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Republic of South Africa

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN)

Exercising its Admiralty Jurisdiction

CASE NO: AC 149/10

Name of ship: The bunker barge "Southern Valour"

In the matter between:

CHEVRON SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LIMITED ….........................................................Applicant

and

UNICAL CALULO BUNKER SERVICES (PTY) LTD …...................................First Respondent

ADVOCATE MICHAEL J. FITZGERALD SC N.O. …..................................Second Respondent

JUDGMENT DELIVERED THIS WEDNESDAY, 15 JUNE 2011

Zondi. J

Introduction

[1] This is an application by Chevron South Africa (Pty) Ltd ("Chevron") for an order that the time required to bring suit under a charter party dated July 2007, be extended, pursuant to section 8 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965("the Arbitration Act"). The application is opposed by Unical Calulo Bunker Services (Pty) Ltd ("Unical"). The second respondent has not involved himself in this litigation.

[2] Chevron has commenced arbitration proceedings against Unical to enforce a damages claim of R24 412 221.33 arising out of a Shelltime 4 charter party concluded by the parties in respect of barge. Unical has defended the claim and has raised a special defence to the effect that a significant portion of the claim, being an amount of approximately R18 million, is time-barred. For its special defence Unical relies on the provision of Article 111, Rule 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules which discharges the ship from all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods unless the claim is brought within one year of their delivery or the date when they should have been delivered. Although Chevron disputes that Article 111, Rule 6 applies to the claim it nevertheless seeks an order that in the event of the arbitrator finding it applies to its claim and upholding Unical's special defence, the one year time-bar be extended to the date upon which the arbitrator finds that Chevron validly commenced arbitration proceedings to enforce the claim.

Point in Limine

[3] Before dealing with the merits of the application I must first consider a point in limine taken by Unical.

[4] The point taken by Mr Stewart., who appeared on behalf of Unical, was that in the absence of a concession by Chevron that a time-bar applies to its claims, the court does not have jurisdiction to order the relief sought by Chevron. He argued that it is clear from section 8 of the Arbitration Act, which is the section under which Chevron claims relief, that in order for the court to extend the time within which Chevron may commence arbitration proceedings there must be an agreement providing for the referral of future disputes to arbitration and the agreement must provide that any claim to which the agreement applies shall be barred unless the arbitration proceedings are commenced within a stipulated time. In support of his submission he referred to the case of Willmington (Pty) Ltd v Short & McDonald (Pty) Ltd¹ in which the court held at 34E-F:

"It is only when a dispute actually arises between the parties that arbitration proceedings can be commenced and, accordingly, that some step can be taken to commence such proceedings, it is clear from the wording of Section 8 of Act 42 that, before an order in terms of that section can be made - (a) there must be an arbitration agreement to refer future disputes to arbitration; (b) that agreement must provide that any claim to which the agreement applies shall be barred unless some step to commence arbitration proceedings is taken within a time fixed by the agreement; and (c) a dispute to which the agreement applies must have arisen".

[5] He pointed out that since Chevron in its founding affidavit and replying affidavit disputes that there is a time-bar which is applicable to its claim this court does not have jurisdiction to order the relief which Chevron seeks. In developing this point Mr Stewart argued that the charter party between the parties provides that all claims 'arising out of any loss of or damage to or in connection with cargo shall be subject to the Hague-Visby Rules notwithstanding that the parties have agreed that bills of lading will not be issued for the carriage of the cargo'.

[6] He pointed out that Article 111 Rule 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules excludes liability of the carrier and the ship in certain instances. It discharges the carrier and the ship from all liability in respect of the goods if the suit is not brought within one year of their delivery or the date when they should have been delivered.

[7] In response Mr Wragge, who appeared together with Mr McKenzie for Chevron, submitted that section 8 of the Arbitration Act does not establish the requirement contended for by Unical. He argued that the suggestion by Unical that the court cannot determine the present application until such time as there is either a concession or a waiver of a right by Chevron to take the arbitration point is incorrect. He pointed out that in the arbitration proceedings Unical has sought a declaratory order that some of Chevron's claims have prescribed and that any liability of Unical to Chevron as may be established in due course should be limited as being only in respect of losses of cargo that was delivered one year or less prior to the bringing of suit in respect of those losses. Mr Wragge argued that the fact that the one year time-bar has been raised is sufficient to enable the court to determine the issue and in doing so it must proceed on the basis that Unical's defence is a good one.

[8] In my view, the matters raised in the arbitration proceedings are matter which this court cannot go into. The arbitrator, before whom the proceedings are pending, is best suited to deal with them when he hears the arbitration. The present application can. in my view, be disposed of without the need to determine the issues which are for consideration by the arbitrator.

[9] The matter must therefore be considered on the footing that the one year time-bar defence which Unical has raised is a good defence. The question which must therefore be decided is, on the footing that the time-bar applies to the claims of Chevron and that Unical's defence is a good one, whether the time in which to commence arbitration proceedings should be extended. This approach does not force Chevron to forego any defence it may possibly raise in the arbitration proceedings including the one relating to non-applicability of the one year time-bar provision to its claims.

[10] I now proceed to consider the merits of the application. It is common cause that Chevron is a manufacturer and seller of petroleum products, including marine fuel and diesel oils, which marine products are sold to its customers and delivered to vessels at various South African ports, including the port of Cape Town ("the port").

[11] Chevron's marine products are either delivered to vessels in the port via pipeline, or via a bunker barge, which is loaded at a berth in the port and thereafter proceeds to deliver fuel to vessels.

[12] During or about July 2007, Chevron and Unical concluded a Shelltime 4 charter party for the bunker barge 'Southern Valour'. Mr Thor Sellar ("Sellar") of Chevron was not involved in the negotiation and conclusion of the charter party. At that point in time Sellar was employed by Chevron as its Supply Operations Manager for Southern and Central Africa. He became the Bunker and Overland Trading Manager for Chevron on 1 May 2008.

[13] In terms of the charter party Unical agreed to let and Chevron agreed to hire the barge for a period of 60 months commencing from the date of delivery of the barge, for purposes of carrying all lawful merchandise.

[14] Unical delivered the barge to Chevron at the port on 19 August 2008 and the barge commenced bunker deliveries to vessels in the port. Chevron contracted Captain Harris to implement the barge's operations under the charter party on its behalf.

[15] Clause 27 of the charter party deals with exceptions and provides as follows:

"(a) The vessel, her master and Owners shall not, unless otherwise in this charter expressly provided, be liable for any loss or damage or delay or failure arising or resulting from any act neglect or default of the master, pilots, mariners or other servants of Owners in the navigation or management of the vessel; fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of Owners: collision or standing; dangers and accidents of the sea: explosion bursting of boilers, breakage of shafts or any latent defect in hull, equipment or machinery; provided, however that Clauses 1, 2, and 3 hereof shall be unaffected by the foregoing. Further neither the vessel, her master or Owners, nor Charterers shall, unless otherwise in this charter expressly provided, be liable for any loss or damage or delay or failure in performance hereunder arising or resulting from act of God, act of war, seizure under legal process, quarantine restrictions, strikes, lock-outs, riots, restraints of labour, civil commotions or arrest or restraint of princes, rulers or people,

(b) ...

[16] Clause 27(c)(ii) excludes the operation of clause 27(a) in certain instances. It provides:

"(c) Cause 27 (a) shall not apply to or affect any liability of Owners or the vessel or any other relevant person in respect of:

(ii) any claim (whether brought by Charterers or any other person) arising out of any loss of or damage to or in connection with cargo. All such claims shall be subject to the Hague-Visby Rules, excluding the provisions of Article 3 Rule 8 thereof, notwithstanding that the parties have agreed that bills of lading will not be issued for the carriage of the cargo".

[17] Clause 5 of Annexure A to the charter party makes provision for law and arbitration. It provides as follows:

"This charter shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of South Africa, without regard to the choice of law principles thereof Any dispute, whether contractual or not arising out of or in connection with this agreement (including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination) shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in Cape Town, South Africa according to the then in force rules of the Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa ("AFSA"). Any arbitration award may be made an order of court by either party and enforced against the defaulting party. The provisions of this clause shall not prevent either party from seeking urgent relief from any competent court'.

[18] The delivery of Chevron's marine products (Marine Fuel Oil (MFO) to vessels in the port involves Joint Bunkering Services (JBS), a joint venture between BP, Shell, Engen and Chevron. JBS has a facility within the port managed and operated by BP. Essentially, Chevron supplies marine products via a pipeline to the JBS facility, where the products are stored, pending delivery to vessels via a pipeline directly from JBS, or to the barge at the JBS berth.

[19] The barge 'fills-up' with products at the JBS berth every few days or as and when necessary. JBS has fixed shore meters at the berth which measure the quantity of MFO and Gasoil delivered to the barge. The barge on the instructions of Chevron then delivers the marine products to vessels within the port and is responsible for ensuring that the correct quantities are delivered.

[20] During this period Chevron monitored the deliveries of marine products to the barge, and from the barge to vessels in the port by way of a number of internally prepared excel spreadsheets created from figures and/or report provided externally from, inter alia, JBS; the barge; Chevron's customers, which were then compared. This involved a reconciliation of the volume of marine products recorded by the JBS facility as having been delivered to the barge; the volume recorded by the barge as having been delivered to vessels, and the volume reflected by the barge as remaining on board at the end of the month.

[21] On 3 September 2008 Captain Harris, Chevron's representative, wrote to Unical pointing out that he had picked up problems reconciling the month end stock sheets for the period commencing 13 August 2008 and asking that the barge masters check their stock sheets.

[22] In an attempt to establish the cause and extent of the loss, on 11 September 2008 Chevron contracted Gazelle Testing Services, who were later replaced by Intertek Testing Services ("ITS"), to monitor stock movements.

[23] Chevron and Unical had, since the inception of the barge's operations in the port, convened a monthly meeting to deal with operational and other issues arising out of the charter party.

[24] On 15 September 2008 the parties' respective representatives held their usual monthly meeting. Chevron's representative advised Unical's representative that Chevron's records indicated that marine products delivered to the barge by the JBS facility were unaccounted for, and that Chevron would have to bill Unical for the loss in accordance with the provisions of the charter party.

[25] Unical's representative denied liability. It contended that any possible discrepancy was the inaccuracy of the JBS shore meters and that if there was a shortage, it was the fault of JBS and not Unical.

[26] According to Mr Burns ("Burns") of Unical Mr Esterhuyse ("Esterhuyse"), who represented Unical at the meeting, insisted that the shore meters be recalibrated against a master meter in the light of the fact that Unical was unaware of when the JBS meters were last calibrated. Esterhuyse informed the meeting that at that time, the equipment to check the vessel's meters was not available in the country but that Unical had valid calibration certificates for the vessel's meters.

[27] Unical conducted its own investigation and in response to Chevron's e-mail of 1 October 2008 advising Unical of its losses, Unical by e-mail dated 23 October 2008 informed Chevron that it was busy putting together a spreadsheet with all the loading and discharging figures to date. The e-mail further pointed out that although Unical was busy with its investigation, there were, however, clear indications that the JBS meter might "be out"and Unical requested calibration certificate of JBS meters.

[28] On 14 October 2008, Unical forwarded an e-mail to Chevron enclosing a spreadsheet produced from all the figures drawn from the file server where it kept all the barge records. The e-mail reported what Unical had discovered. It states:

"We found that the system works best if the tanks aren't lowered below 10%, as the Cargomaster starts hunting for an accurate level. More often than not, once the tank level drop below 10% the Cargomaster indicates a zero level. This results in the dip indicating that more product had been delivered than indicated by the meter Empty spectrums still have to be done on the Radar level gauging system to enable us to empty tanks completely and still get accurate readings below 10%. This had already been done on our barge in Durban, with the desired results. IVs a simple process for the Krohne instrument technicians, but the tanks have to be completely empty to perform this task. I have to coordinate this with you".

[29] Unical points out that in the period October/November 2008 it did not know whether the JBS loading meter was accurate or not. It knew that the Cargomaster was inaccurate when the tanks were less than 10% full and believed that the barge's calibrated Krohne delivery meter was accurate but it was not possible for it to prove barge delivery meter as there was no master meter in South Africa at the time capable of proving the barge meter across the entire flow range. Its investigation revealed that the empty spectrums problem could never have caused any losses and did not explain the apparent losses.

[30] Unical alleges that from the time that the empty spectrums problem was addressed by Krohne in November 2008 it heard nothing further from Chevron to indicate that Chevron considered Unical to be responsible for any product shortages or over delivery to Chevron's customers until June 2009.

[31] This is disputed by Chevron. Sellar alleges that during April and May 2009 he became aware that the losses were more than originally estimated and he made Unical's representative aware of this fact during bi-weekly safety meetings he held with him.

[32] Sellar points out that ITS which Chevron had contracted to investigate the cause of losses reported in June 2009 that there were significant problems with the barge's stock monitoring system, including the use of incorrect density figures for marine products, and inaccurate calibration tables. It recommended that further investigations be conducted. It is disputed whether Unical was provided with a copy of ITS report. Unical alleges that Chevron sent to it an e-mail recording certain observations based on only three monitoring occasions.

[33] Sellar further alleges that at the suggestion of ITS an independent mobile meter was installed between the JBS shore meter and the shore flange from which marine product was pumped onto the barge to verify the accuracy of the JBS shore meters. ITS monitored it on 30 July 2009. But Esterhuyse objected to the use of the mobile meter on the basis that its readings were unreliable since it was not a "master meter". The ITS report was discussed with Unical but the latter disputed its correctness.

[34] Unical's representatives indicated to Chevron's representative that Unical had procured a new Krohne master meter capable of calibrating the discharge flow meter, not the Cargomaster, and further that SGS would perform the calibration during September 2009 which was the earliest that SGS expected that the Krohne master meter would be available to carry out the test.

[35] On 28 September 2009 SGS performed the calibration of the barge using the Krohne master meter and found that the flow meter was providing correct measurements if the flow rate at the time of reading was within a certain band and that since the meter was designed to measure at flow rates from 80mt/h to 1300mt/h, readings at below 80mt/h could not be guaranteed.

[36] Mr Sharp of ITS met regularly with Unical's representatives over this period in an attempt to trace the cause of Chevron's losses. On 28 September 2009 ITS produced barge monitoring reports for the period July and August 2009.

[37] On 29 September 2009 a meeting was held between Sellar and Mr Hutchinson ("Hutchinson") of Chevron and Esterhuyse and Mr Stuart-Hill ("Stuart-Hill") representing Unical. At the meeting Sellar advised Stuart-Hill that he had given Esterhuyse details of the claim and that Chevron would be proceeding to bill Unical for the losses which it had suffered. Stuart-Hill responded by saying that whilst Unical was aware that Chevron would be seeking to recover the losses from Unical, Chevron should not expect Unical to simply lie down and pay the claim. Sellar understood Unical to contend that JBS meters were at fault and that any claim that Chevron might have had lies against JBS and not Unical.

[38] Sellar alleges that after the meeting he continued to investigate the cause of the loss and that he continued to work with Esterhuyse to try and find a cause for the discrepancy.

[39] On 25 October 2009 Chevron e-mailed Unical a reconciliation statement reflecting the quantity of marine products lost and the size of the claim and thereafter, on 12 December 2009, Chevron forwarded a tetter of demand to Unical demanding payment of the sum of R24 412 21976.

[40] In a letter dated 17 December 2009 Unical acknowledged receipt of the letter of demand and confirmed that it had referred the matter to its attorneys and to its insurer's attorneys who had advised it not to make any admissions.

[41] Unical sent Chevron a further letter on 12 January 2010 advising that its insurer's

lawyers were still busy with investigation. Unical's letter further states:

"Finally, our interpretation of the charter party is that all cargo claims are subject to the Hague-Visby Rules (Shelltime 4 Clause 27 (c) (ii) and Chevron Rider Clauses 3.1 _r 3.8 and 5.13. Kindly confinn your schedules are in accordance with these provisions".

[42] Chevron forwarded Unical's letter of 12 January 2010 to its legal department and requested advice on whether there was anything in the Hague-Visby Rules which should be of concern to it.

[43] In the meantime, at the request of Unical, Sellar met with Burns and Stuart-Hill of Unical at Cape Town on 20 January 2010. A week later after the meeting Sellar contacted Esterhuyse to enquire from him what it is that he was investigating.

[44] On 1 February 2010 Chevron's in-house legal department informed Sellar of the existence of the one year time-bar period in the Hague-Visby Rules. Thereafter Chevron instructed its attorneys of record to provide it with further advice in relation to the application of the Hague-Visby Rules to its claim.

[45] Burns of Unical sent an e-mail to Hutchinson of Chevron on 2 March 2010 advising as follows:

"I left a number of messages on your office voicemail. I'm concerned you have not received them. I was wanting to talk to you regarding the position on the bunker stock position relating to Fumana. We have been asked by Thor to make an offer of settlement before the end of February (and hence my urgency to get hold of you before the month end). The request caught me by surprise as we had agreed to have the whole issue resolved before end May We are not in opposition to make any form of offer at this stage.

t want to meet with urgently to discuss and seek guidance on how to go forward on this matter but am unfortunately in the east until the 12'" March. Can we meet the week beginning the 15 March.

Look forward to your response".

[46] In response thereto and on 3 March 2010 Sellar sent an e-mail to Unical recording Chevron's position and what was agreed at the meeting.

[47] Stuart-Hill responded by an e-mail on 5 March 2010 and expressed his wish to resolve the matter as soon as possible and suggested that they meet on 16 March 2010. The parties met on 16 March 2010 but there is a dispute regarding what was discussed at the meeting in particular whether Unical had indicated that it would invoke the one year time-bar provision in the Hague-Visby Rules as a defence in the event of the parties failing to reach settlement.

[48] Chevron commenced arbitration proceedings on 30 March 2010 in terms of the AFSA's rules for expedited arbitration and when Unical objected thereto. Chevron delivered a request for arbitration on 18 June 2010. Unical is defending the proceedings and has raised a special defence to Chevron's claim in reliance on the one year time-bar period contained in Article 111, Rule 6_: of the Hague-Visby Rules. Chevron seeks an extension of the one year time-bar contained in the Hague-Visby Rules.

[49] The issue for determination is whether in terms of section 8 of the Arbitration Act the time period within which to commence arbitration proceedings should be extended.

Legal Principles

[50] Chevron seeks an order in terms of section 8 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 which deals with the court's power to extend time fixed in an arbitration agreement for commencing arbitration proceedings. It provides as follows:

"Where an arbitration agreement to refer future disputes to arbitration provides that any claim to which the agreement applies shall be barred unless some step to commence arbitration proceedings is taken within a time fixed by the agreement, and a dispute arises to which the agreement applies, the courts if it is of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case undue hardship would otherwise be caused, may extend the time for such period as it considers proper, whether the time so fixed has expired or not, on such terms and conditions as it may consider just but subject to the provisions of any law limiting the time for commencing arbitration proceedings".

[51] The charter party under which the dispute arose was concluded by Chevron and

Unical in July 2007. It includes the Chevron Rider Clauses which are contained in

Annexure A attached to the charter party. Clause 27 of the charter party deals with

exceptions and exclusions of certain losses. In the consideration of the merits of the

matter, it is necessary to quote again its provisions in full. Clause 27 (a) states:

'The vessel, her master and Owners shall not, unless otherwise in this charter expressly provided., be liable for any loss or damage or delay or failure arising or resulting from any act, neglect or default of the master, pilots, mariners or other servants of Owners in the navigation or management of the vessel; fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of Owners; collision or standing; dangers and accidents of the sea; explosion bursting of boilers, breakage of shafts or any latent defect in hull, equipment or machinery; provided, however, that Clauses 1. 2, and 3 hereof shall be unaffected by the foregoing. Further, neither the vessel, her master or Owners, nor Charterers shall,, unless otherwise in this charter expressly provided, be liable for any loss or damage or delay or failure in performance hereunder arising or resulting from act of God, act of war, seizure under legal process, quarantine restrictions, strikes, lock-outs, riots, restraints of labour civil commotions or arrest or restraint of princes, rulers or people."

[52] Clause 27 (c) provides that clause 27 (a) shall not apply to or affect as liability of Owners or the vessel or any other relevant person in respect of:

"(ii) any claim (whether brought by charterers or any other person) arising out of any loss of or damage to or in connection with cargo. All such claims shall be subject to the Hague-Visby Rules, excluding the provisions of Article 3 Rule 8 thereof notwithstanding that the parties have agreed that bills of lading will be issued for the carnage of the cargo".

[53] Clause 5.1 of the Chevron Rider clauses provides that all disputes under the contract shall be settled by arbitration in Cape Town. For the purposes of this judgment I will assume firstly that. Chevron's claims pursued in the arbitration constitute claims contemplated by clause 27 (c) of the charter party, secondly, that they are covered by the arbitration clause 5.1 of the charter party, thirdly, that Unical's defence that Chevron's claims are subject to a one year time-bar is a good defence and fourthly, that Chevron is correct in approaching this court for an extension of time within which to bring arbitration proceedings in terms of section 8 of the Arbitration Act.

[54] The exercise of the power to extend time under section 8 is a matter of discretion and the approach to be adopted in the exercise of such discretion is to be found in Administrateur Kaap v Asia Konstruksie (Edms) Bpk² which adopted the English judgments dealing with section 27 of the English Arbitration Act. 1950, the equivalent of section 8 of the South African Arbitration Act.

[55] In Administrateur Kaap v Asia Konstrvksie (Edms) Bpk> Tebbutt J adopted and applied the guidelines as set out in Libehan Shipping Corporation ("The Pegasus") v A King & Sons Ltd³ and (CA) Moscow V/O Exportkhleb v Helmville Ltd (the "Jocelyne") QB (Admiralty Court)⁴.

[56] In the Liberian Shipping case (supra) Lord Denning, M R dealt with the meaning of the phrase "Undue Hardship" as used in section 27 of the English Arbitration Act. He disapproved certain earlier decisions in which the phrase had been given a narrow meaning. He went on to state at 938:

"These time-limit clauses used to operate most unjustly. Claimants used to find their claims barred when, by some oversight, they were only a day or two late. In order to avoid that injustice, the legislature intervened so as to enable the courts to extend the time whenever 'in the circumstances of the case undue hardship would otherwise be caused'. Undue there simply means excessive. It means greater hardship than the circumstances warrant. Even though a claimant has been at fault himself, it is an undue hardship on him if the consequences are out of proportion to his fault

Applying this test, it seems to me that if a claimant makes a mistake which is excusable, and is in consequence a few days out of time, then if there is no prejudice to the other side, it would be altogether too harsh to deprive him of all chance for ever of coming and making his claim. All the more so if the mistake is contributed to or shared by the other side. That indeed is this very case. I am quite prepared to accept that the charterers, when they went to the meeting of June 27, did not intend to mislead the owners. They were both under a misapprehension. Neither of them realised that the time had already expired; but it is pretty plain that he conduct of the charterers put the owners off their guard. The owners would not contemplate that they would be barred whilst negotiations were still going on. As soon as they realised that the negotiations were not going to be fruitful, they at once took the necessary steps."

[57] In the same case Lord Justice Salmon, who concurred in the judgment of Lord Denning M R, had this to say at 940I-941A regarding the meaning of section 27:

_,

'That section seems to me to state quite plainly that if, having considered all the circumstances of the case, the court comes to the conclusion that the hardship imposed by the form of the arbitration clause on the claimant is greater than that which, in justice, he should be called on to bear, the time within which to appoint an arbitrator may be extended by the court. I do not believe that the courts are entitled to read words into this section which are not there and which would have the effect of cutting down the power given to the courts by the plain language of the section itself.

[58] The guidelines enunciated in the Liberian Shipping (supra) judgment and (the "Pegasus" (supra) judgment) were adopted and applied by Brandon J in the "Jocelyne" (supra) case and he summarised them as follows at 129:

'(1) the words "undue hardship" in s. 27 should not be construed too narrowly.

(2) Undue hardship means excessive hardship and, where the hardship is due to the fault of the claimant, it means hardship the consequences of which are put out of proportion to such a fault

(3) In deciding whether to extend time or not, the Court should look at all the relevant circumstances of the particular case.

(4) In particular, the following matters should be considered:-

1. the length of the delay;

the amount at stake;

2. whether the delay was due to the fault of the claimant or to circumstances outside his control:

3. if it was due to the fault of the claimant the degree of such fault;

whether the claimant was misled by the other party;

4. whether the other party has been prejudiced by the delay, and. if so, the degree of such prejudice."

(See also Libra Shipping & Trading Corp Ltd v Northern Sales Ltd (the "Aspen Trade") ⁵ and Evergos Naftiki Eteria v Cargill pic (the "Voltaz")⁶.

[59] With this legal background I now turn to consider whether the extension of time should be granted in terms of section 8 of the Arbitration Act.

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