Republic of South Africa 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
(CAPE OF GOOD HOPE PROVINCIAL DIVISION)

REPORTABLE
CASE No: 14867/095

In the matter between:
PEARL BETTING CC 					First Applicant
HILTON ALEXANDER HASSON				Second Applicant

and
WESTERN CAPE GAMBLING AND RACING BOARD		First Respondent
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE WESTERN CAPE 
GAMBLING AND RACING BOARD					Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT DELIVERED : 9 SEPTEMBER 2009

[1] This matter came before me as a matter of extreme urgency in the Motion Court on 24 July 2009. The urgency was dictated by the fact that the licences issued, by First Respondent to enable First Applicant to operate as a bookmaker and Second Applicant as a "key employee" of First Applicant, were to expire at twelve midnight on the day the matter was argued before me.

[2] After having read the papers filed in the matter and having heard counsel for the parties, I granted a mandatory interdict authorising First and Second Applicants to carry on their respective bookmaking activities under the existing licences pending the review proceedings instituted by them. The authority was granted subject to the existing conditions attached to such licences or any such additional requirements which may lawfully be imposed by First Respondent.

[3] I would have preferred to have more time to give consideration to this matter, but because of the extreme urgency of the matter, I issued the order and indicated that I am prepared to furnish reasons should I be requested to do so. On 28 July 2009, I was requested by Respondents' Attorneys to furnish reasons for my order.

The Facts
[5] On 23 April 2009, Applicants applied for the renewal of their respective licences. On 13 July 2009, Second Applicant was informed telephonically that the applications were considered at the meeting of First Respondent on 30 June 2009 and the applications were declined. The decisions and the reasons therefore were formally conveyed to Applicants in writing on 15 July 2009. Applicants requested First Respondent to reconsider the decisions but it refused such request.

The Law

The Case for the Parties
[9] Applicants contended that First Respondent's decisions fall to be set aside on the bases that they were unlawful and procedurally unfair in that they were founded on an error of law; that they were taken for a reason not authorised by the Act; that irrelevant considerations were taken into account and relevant considerations were not considered; and that the decisions were not rationally connected to the purposes of section 40 of the Act and the information before it.

Evaluation

[12] The second requirement was a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm If the interim relief was not granted and Applicants succeeded in their review proceedings. In that event First Applicant would have been forced to close its bookmaking business; the goodwill that had been established since the commencement of the business would have been destroyed; difficulty would have been experienced in recovering monies owed by punters; the prospects of negotiating with funders and/or partners to inject more capital into the business to make it more viable and expand its operations, would have come to nought and those employees, including Second Applicant, who were dependent on the business for a living, would have lost their livelihood ,especially in the present economic turn down and if Applicants succeeded in the review proceedings it would have been almost impossible to re-establish the business. The prejudice that Applicants would have suffered if the interim relief was not granted, would by far have exceeded any prejudice that First Respondent would have suffered if the interim relief was granted. I was therefore of the view that the Applicants had met the second requirement for interim relief.

[13] The third requirement was a balance of convenience of granting the interim relief. The Applicants are challenging the decisions of the First Respondent in the review proceedings on the basis of unlawfulness and procedural unfairness. They contended that First Respondent was not competent to "revoke" their licences under section 40 of the Act, which provide for the annual renewal of the licences. They contended further, that it should have made use of the powers set out in section 42 of the Act which provided for the suspension or revocation of licences and the procedures dictated by section 23 of the Act.

[16] The last requirement was the question of alternative remedy. I do not think that the Respondents seriously contested the fact that Applicants had no suitable alternative remedy. The question of damages was not a practical alternative remedy as it would have been virtually impossible to quantify. In my view Applicants would have been left remediless if the interim relief were not granted and Applicants succeeded in their review proceedings. In such event, Applicants would not only have suffered serious prejudice, but a grave injustice would have been perpetrated against them.

"For more than half a century interim relief in the form of mandatory orders to prevent prejudice or injustice has been decreed in several of the provinces."

"An inherent power of this kind is a salutary power which should be jealously preserved and even extended where exceptional circumstances are present and where, but for the exercise of the power, a litigant would be remediless, as is the case here."

The Order

[21] For reasons stated above, I was satisfied that Applicants met all the requirements for the interim relief and accordingly granted the order as set out in annexure "A" hereto.
E MOOSA