IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(CAPE OF GOOD HOPE PROVINCIAL DIVISION)

Case Numbers: 524/2003
6055/2003
In the matter between:

MARLIESE TOWNSEND-TURNER	First Applicant
DEREK ROYSTON TURNER	Second Applicant

and

BRUCE ANDREW MORROW	Respondent

KNOLL, J:

There are two applications before me.  In the first application (case number 524/2003), the applicants seek an order that they be granted the right to defined access to the first applicant’s minor grandchild, G.   The orders sought by the applicants in the first application read as follows:-

	2.1.1	For one week during each long school holiday and for three days during the short school holidays, by timeous prior arrangement with the respondent.
	2.1.2	For one weekend each month commencing on a Friday at 18h00 until Sunday at 18h00;
	2.1.3	For one afternoon every second week on a week day;
	2.1.4	Telephonic access at all reasonable times.

2.2	That the applicants shall be entitled to exercise the access set forth in paragraph 2.1 above, in the event that G relocates temporarily or permanently to another jurisdiction, at such location.”

The parties are referred to herein as first and second applicant and respondent respectively, and where it is necessary to distinguish between the two applications, this will be done.  

These matters have a long history and the papers filed are voluminous.  

The second applicant is a former husband of the first applicant, who currently lives with the first applicant and is regarded by G as his grandfather.  Tanja’s natural father died when the former was 3 years old.  

It is common cause that before Tanja’s death, both applicants enjoyed access to G when the families visited each other.  For some months preceeding Tanja’s death, respondent, Tanja and G resided with the applicants at their home in Muizenberg.  Immediately after Tanja’s death respondent and G moved back into their own home in Greenpoint.

In March 2000, respondent formed a relationship with Louise Van Zyl.  The couple currently live together as a family unit and, it is common cause, that G is very close to Ms Van Zyl and regards her as his mother although he is aware that his natural mother has died.

It is common cause that the relationship between the respondent and the first applicant deteriorated after Tanja’s death.  It is also common cause that respondent allowed the first applicant very limited contact with G until approximately September / October 2000, whereafter respondent allowed her only telephonic access and 1 hour per week of supervised access.  Later, at the first applicant’s request, she was permitted to spend one weekend in three with G on an overnight basis.  

The respondent has business interests in Portugal and is required to go there for some periods of time each year.  In or about May 2001, respondent, Ms Van Zyl and G resided in Portugal for some months although there is a dispute as to the exact length of time.  During this period, it is common cause that the first applicant visited Germany while the Morrow family were visiting relatives there and first applicant spent approximately 6 days with the family and G.

After the family’s return from Portugal in 2001, the applicants again enjoyed access to G as they had prior to the Portugal visit.  From April 2002 to October 2002, the family returned to Portugal.  First applicant was permitted telephonic access and she corresponded with G.  Again she visited with the family in Hamburg, where they visited with relatives, for nine days. 

She recorded, that because of the delay in the matter, various requests had been made by her attorneys for interim access.  These requests were initially rejected outright by the respondent, but he later agreed to consider them if advised by the professionals that it would be in G’s best interests.  

Dr Bredenkamp expressed the view that the contact visits at G’s house were unnatural and difficult for both the first applicant and G.  Furthermore, she noted that they only played games together and did not have much say to each other with regard to personal things,  for example, there was no discussion as to G’s school or friends or anything else.  Her view was that this indicated the estrangement between them, but also a lack of attachment or bond.  She felt that G would have enjoyed playing games with anybody else as well.  Furthermore, Dr Bredenkamp reported that she had had some contact with a Ms Amie Rodes, G’s occupational therapist.  After one of the access visits with his grandmother, the latter reported to have found G to have behaved more childishly and been more difficult than was normally the case.  Furthermore, Ms Van Zyl’s son Ettiene, had observed that G had behaved aggressively towards him after one of these visits, which was not G’s manner.

The second option is that the court should decide about the rights of a grandparent to see her grandchild under these difficult circumstances and that, in the event of the first applicant having a right to have an ongoing relationship with G, supervised access should be granted for a year, whereafter G should be allowed to lead the way in deciding whether he wished to have contact with his grandmother or not.  Finally, she expressed the view that it is evident that harm had been caused to the grandmother / grandchild relationship as a result of the family circumstances, which will not be easily restored.  Furthermore contact created a lot of stress to all parties, G included.  She could not foresee that things would change much in future and expressed the opinion that it would be unfair and unjust to G to carry on with trying to help him and his grandmother to rebuild their relationship under the present circumstances.  She recommended that the adult parties should lay to rest their differences and start interacting with each other in such a way that it will make it possible for G to have a relationship with his grandmother under less stressful circumstances.  She again expressed the view that the parties should attempt to settle the matter out of court.

Mr Van Der Westhuizen essentially expressed the same views as Dr Bredenkamp, emphasising that, in his view, based on consultations with the first applicant as well as the reports that he has had, the first applicant is concerned about her own interests in having access to G and not G’s interests.  Furthermore, he submitted that there was no evidence to suggest that she played a significant parenting, or any other role, in G’s life, or that a bond existed between them to the extent that severance thereof would cause harm to G.  He submitted that the fact that the first applicant was unable to control her emotions in front of G was detrimental to the latter’s well being.  Mr. Van Der Westhuizen ended his report with the following remarks:-

Accordingly, he recommended that no access rights be granted to the applicants, that the first applicant receive therapy to help her cope with her emotional difficulties and that the respondent facilitate visits and contact between G and the applicants at G’s request.

Certain discussions were held between the court and Advocates Louwrens, Van Der Westhuizen and Weyer in chambers prior to the hearing.  The object of these were to attempt to find common ground and facilitate settlement of the matter out of court.  I expressed the view that the parties should attend mediation in an attempt to resolve the conflicts between them and that first applicant should attend counselling to assist her to understand her own role in the ultimate refusal of the respondent to grant access to G.  

Counsel attempted to reach an out of court settlement, but were unable to do so.  At the hearing they indicated that both parties were prepared to attend mediation and that the court should order this.  Furthermore first applicant was prepared to attend counselling.  There was some debate as to the terms of any mediation order, culminating in the parties and Mr Van Der Westhuizen reaching an out of court settlement in this regard, which they wish to have incorporated in this court’s order.

The dispute between the parties related only to the main issue of whether access should be granted or not.  Both Mr. Van Der Westhuizen and Ms. Weyer for the respondent submitted that no access should be granted.  Mr Louwrens, for the applicant, submitted that access should be granted, alternatively, that the matter should be postponed for the family advocate to do a further evaluation, as he had indicated he wished to do in his memorandum.  In the interim, he submitted that this court should allow the applicants defined supervised access but not on the previous basis.  Furthermore, a postponement would allow the first applicant to be counselled and mediation to take place, whereafter the court could make a final decision on the access.  He relied, in the main, on Dr Bredenkamp’s second option and her recommendation in her initial report that supervised access should be allowed.

Before I turn to the facts of the instant case, it is necessary to deal with the legal situation.  
There is currently nothing to be found in the South African common law which indicates that anyone has the “right” to access to a minor child, other than the parents of children born of a marriage.  This principle is expressed in the decision of the then Appellate Division when considering the rights of a natural father of an illegitimate child to access as follows:-

“

The learned judge of appeal expressed the view that if there were sound sociological and policy reasons for affording such fathers an inherent right, the matter must be dealt with legislatively.

The South African Law Commission, in its Working paper 62, project 100 investigated the granting of visitation rights to grandparents of minor children.

At the outset, the commission points out that parental authority (insofar as it is relevant to this case) is vested in the mother and father of a child born in wedlock and, on the death of one of the parents, it then vests solely in the surviving parent. 

“It seems to me, however, that the court has no jurisdiction to deprive a surviving parent of her custody at the instance of third parties, except under its power as upper guardian of all minors to interfere with their custody, but then only on special grounds.  Such special grounds include danger to a child’s life, health or morals, but those are not the only grounds on which a court will interfere.  Good cause must be shown before a court will interfere, but good cause is not capable of precise definition.”

Both counsel for the parties and Mr Van der Westhuizen are ad idem that the aforesaid view is the current state of the common law in South Africa. 

No legislation has followed upon the Law Commission recommendation to date and this court must therefore follow the common law.  

In the instant matter, this court has had the benefit not only of the papers, but also of the expert assessment of Dr Bredenkamp, Ms Loedolf and the Family Advocate, Mr Van der Westhuizen.  I intend to approach this matter, having regard to these objective reports as also those facts on the affidavits that are common cause.  It is, in my view, not in G’s interests to draw this matter out by ordering oral evidence on the disputed facts and, it is in any event, not necessary to decide the disputed facts as will appear below. 

A brief resumé of the facts with regard to access to G leading up to this application, is set out above.  The real disputes relate to the reasons why access to G has been problematic.

It is common cause that the first respondent has, at times, allowed the applicants access to G.  He has adopted the attitude on the papers, which is not disputed, that he has tried to maintain a healthy relationship between G and the applicants.  Certain concerns caused him to limit and sometimes refuse that access. 

It is common cause that G is the only grandchild of the first applicant and that his late mother was the first applicant’s only child.  Furthermore, the first applicant admits to being understandably emotional after the death of her daughter.  Respondent felt that her emotionalism when she saw G, unsettled the little boy and made it difficult for him to settle back into his own home.  This attitude, in my view, is understandable, given that G had been moved from his own home to the applicants’ home and then back to his home again after his mother’s death.  It was necessary that he be given stability and routine and security at that time.  

It is, furthermore, common cause that the first applicant removed certain photographs of herself that belonged to her and a box of cards relating to Tanja’s childhood from respondent’s home.  There is a dispute as to whether she did so with permission or not.  It is not important, in my view, whether this dispute be resolved.  What is important is that the respondent is clearly aggrieved by what he viewed as an intrusion into his privacy.  

It is common cause that relations became strained between the first applicant and the respondent due to disputes specifically regarding a family trust.  Matters deteriorated and the respondent and the first applicant were not communicating effectively.  This led to the first applicant, on her own admission, telephoning G’s school and attempting to visit G at school, despite her knowledge that the respondent did not wish her to have access to him.  This type of situation led to an incident, during May 2000, where first and second applicants came to G’s school, resulting in respondent phoning the police and second applicant shouting abuse at the respondent when he drove away from the school.  Precisely why the police were called and what happened on that occasion is in dispute.  It seems to me, however, that the details of this dispute are not important but what is important is that this incident occurred at G’s school, which is clearly not in G’s interests.

The respondent alleges numerous incidents where the first applicant contacted his domestic staff or office staff, which he regarded as an intrusion on his private and business affairs.  The reasons why they were contacted are in dispute.  Again, the dispute itself is not important, in my view, what is important is that contact was made with these people against the respondent’s wishes, which is not disputed.  This clearly soured relations between the respondent and the first applicant.

It is common cause that there was an incident where the first applicant slapped the respondent in full view of his staff at his business premises when she arrived there uninvited.  It is also common cause that during this incident a plate glass door was broken because of force applied to it by the first applicant.  It is common cause that the reason first applicant approached the respondent at his business premises was because access to G had been denied her.  It is not disputed that, in an attempt to allay further scenes, the respondent allowed G to see the first applicant at G’s home.  This was shortly before they left for overseas in 2002.  

The first applicant does not deny that when the respondent, Ms Van Zyl and G went to Portugal she phoned and said that she could not “survive” without seeing G and that she furthermore borrowed money from the family trust to visit G overseas.  It is common cause that she wished to visit the family in Portugal.  It is not denied that the respondent and Ms Van Zyl found this an unwarranted intrusion into their holiday and business time and as a compromise suggested that they meet in Hamburg. 

The first applicant admits to telephoning G every second day but expresses the view that this is not excessive or unusual.  

There are numerous allegations by the respondent of inappropriate remarks made to G when the first applicant had access to him which are denied by the first applicant.  There are, however incidents where she admits that she made, what in my view, are inappropriate statements to a young child.  There was an incident where the respondent, because of business commitments did not bring G through to see her as he had indicated he might.  Instead of addressing herself to the father’s remissness, she phoned G to express her disappointment.  This upset the child.  Furthermore, after the first applicant had been asked to curtail her calls to G, she did not comply and there was a call overheard by a friend of the respondent, one Mary Slater, during which the first applicant admitted she had told G not to tell his parents that she had phoned him.  This caused additional acrimony as respondent and Ms Van Zyl felt that they had worked hard to maintain open communication with G and that it placed him in an invidious position when he was told not to communicate things to his parents.

Another incident which the first applicant admits to is that she threw a packet of sweets over a garden wall for G’s nanny to give to G.  This was necessary according to her because of the lack of contact with G.  Again there was no attempt to follow appropriate channels.  Had she wished to give G a gift, it was not appropriate for her to do this behind his parents’ back.

It is quite clear from what is common cause that the relations between the parties were extremely strained and that this impacted on G.  The first report of Dr Bredenkamp confirms this.

“Children caught in the middle react differently to conflict between family members, but, in general, a history of aggression and conflict in the family has been strongly and consistently associated with emotional, behavioural and social problems in children.  School aged children are much more likely than their younger counterparts, to have a range of reactions, starting with guilt.  Children this age often feel responsible for the conflicts of their family members.”

Her recommendations in her initial report were that supervised access should be granted to the applicants in a structured way, along the lines of what was ordered by this court during June of this year.  However, she repeatedly expressed the view that the conflicts in the family were those of the adults and that the parties should take every step to resolve the conflict between them.  G was suffering as a result of these conflicts.

She furthermore recommended that the first applicant should refrain from intruding herself into the respondents’ domestic and business life and that she should avoid conversing about G’s deceased mother.

Dr Bredenkamp, in analysing the personality of the first applicant, described her as not having a personality disorder, but of having a personality style which is best described as “compulsive, narcissistic, schizoid and aggressive”.  Despite this rather unflattering description of her personality, Dr Bredenkamp was of the view that she could play a positive role in G’s life should she show more sensitivity to G’s needs.  Dr Bredenkamp agreed with the experience of the respondent that the first applicant was an intrusive person who “can consume one’s life and invade one’s private space”.  This was Dr Bredenkamp’s own experience with the first applicant.  She based this impression on the first applicant’s numerous phone calls to her, even after hours, despite an undertaking from Dr Bredenkamp to keep her informed.  On these occasions, Dr Bredenkamp found that she interfered with her work schedule and intruded on her time with other patients.  The first applicant often broke down and cried and took on the role of the injured party.  She even became distrustful of Dr Bredenkamp’s motives.  Dr Bredenkamp reported that there was a situation where she was almost forced to give an opinion on supervised access before she had had an opportunity to interview G.  She found this totally unacceptable and in her opinion it showed the first applicant’s intolerance with a sensitive issue regarding the minor child.  She described the first applicant as having a difficult personality.

I am of the view, having read the report of Dr Bredenkamp as well as her subsequent addendum and having heard the family advocate, as also having paid regard to those aspects which are common cause on the papers, that the first applicant’s behaviour towards the respondent, Ms Van Zyl and G, has been unduly intrusive and insensitive to their needs.

It is my view that it is clear from the common cause facts, Dr Bredenkamp’s report and the problems that arose during the third access visit, that the first applicant does not fully appreciate what is in the best interests of G.  She is rather more concerned that her own needs be fulfilled.  The way she reacted to a 7 year old child when he arrived late and she was upset about it was not appropriate.  I bear in mind that she has not been able to explain her reaction or deal with this report.  However, it was never suggested by Mr Louwrens that there was any inaccurate reporting of this access visit.  It is also clear that, as indicated by the respondent and Dr Bredenkamp, the first applicant has difficulty in controlling her emotions.

I agree with Mr Van der Westhuizen that the ideal situation is that a normal relaxed access to his grandmother and the second applicant, on a regular basis, at the instance of G or at the suggestion of respondent should happen.  This clearly cannot happen until the first applicant takes responsibility for her role in the conflict and understands why the respondent has refused her access to G in the past.  Furthermore, there is a pressing need for the adults to try and resolve their conflicts and to build up an atmosphere of tolerance of each other, and respect for each other’s points of view.  Accordingly, I intend to make the order with regard to the mediation which the parties have agreed to.  The parties are furthermore, encouraged to use mediation, or a counsellor, to resolve any future issues with regard to applicant’s relationship with G.  The adversarial nature of court actions and their cost tend to deepen the divide.

The first applicant must understand that the respondent as G’s father, is entitled to make decisions with regard to his child.  This court has not been left with the impression that the respondent, at any stage, acted with anything but real concern for his child’s best interests.  It is, in my view, clear that the respondent has been greatly troubled by the situation and would encourage a healthy relationship between his son and the applicants.  Furthermore, it is clear from the report of Dr Bredenkamp and, indeed from the admissions made by the first applicant, that Ms Van Zyl is an important person in G’ s life, that she has taken the place of his mother and that they have a close and good relationship.  Any negative remarks about or attitudes to Ms Van Zyl by the applicants that come to G’s attention will have a detrimental impact.  The first applicant must trust that the respondent’s decisions for his family and for G are taken in the best interests of that family and G and she must show respect for his decisions.  If she wants a relationship with G, which is to be encouraged, she must refrain from involving herself in the respondent’s family and work life.  She must accept that the respondent and G have the right to get on with their lives and to build strong family relationships in their nuclear family, in the  interests of G’s security.  She must also accept that her role in G’s life is ancillary to that of this nuclear family.  She must behave towards G, and in G’s presence in a manner which is appropriate to his age and which will not confuse him, or in any way, place him in a situation where he is required to feel divided loyalties.  She must understand that she must respect respondent and Ms Van Zyl’s wishes with regard to the giving of presents etc. to G, whether or not she agrees with them.

Although this court has sympathy for the position of the first and second applicants, and particularly the difficult emotional times that the first applicant has been experiencing, after careful consideration, I am of the view that in the light of the conflict within the family and the difficult relationships at present, it cannot be in G’s best interests to allow the applicants access to him and so place him in the middle of a situation which will confuse him and lead him to feel guilt and divided loyalties. The abnormality of judicially sanctioned enforced visitation has been shown not to be desirable in this matter.  I am in agreement with Mr Van der Westhuizen that any relationship between G and the applicants should be allowed to develop spontaneously and in an atmosphere of accord between the parties.  The first applicant must refrain from pushing the issue and the respondent and Ms Van Zyl must be encouraged to allow such spontaneous contact but only when the relations between the adults have been mended to the extent that contact might take place in a manner that would benefit G. 

Accordingly, it is my view that the application must be dismissed.

I turn to consider the application that respondent be found guilty of contempt of court in not complying with this court’s order.

It is well established that an applicant for committal must show:-

1.	that an order was granted against the respondent; and
2.	that respondent was either served with the order or was informed of the grounds of the order against him and could have no reasonable ground for disbelieving the information; and
3.	that respondent has either disobeyed it or has neglected to comply with it.  

The applicants maintain that the respondent was:-

4.	
5.	
6.	in wilful default of paragraph 4.2 of the order in that be breached his undertaking to consult with G and Dr Bredenkamp to, prepare G for the applicants’ access to G.  
With regard to the default alleged in paragraph a) above, it is common cause that it was envisaged by the order, if paragraph 1.5 and 5.3 are read together, that the first physical access to G should take place on Friday 18 July 2003.  It was furthermore, common cause that this did not occur.

“Dr Bredenkamp will have individual sessions with G to test his preparedness and willingness to meet with his grandmother before the actual access will take place.  The date of the first visitation will be determined during these sessions; whereafter arrangements for access will commence.  Both parties will be informed when the first visit on a Friday will take place.”

Numbered paragraph 10 of her letter is also relevant.  She suggests that after a period of three months she and the social worker should meet with the family advocate and the attorneys to provide personal feedback on the access process and progress made.  At that stage, further recommendations about access will be put to the legal teams.

In the light of there being no express mention of the date on which access is to commence, read with Dr Bredenkamp’s letter as to the manner in which the order would be implemented, it cannot, in my view, be said that the respondent’s opinion that the matter needed to be clarified was unreasonable, neither was his reliance on Mr Van der Westhuizen’s advice. 

Furthermore, the respondent states that with regard to the telephonic access, he was of the opinion that the court order meant that telephonic access should only commence after physical access had taken place.  

Dr Bredenkamp was appointed to advise the court and the family advocate in this matter at the request of the family advocate.  It is not unreasonable, in my view, to have accepted the family advocate’s advice under these circumstances.

I turn to deal with the question of the costs of both applications.   

7.	While it is quite true that a custody dispute should not be seen as an adversarial contest in the ordinary sense, but rather as an enquiry into the best interests of the child, it cannot be denied that in most cases the litigants are advancing their own preferences and seeking satisfaction of their love of the child.  Often, too, the papers contain many attacks on the character and conduct of the opponents.  
8.	On the other hand, it is also a consideration that a party should not be discouraged from putting up a case which he or she, on broadly reasonable grounds, thinks to be in the interests of the child for fear of having costs awarded against him or her if unsuccessful.  By the same token, a party who is, on what turn out to be good grounds, confident that his or her case will prevail, should not be discouraged from taking or resisting action because of the costs which he or she will incur.
9.	However bona fide and concerned a party may be, if his or her opponent’s judgment of the issue prevails, it is not, in the absence of circumstances justifying it, fair that the opponent should be mulcted in his or her own costs.”

Mr Louwrens submitted that the applicants had no choice but to launch an application to court to ask for the court’s assistance to gain access to their grandchild.  He submitted that the application had resulted in some progress being made insofar as there has been an  agreement reached with regard to mediation.  He submitted that without this application, the parties would not have agreed to attend mediation.  I cannot agree with this latter submission as mediation was never suggested at any stage by the applicant, neither was the invoking of the assistance of an independent counsellor prior to the launch of the application.  Had the applicants suggested such a course, there is nothing to suggest that the respondent would have opposed it.

Mr Louwrens furthermore submitted that, with regard to the first application, each party should pay his or her own costs.  He suggested that this would assist in building the relationship between the parties.  Ms Weyer, on the other hand, while accepting that it might smooth  the relationship were each party to pay their own costs, submitted that the respondent had been put to considerable costs by what was, in effect, three substantive applications all initiated by the applicant.  She furthermore submitted that given the wide orders sought by the applicant in the first application, the respondent had had no option but to oppose the matter.  She further submitted that the litigation had only succeeded in increasing the hostilities between the parties and that all moneys expended thereon by the respondent meant that less money would be available for G’s needs.

I have considered the arguments of counsel, the undisputed facts of the first application and the findings of this court.  Although the launch of the proceedings in this court may be understandable, given the soured relations and attendant difficulties in communication between the parties, and respondent’s refusal to allow the first applicant access to G, first applicant has, in my view, shown little insight or sensitivity to G’s needs in so doing and throughout the proceedings.  It would have been preferable had she explored other options to facilitate improved family relationships before she sought the assistance of the court.  

Furthermore, although the applicants’ frustrations with the slowness of court process are also understandable, the pushing for interim access prior to the finalisation of the matter was not advisable and ultimately led to more difficulties and problems for G.  Although the applicants had some measure of success in that application, it arose out of the respondent’s preparedness to be guided by Dr Bredenkamp’s advice.  

I agree with Ms Weyer that the access order sought was very wide and, if granted, would cause quite considerable inroads into G and his family’s choice of their free time pursuits, time with friends, family holidays etc.  What is of more importance, however, in my view, is that the respondent was genuinely concerned about what he perceived as the negative impact access to his grandmother was having on G.  This negative impact was exacerbated by the conflict between the adults, however, his concerns also related to the over emotionalism of the first applicant and her inappropriate behaviours towards G.  It is quite apparent that while he was concerned to try and maintain a healthy relationship between the first applicant and her grandchild, he was not prepared to allow such relationship to upset his son.  His concerns were to an extent borne out by the assessment of the first applicant’s personality style by Dr Bredenkamp and the first applicant’s demonstrated lack of sensitivity to the needs and emotions of this young child.

As indicated, it is my view that the first applicant has, in her dealings with respondent and G been driven by her own needs and preferences rather than G’s best interests.  Although it is fully understandable that the first applicant wished to and still wishes to maintain contact with her grandchild, there seems to have been little concern for the effect of such contact on G in the emotion-charged and conflictual family circumstances or of her, sometimes inappropriate behaviour towards him.
In my view, in all the circumstances, the respondent cannot be faulted for opposing the application and placing his concerns before this court.

It is undisputed that the respondent has caused two postponements of the main application as he was absent on agreed court dates.  However, I am not of the view, that the matter would have been able to proceed on those dates, in any event, as neither Dr Bredenkamp nor the family advocate had completed their reports.

Having anxiously considered all the relevant factors, I am not of the view that the circumstances of the first application are such that the court should depart from the general principle that the costs follow the result. 

In the result the following orders are made in these matters:-

10.	The first application, (case no. 524/2003) is dismissed.
11.	The second application, (case no. 6055/2003) is dismissed.
12.	The first and second applicants are ordered to pay the respondent’s costs in both applications, jointly and severally, the one paying, the other to be absolved.
13.	The parties are to attend mediation, as directed by the appointed mediators and in terms of this order, in order to reach resolution on the areas of conflict between them, or the manner of dealing with such conflicts appropriately in general, and, in particular, so as not to impact negatively on G’s welfare.

	4.1	There shall be two co-mediators appointed by the Office of the Family Advocate within seven days of the granting of this Order, should the parties themselves not be able to agree on the mediators from the list of mediators made available to them through the office of the Family Advocate.
	4.2	The mediators are requested to mediate the issues of conflict between the parties, which issues the parties shall themselves identify at the mediation.
	4.3	If, in the opinion of the parties and the mediators, the issues of conflict have been sufficiently resolved, then and in that event the mediators may attempt to mediate the issue of access with the parties.
	4.4	If after four sessions of mediation, or three months, whichever occurs first, the mediators in their sole discretion should conclude that the issues of conflict are not capable of being mediated, they shall file a certificate to this effect with the office of the Family Advocate.
	4.5	The costs of the mediation shall be shared equally between the Applicants and the Respondent.
	4.6	It shall be in the discretion of the mediators when the mediation sessions shall be held, save that such sessions shall commence within 2 weeks of the granting of this Order,
	4.7	Termination of mediation shall take effect on the filing of a certificate as contemplated in 4.4 above, or, in the event of the conflicts being capable of mediation, at the discretion of the mediators in consultation with the parties.

                                                
KNOLL J