit while standing near the stadium
entrance. His
evidence as to his movements after the meeting had ended was not seriously
challenged, nor is
7 there any reason to doubt it: As a shop-steward of the
trade union he had been deputed to assist in serving members who wanted to
eat
before departing. While he was engaged in that task at a point inside the
stadium a teargas canister fell nearby; he dropped
his ladle, ran for the exit
and managed to push his way through the crowd milling there; he emerged, peeped
round a bus parked just
to the south of the exit, saw some police activity
further down the lane and was then hit in the eye.
In the final analysis,
therefore, the bulk of what had been in contention on the pleadings and most of
the evidence at the trial eventually
proved irrelevant or of peripheral
importance only. The shot Meeker fired which injured the respondent to the north
of him - on his
own showing - had not been legally justified. A suggestion
(advanced for the first time in argument on behalf of the appellant in
this
court) that the offending pellet
8
may have ricocheted in a northerly direction, was speculative, inherently improbable and can be disregarded. The conclusion is ineluctable that the respondent, an innocent onlooker, was shot while standing in a quarter from which Meeker had sensed no danger and which he had had no reason to direct any fire.
The trial court's conclusion that the appellant was liable to compensate the respondent for the damages he suffered as a result of the loss of vision in his eye was therefore correct.
J.C. KRIEGLER
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL
BOTHA ]
VAN HEERDEN ] AGREED
NESTADT
]
GOLDSTONE ]