IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOW

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH ARICA

(WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN)

						CASE NO:4280/2007

In the matter between:

ADVOCATE W. COUGHLAN obo 
M.H. WITBOOI 								Plaintiff

and
LEANDRA TRANSPORT CC				Defendant
and
SANTAM LIMITED						Third Party

			JUDGMENT : 25 OCTOBER 2010

TRAVERSO, DJP :

"3.   Roadworthy
The insurer shall not be liable for any accident injury loss damage or liability whilst the vehicle is being used in a condition which does not comply with the provisions and regulations of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996, the National Road Traffic Regulations 2000 and/or any other applicable or subsequent legislation and/or regulations providing for the use of motor vehicles on a public roadway in South Africa or any similar legislation which applies to the countries specified as the territorial limits in the schedule."

Read with the following clause:

"6.   Prevention of loss
The insured shall take all reasonable steps and precautions to prevent accidents or losses arising. If any vehicle which is the subject of a claim in terms of this policy is in an unroadworthy condition at the time of the occurrence giving rise to a claim it will be deemed that this condition has not been complied with and no benefit will be payable."

"The ordinary rules relating to the interpretation of contracts must be applied in construing a policy of insurance. A court must therefore endeavour to ascertain the intention of the parties. Such intention is, in the first instance, to be gathered from the language used which, if clear, must be given effect to. This involves giving the words used their plain, ordinary and popular meaning unless the context indicates otherwise (Scottish Union & National Insurance Co Ltd v Native Recruiting Corporation Ltd 1934 AD 458 at 464-5). Any provision which purports to place a limitation upon a clearly expressed obligation to indemnify must be restrictively interpreted (Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd v Hanmer-Strudwick 1964(1) SA 349 (A) at 354 C-D); for it is the insurer's duty to make clear what particular risks it wishes to exclude (French Hairdressing Saloons Ltd v National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd 1931 AD 60 at 65; Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd v Hanmer-Strudwick (supra at
354 D-E). A policy normally evidences the contract and an insured's obligation, and the extent to which an insurer's liability is limited, must be plainly spelt out In the event of a real ambiguity the contra proferentem rule, which requires a written document to be construed against the person who drew it up, would operate against Fedgen as drafter of the policy (Kliptown Clothing Industries (Pty) Ltd v Marine and Trade Insurance C of SA Ltd 1961(1) SA 103 (A) at 108 C)."

Regulations providing for the use of motor vehicles on a public roadway in South Africa.

(b) General policy condition number 6 excludes liability in the event of a vehicle being in an unroadworthy condition at the time of the occurrence giving rise to a claim.

"If the insured vehicle at the time of any accident giving rise to a claim in terms of this policy is found to be in a state or condition which is deemed not roadworthy then all benefit under this policy shall be forfeited."

'Roadworthy' in the present context can in my view only mean 'fit for the road' or 'worthy for the road'. It means, in other words, that it must be in a suitable condition for using on the road."

"[10] There can be no question that, if the ordinary meaning of the words in the exception clause is given effect to, the plaintiff and Cumbe fell squarely within the terms of the exception clause. Reading causation into the exception clause is not justified by its wording. I agree with the submission that such an approach may have the effect that even in the case of an accident involving an unlicensed driver the insurer would still not be able to rely on the exception clause, because it would have to prove, not only the absence of the licence, but also that the lack thereof caused the accident. The practical effect would be that the company would be exempted only if the unlicensed driver's lack of skill in driving the vehicle caused the accident That would mean that not only causation but also negligence on such a driver's part is required and that, clearly, is not the intention conveyed in the clause. It is true that the exception clause in casu must be restrictively interpreted but equally true is the fact that the ordinary meaning of the words must be given effect to."

accordingly found:
"Mr. Makhubedu was undoubtedly in contravention of s 32 at the time of the collision. He was however for all intents and purposes licensed to drive the insured vehicle at the time of the collision."

On appeal, the Full Bench (per Thring, J, Cleaver et Dlodlo, JJ concurring) said the following in this regard:
"Weliswaar het die bestuurder op die getuienis aan al die vereistes voldoen vir die uitreik aan horn van 'n nuwe PBP, en sou die uitreiking daarvan 'n formaliteit gewees het. Dit maak horn egter nie 'n persoon wat 'gelisensieer is om sodanige voertuig te bestuur nie'. Op die gewone betekenis van die woord 'gelisensieer' kon hy dit eers geword bet nadat die PBP aan horn uitgereik was, want tot dan kan nie gese word dat 'n lisensie of verlof aan horn toegeken is of dat vergunning aan horn gegee is om die betrokke voertuie op 'n openbare pad te bestuur nie (HAT omskrywing van 'lisensieer' en 'lisensie'): hy het dus nie aan die vereiste van spesifieke uitsondering 1(c)(ii) voldoen nie, naamlik, dat hy 'gelisensieer' moet wees om die betrokke voertuie te bestuur.
Myns insiens is die tersaaklike woorde wat die partye in die polis gebruik het duidelik en ondubbelsinnig. Daar is geen rede waarom hulle nie hulle gewone, alledaagse betekenis in die polis moet dra nie, of waarom hulpmiddels soos die contra proferentem-reel ingespan moet word, wat slegs in geval van dubbelsinnigheid of onduidelikheid van toepassing is.
Die intellektuele sprong wat die Hof a quo van die woord 'gelisensieer' na die begrip 'competent' gemaak het is dus na my oordeel een wat nie behoorlik gemaak kon word nie. Dit volg dat die geleerde Verhoorregter myns insiens gefouteer het toe sy dit gemaak het"

"The defendant's claim against the Third Party is dismissed with costs."
traverso, djp