REPORTABLE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(CAPE OF GOODHOPE PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
CASE NO:   10838/2004
807/2005
In the matter between
THE NATIONAL ARTS COUNCIL                                     First Applicant
MARK HILTON GORDON                           		    Second Applicant

and

MINISTER OF ARTS & CULTURE			     First Respondent
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ARTS & CULTURE			Second Respondent
Coram:		YEKISO J

Heard:		8, 9, 10 and 14 March 2005
Delivered:		15 July 2005

Summary:	Doctrine of submission – what constitutes - principles applied – respondents agreeing to postponements before hearing – respondents raising defence of absence of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction: Meeting held in Cape Town prior to decision made – Not sufficient to constitute sufficient connecting factor in respect of decision made in Pretoria.

JUDGMENT DELIVERED:     15 JULY 2005

Yekiso J
[1]	This is an application for the judicial review of a decision taken by the first respondent, purportedly taken in terms of section 5(5) of the National Arts Council Act, 56 of 1997.   In the paragraphs which follow I shall simply refer to this piece of legislation as “the Act”.
 
[2]	The first applicant is the National Arts Council, a juristic person established in terms of section 2 of the Act.   The National Arts Council is constituted by persons referred to in section 4(1) of the Act.   The first applicant has its offices and place of administration at 66 Wolhuter Street, Newtown, Johannesburg.   When I refer to persons who constitute the National Arts Council and who are appointed in terms of section 4 of the Act, I shall simply refer to them as members of the National Council.
 
[3]	The second applicant is the acting Chairperson of the first applicant in the absence of the incumbent Chairperson.   The second applicant was elected vice Chairperson of first applicant on 30 May 2004.
	
[4]	The first respondent is the Minister of Arts & Culture, a minister in the Government of the Republic of South Africa.   These proceedings have been instituted against the first respondent in that capacity.
 
[5]	The second respondent is the Director-General of the Department of Arts & Culture.   The second respondent has been joined in these proceedings in that capacity.
 
[6]	On 13 December 2004 the first respondent addressed a letter to the members of the National Council advising of a decision the first respondent had taken to “…cease all functions of the Board, in accordance with section 5(5) of the National Arts Council with effect from the 14th December 2004…”.   In his answering affidavit the first respondent refers to the decision he had taken to “terminate the tenure of the Board members” and that this decision was taken in Pretoria on 13 December 2004.   The evidence shows that the second applicant received the letter communicating the first respondent’s decision on 13 December 2004.

[7]	On 15 December 2004 second applicant launched an urgent application out of this Court for a rule nisi calling on the first and the second respondent to show cause, on a date to be determined by this Court, why an order should not be issued restraining the first respondent from purporting to dissolve the first applicant in terms of section 5(5) of the Act or, alternatively, an order restraining the first respondent from giving effect to any decision to dissolve the first applicant, pending review proceedings to be instituted to set aside any decision or purported decision taken by the first respondent to dissolve first applicant.

[8]	The first and the second respondent are opposing the relief sought.   Only the second respondent filed what he refers to as the abridged answer to the second applicant’s founding affidavit for urgent relief.   The second respondent goes on to say in his abridged answering affidavit that they needed an opportunity to consult with their legal representatives in order to file full and informed affidavits in answer to the second applicant’s founding affidavit.   After the launch proceedings for an urgent relief had been launched, the matter appears to have come before Van Zyl J who, it appears on basis of the record, had it postponed to 20 December 2004.

[9]	On 20 December 2004 the matter came before Desai J when, by consent between the parties, an order was granted postponing the matter to 28 January 2005 in order to afford the applicants an opportunity to amplify their founding affidavits and to amend their Notice of Motion to seek relief, by way of review, of the first respondent’s decision to dissolve the first applicant, alternatively, to order it to cease functioning.   

[10]	On 28 January 2005 the matter could not be heard but was postponed for the hearing of the review application on 3 March 2005.   Once again and for reasons not apparent on the record, the matter was once again postponed to 8 March 2005 for the hearing of the review application.   The Notice of Motion launching the review application was issued out of this Court on 31 January 2005.   The matter was argued before me on 8, 9, 10 and 14 March 2005.   After hearing the parties’ argument I reserved judgment.

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
[11]	The applicants seek to have the first respondents’ decision, communicated to members of the National Council, to cease all functions of the Board, purportedly taken in terms of section 5(5) of the Act, reviewed and set aside on a number of grounds and these being that the first respondent is not authorized by section 5(5) of the Act to remove the members of the National Council as opposed to dissolving first applicant; that the removal by first respondent of the members of the National Council is not authorised by the Act, such powers vesting only in the National Council itself; that the decision of first respondent, in removing the members of the National Council, was not procedurally fair as contemplated in section 3(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act nor were the members of the National Council afforded a reasonable opportunity to make representation prior to the first respondent taking such a decision; that the members of the National Council were not given a clear statement of the administrative action contemplated; they were not given adequate or any notice of any right of review or appeal and to request reasons in terms of section 5 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act; that the jurisdictional requirement of “reasonable ground” contemplated in section 5(5) of the Act was absent and that, therefore, in respect of any one or all such grounds, the action of the first respondent, in taking the decision as he did, constitutes an administrative action as defined in section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.   The applicants further contend in their papers and submissions that even if the action taken by the first respondent does not constitute an administrative action within the meaning of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, it is nonetheless reviewable under the principle of legality or under the rule of law in that the first respondent misconstrued his powers and/or acted arbitrarily or irrationally.

GROUNDS OF OPPOSITION
[12]	Both first and the second respondents oppose the relief sought, contending that the first respondent, in dissolving the Council as he did, acted validly in terms of the empowering provision and, as it were, dissolved the Council on reasonable grounds.   In doing so, so the respondents contend and argue, the first respondent dissolved the Council on reasonable grounds and in the exercise of executive authority relying, inter alia, on such authorities as the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 2000(1) SA 1(CC), in particular, paragraph [141] thereof.
 
[13]	Apart from the grounds of opposition set out in the preceding paragraph, the respondents are raising two points in limine, these being that, in as much as the decision by the first respondent complained of was taken in Pretoria and, in as much as the applicants contend that the decision taken by the first respondent constitutes an administrative action within the meaning of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, this Court does not have jurisdiction as the first respondent’s action, which is the basis of the applicants’ complaint, was taken in Pretoria and thus outside the jurisdiction of this Court.   The second point in limine taken by the respondents is based on the alleged authority by the second applicant to institute these proceedings, the respondents contending that the first applicant did not resolve to institute these proceedings and, as a consequence, the second applicant could not have been authorized to institute these proceedings on behalf of first applicant.   In determining these issues, it appears sensible to me to first dispose of the points raised in limine before dealing with the rest of the other issues in dispute.   In doing so, I shall first determine the issue of jurisdiction.

JURISDICTION
[14]	The statute which governs the structure and the jurisdiction of the High Court of South Africa, its several divisions, their respective jurisdictions and powers is the Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959.   In terms of the Supreme Court Act the original jurisdiction of the various divisions of the High Court is territorial.   In the instance of the Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division of the High Court, its jurisdictions is exercised over persons resident in or causes arising in the province of the Cape of Good Hope, excluding those areas over which the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape Divisions of the High Court exercise jurisdiction.     Similarly, in the instance of the Transvaal Provincial Division, its area of jurisdiction encompasses the area which used to constitute the old Transvaal but excluding the areas over which the Bophuthatswana High Court and the Venda High Court exercise jurisdiction.   Thus this Court will exercise jurisdiction in respect of persons resident within its area of jurisdiction or in respect of causes of action arising within its area of jurisdiction as defined in the First Schedule to the Supreme Court Act.   

[15]	Section 19(1) of the Supreme Court Act provides that a Provincial or Local Division of the High Court shall have jurisdiction over all persons residing or being in and in relation to all causes arising within its area of jurisdiction and all other matters of which it may according to law take cognisance.   To the extent that the applicants in the instance of these proceedings rely on the violation of their constitutional right to just administrative action, the question of whether this Court has jurisdiction must be answered with reference to both the Supreme Court Act read with the provisions of sections 1 and 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.

[16]	In terms of section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, the term “court”, in the instance of the High Court, is defined as:
“(a)	……….
(b)	(i)	a High Court or another court of similar status;
(ii)	…………..
within whose area of jurisdiction the administrative action occurred or the administrator has his or her or its principal place of administration or the party whose rights have been affected is domiciled or ordinarily resident or the adverse effect of the administrative action was, is or will be experienced.”
Section 6(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, in turn, provides that a court or tribunal has the power to review an administrative action on a number of grounds listed in subsection 2 of section 6.
 
[17]	As has already been pointed out in paragraph [13] of this judgment the respondents, by way of a point in limine, place the question of jurisdiction of this Court in dispute on the basis that the decision which constitutes the basis of the applicants’ complaint was taken in Pretoria and communicated to the members of the National Council from Pretoria.  The respondents thus contend the cause of action, whether or not the first respondent’s action constitutes an administrative action, on the applicants’ version, or constitutes an executive action, on the respondents’ version, arose in Pretoria.

[18]	The respondents contend further that the first applicant has its principal place of administration in Johannesburg and, for that reason, the first applicant is resident or domiciled in Johannesburg and whatever effect the decision taken by the first respondent could have, these effects are felt or ought to be felt by the first applicant in Johannesburg and thus outside the area of jurisdiction of this Court.   Thus, so the respondents argue, the proper forum to have been properly seized with this matter is the Transvaal Provincial Division where the cause of action arose, or, alternatively, the Witwatersrand Local Division of the High Court in whose area of jurisdiction the effects of the first respondent’s decision are felt by the first applicant.

[19]	The applicants counter the respondents’ assertions on various contentions, these being that the Act does not provide where in the Republic the activities of the first applicant that constitute its business must be carried out; that at least two of the former members of the National Council are resident in Cape Town and that, therefore, the adverse effect of the first respondent’s decision was and is still being experienced in Cape Town; that the adverse effects on the rights of the public, represented by their duly elected provincial representative, unless lawfully removed, was and is still being so experienced in Cape Town; that the administrative action complained of flows from the meeting which was held in Cape Town on 16 November 2004; that it was at this meeting  (on 16 November 2004) where the first respondent intimated that he was considering dismissing the members of the National Council under the Act and that, in any event, the respondents have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court.

[20]	In the first instance the applicants do not seriously dispute the respondents’ assertion that the decision to “cease all functions of the Board” was taken in Pretoria and communicated to the various members of the National Council from Pretoria.   All that the applicants contend in their submission and argument is the fact that the decision taken by the first respondent flows from the meeting held in Cape Town constitutes  a sufficient connecting factor for this Court to exercise jurisdiction.   This may well be so, but no decision which adversely affects either the rights of the first applicant or those of the second applicant was taken in Cape Town.

[21]	That the decision to “cease all functions of the Board” was taken in Pretoria and communicated to various members of the National Council from Pretoria, is not seriously challenged by the applicants.   Whether or not the decision taken by the first respondent is administrative or executive in nature, to me there does not seem to be any serious dispute that such decision was taken in Pretoria and thus outside the area of jurisdiction of this Court.    Thus the conclusion is inescapable that the Court within whose area of jurisdiction the administrative action, on the applicants’ version, occurred, or where the executive action, on the respondents’ version, occurred, is the Transvaal Provincial Division.

THE NATIONAL ARTS COUNCIL ACT
[22]	As to the applicants’ contention that the National Arts Council Act does not provide where in the Republic the activities of the first applicant that constitutes its business must be carried on, it needs to be recalled that, amongst other things, the preamble to the Act provides “to establish a juristic person to be known as the National Arts Council; to determine its objects, functions and method of work; to prescribe the manner in which it is to be managed and governed; to regulate its staff matters and financial affairs and to provide for matters incidental thereto.”  (my underlining)  

[23]	The Act goes on to provide for the management structure of the Council, which is headed by the Chief Executive Officer who, in the nature of the position, will be responsible to supervise staff and manage the financial affairs of the Council.   What the Act clearly envisages is the administrative unit of the Council where its activities are to be carried on or where the program management unit of the Council is to be based.     

[24]	On basis of the evidence on record, this appears to be in Johannesburg.   The letterheads of the National Arts Council depict an address in Johannesburg.   The letter addressed by the second applicant to the first applicant authorising the transfer of funds is addressed to an address in Johannesburg; the response to such letter emanates from Johannesburg; indications are that the staff of first applicant is based in Johannesburg and indeed all indications are that the first applicant’s business activity is carried on in Johannesburg.   

[25]	The Act does indeed provide that the Council shall meet at least three times a year … at such times and places as the Council may determine.   No member shall serve on the Council on a full time basis.   The Council meets from time to time to take resolutions and to determine matters relating to policy.   These activities do not constitute the daily business activity of the first applicant.   That the Council may meet at such times and places as may be determined does not negate the only inference which, in my view, can be drawn based on the facts and evidence that first applicant carries on its business activity in Johannesburg and thus resident or domiciled in Johannesburg.   Whatever effects the decision taken by the first respondent may have on the first applicant, these are felt by the first applicant in Johannesburg.

MEMBERS RESIDENT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
[26]	The applicants further contend in their submissions that two members of the National Council reside within the area of jurisdiction of this Court, one of them having resigned before the first respondent took the decision complained of.   The applicants contend that the rights of the remaining member of the National Council resident in Cape Town were similarly affected by the decision take by the first respondent and that, by virtue of this member’s residence within the area of this Court’s jurisdiction, this Court ought to have jurisdiction to be properly seized with these proceedings by virtue of such residence, placing reliance for this proposition on such authority as Estate Agents Board v Lek .

[27]	The members of the National Council are appointed in the manner provided for in the National Arts Council Act.  They shall hold office for a period not exceeding four years.   No member shall serve on the Council on a full-time basis.   Members of the Council shall, in respect of their services, receive such allowance as the Minister, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, may determine either in general or in a particular case.   The Council shall meet at least three times a year, and meetings shall be held at such times and places as the Council may determine and their functions (members of the National Council) are as set out in the Act.

[28]	From what has been set out in the preceding paragraph, it is abundantly clear that members of the National Council serve on part-time basis; that they are not salaried members of staff and whatever allowance they receive, is in respect of such service they may render from time to time.   It appears that their core function is to deliberate at meetings and take resolutions arising from such meetings.   Whatever resolutions are taken, anywhere in the Republic, these have to be executed at the principal place of administration of the first applicant and in respect of which I have already found, in paragraph [25] of this judgment, is resident or domiciled at no 66 Wolhuter Street, Newtown, Johannesburg.   In my view whatever effect the first respondent ‘s decision could have, does not adversely affect each individual member of the National Council but that such decision has a direct effect on the first applicant whose principal place of administration is in Johannesburg.   In my view it cannot be said that the residence or otherwise of any member of the National Council within the area of jurisdiction of a Court is a sufficient connecting factor to establish jurisdiction.   The applicants’ reliance on the Estate Agents Board, supra, for the proposition that this Court is properly seized with these proceedings is, in my view, misplaced.   Thus I am unable to find that, because one of the members of the first applicant resides in Cape Town, constitutes a sufficient connecting factor to found jurisdiction.

[29]	As regards the applicant’s contention that the decision of the first respondent has an effect on the general arts community, some of whose members reside in Cape Town, the problem I have with this proposition is, apart from a sufficient connecting factor as regards such arts community not having been established on evidence, this action is brought by the second applicant on behalf of the first applicant, purportedly on basis of the resolution taken by members of the National Council in Johannesburg on 27 November 2004.   The action is not brought on behalf of a class of persons but has been instituted, on behalf of the first applicant, on basis of the alleged violation of the first and the second applicant’s constitutional right to just administrative action as also the members of the National Council.

[30]	Nowhere in the founding affidavit of the second applicant or in his replying affidavit is it alleged that these proceedings have been instituted on basis of any of the grounds identified in section 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.   These proceedings are clearly not a class action of the kind envisaged in section 38 of the Constitution, so that, this further suggested ratio jurisdictionis also ought to fail.

MEETING IN CAPE TOWN
[31]	The jurisdictional fact which has specifically been pleaded in the applicants’ papers is the one alleged in paragraph 9 of second applicant’s founding affidavit in support of the urgent relief deposed to on 14 December 2004.   In this affidavit the second applicant states that “This Court has jurisdiction to hear this application as the action on the part of the First Respondent that the Applicants complain of commenced in Cape Town as appears from what is stated hereunder.”   As has already been pointed out, this allegation is made in the second applicant’s founding affidavit in an urgent application for urgent relief and which preceded the launching of the review application.   The allegation is not repeated in the founding affidavit in support of the review application.

[32]	In response to a letter addressed to the first respondent by the applicants attorneys of record as regards the precise grounds of the alleged dismissal of the members of the National Council, the first respondent, whilst denying the allegation that he had dismissed the members of the National Council, stated that he is “reviewing the matter” and that “a further communication will be addressed to you (applicants’ attorneys of record)in due course”.

[33]	On 19 November 2004, the first respondent addressed a similarly worded letter to Members of the Executive Council of the nine provinces represented in the Council seeking their views about the steps he contemplated taking against the members of the National Council to which it appears all the Members of the Executive Council of the nine provinces responded.   By way of a letter dated 10 December 2004 the first respondent communicated the following letter to each of the members of the National Council:
“Following our meeting on 16th November 2004 regarding the future of the National Arts Council, I have taken a decision to cease all functions of the Board in accordance with Section 5(5) of the National Arts Council Act with effect from the 14th December 2004.   I consulted all nine the MECs from the provinces before taking this decision and their views have been taken into account.   I have taken the above decision in the best interest of the arts community and the country at large.   A Ministerial Media Statement will be issued in due course, explaining my actions and what has transpired between the Ministry and the outgoing Board.”

[34]	It would appear that the second applicant received this letter at approximately 13h00 on 13 December 2004.   This letter was communicated to each member of the National Council from Pretoria.   In paragraph 9 of the affidavit deposed to by the first respondent in Cape Town on 16 February 2005, the first respondent states that he took the decision to act in the matter he did after considering the views of Members of the Executive Council from the various provinces.   The first respondent further states that he took the decision in Pretoria.

[35]	It is quite clear on basis of the record that no decision which adversely affects the rights of any one of the applicants having a direct, external legal effect was taken in Cape Town.   Even if the first respondent proposed or contemplated making a decision at the time of the meeting held in Cape Town, the decision was finally made in Pretoria.   It is thus clear, in my view, that the decision by the first respondent was taken in Pretoria and thus outside the jurisdiction of this Court.   I am not persuaded by the proposition that because the decision taken by the first respondent commenced or flows from a meeting held in Cape Town constitutes a sufficient connecting factor to establish jurisdiction.

ALLEGED SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION
[36]	The final point made by the applicants to counter the jurisdictional point is that even if it could be said that both the applicants and the respondents are peregrini of this Court, a point which the applicants do not concede both in their papers and submissions, the respondents have nonetheless consented to the jurisdiction of this Court.   The applicants base this contention on the fact that the respondents did not raise jurisdiction as a defence in their answering affidavits to the applicants’ application for urgent relief; that such consent is furthermore embodied in a court order dated 20 December 2004 by Desai J, obtained by agreement, setting out the further conduct of the matter including the filing of further processes including the amendment of the Notice of Motion in order to seek relief, by way of review, of the first respondent’s decision to dissolve first applicant; that two further orders were further obtained, by agreement, pertaining to the time table to be followed by the parties.   The applicants thus argue the respondents’ conduct in agreeing to the aforementioned orders and to the postponement of the matter, is capable of an inference that the respondents consented to the jurisdiction of this Court.

APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES
[37]	It can at this stage of the development of the law regarding the jurisdiction be said without hesitation that submission to a jurisdiction of a court can take two forms.   These are that the parties may agree, either at the time of contracting with each other or when a dispute between them has arisen, to submit to the jurisdiction of the court.   Alternatively, a defendant may, when sued in a court which would otherwise have no power over him, acquiesce in its jurisdiction.   In each case the onus will be on the party alleging submission to jurisdiction that the defendant has submitted or consented to jurisdiction either expressly or by conduct consistent only with acquiescence.   Innes CJ illustrates the principle thus in Law v Rutherford:
“The onus is strictly on the appellant.   He must show that the respondent, with full knowledge of her right, decided to abandon it, whether expressly or by conduct plainly inconsistent with an intention to enforce it.   Waiver is a question of fact, depending on the circumstances.”

[38]	There is no general rule on when the conduct of a party will amount to tacit submission to the jurisdiction of a court.   If, in deciding whether or not a person has submitted to the court’s jurisdiction, an inference may be fairly drawn either way, then the party who argues that there has been acquiescence with the court’s jurisdiction must be held to have failed to discharge the onus cast on him.   The test to determine an intention to waiver is objective.

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
[39]	The review proceedings were preceded by an urgent application for an urgent relief.   In these proceedings the second applicant has advanced, as the basis of this Court having jurisdiction, the fact that the action complained of commenced in Cape Town.   This allegation is not repeated in the founding affidavit in support of the review application.   In paragraph [31] of this judgment I have made a finding that no decision which adversely affects the rights of any one of the applicants, having a direct external legal effect, was taken in Cape Town and accordingly found against this Court having jurisdiction.

[40]	The papers in the application for urgent relief were issued on 15 December 2004.   It is not clear on basis of the record as regards when and where service was effected on the first and second respondent.   The second respondent’s affidavit, in answer to some of the allegations in the founding affidavit for urgent relief, was deposed to in Pretoria on 17 December 2004.   In paragraph 5 of his answering affidavit the second respondent states: 
“In the short time permitted to the respondents we are constrained to give the abridged answer below.   Neither the first respondent nor I (the second respondent) have had the opportunity to discuss the matter in person with our legal representatives or to reply fully.   Where any allegations made on behalf of the applicants are not specifically answered or dealt with, the omission should be construed as a denial.”

[41]	The record indicates that the matter first came before Van Zyl J on 15 December 2004.    At that stage no answering affidavits had as yet been filed on behalf of any of the respondents.   On 20 December 2004 Desai J granted an order postponing the matter to 28 January 2005.   This was followed by the order granted by Foxcroft J postponing the matter to 3 March 2005 and a further order by Hlophe JP further postponing the matter to 8 March 2005.   All these postponements were by agreement between the parties but obviously subject to the respondents consulting with their legal representatives with a view to filing full and informed affidavits as stated in paragraph 6 of the second respondent’s affidavit deposed to on 17 December 2004.

[42]	On 31 January 2005 the second applicant deposed a comprehensive affidavit in support of the review application.   In this affidavit there is no further allegation made that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the review application nor any allegations that first and second respondents waived their rights to raise jurisdiction as a defence.

[43]	It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the first occasion available to the respondents to deal with the applicants’ application fully was when they filed their opposing affidavits in the review proceedings on 16 February 2005.   The second respondent, in answer to the second applicant’s allegation in his founding affidavit that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the application for urgent relief, had this to say in paragraph 67 of his affidavit deposed to on 16 February 2005:
“Ad Paragraph 9 thereof
The allegeations are denied.   The decision to act in terms of section 5(5) was taken in Pretoria and communicated from Pretoria.”

[44]	Thus, in his answering affidavit, the second respondent clearly placed the allegation that this Court has jurisdiction, in dispute.   In my view this is not the kind of conduct which could be said to be consistent with either waiver or acquiescence.
As has already been pointed out the matter came before me on 8 March 2005 and on the days which followed when jurisdiction and lack of authority to institute these proceedings on behalf of the first applicant was challenged.

[45]	In these circumstances, I cannot, in the absence of any clear indication that the applicants have waived their rights to raise jurisdiction as a defence, or any clear indication that the respondents have submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court, find that the respondent have submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court.   I am therefore unable to find that the respondents, from the time the urgent proceedings were instituted up to the stage of the launching the review proceedings, conducted themselves in a manner consistent with acquiescence.

[46]	I thus cannot find, on basis of any of the contentions advanced by the applicants, either individually or cumulatively, that this Court either has jurisdiction to hear the application for urgent relief or for the judicial review of the decision by the first respondent.   It is thus my considered view that the applicants have not succeeded to surmount the jurisdictional hurdle.   In the light of the conclusion I have reached in regard to the jurisdictional point, it is not necessary for me to determine the rest of the other issues, significant as they are, raised by either of the parties.

[47]	In the result I make the following order:
[47.1]	   The application is dismissed with costs which shall include costs consequent upon employment of two counsel;
[47.2]	   First and second applicant are ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.

………………………..
N  J Yekiso, J