IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN)

Case No. 21145/2011; 21143/2011; 21144/2011

In the matter between:

and

(Case No. 21145/2011 - "the Anton Louw sequestration application")

and

(Case No. 21143/2011 - "the Johannes Louw sequestration application")

and

(Case No. 21144/2011 - the Dewald Louw sequestration application")

and

THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE & 

(Case No. 21144/2011 - "the counter application")

Sequestration Application 
For the Applicant: 	Adv BDJ Gassner SC 
As instructed by:	Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs 
(ref: Ms C Morgan/Ms L Field)

For the Respondents: AdvF Joubert SC etAdvJ De Vries
As Instructed by: Lombard & Kriek 
(ref: Mr JC Kriek)

Counter Application 
For the Applicant:  Adv J de Waal
As instructed by: Lombard & Kriek 
(ref: Mr JC Kriek)

For First and Second Respondents:  Adv RT Williams SC et Adv T Sidaki 
As Instructed by: The State Attorney 
(ref: Mr L Ngwenya)

For the Third Respondent:  Adv APH Cockrell SC et Adv Ferreira

(ref: Ms C Morgan/Ms L Field)

Enclosed is a judgment by Bozalek, J of which only the issues dealt with in: 

Para's 1 - 7; para's 43 - 64 & para's 86 - 91 are reportable.

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN

CASE NO:   21 145/2011; 21143/2011; 21144/2011
In the matter between:

and

(Case No. 21145/2011 - "the Anton Louw sequestration application")

and

(Case No. 21143/2011 - "the Johannes Louw sequestration application")

and

(Case No. 21144/2011 - the Dewald Louw sequestration application")

and

THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE & 

(Case No. 21144/2011 - "the counter application")

BOZALEK J:

[1] The applicant in all three of these matters, Investec Bank Limited, seeks provisional sequestration orders against the first respondents in each case, namely Messrs Anton Louw, Johannes Louw and Dewald Louw. I shall refer to them collectively as the respondents. The second respondents in each case are their respective wives against whom no direct relief is sought since in each case they are married out of community of property. [2] The respondents opposed the relief sought and filed voluminous answering affidavits. At the hearing of this matter only Mr Dewald Louw was represented by counsel. Neither of the two remaining respondents appeared in person or were legally represented but they continued to oppose the relief sought.

[9] The applicant denies the conclusion of any such agreement or release but concedes, for the purposes of these proceedings, that there is a bona fide dispute regarding this and various other issues ancillary to this dispute. These are set out in affidavits filed by the applicant and are as follows:

[12] In the present matter the applicant contends that notwithstanding the existence of the bona fide factual disputes, on a proper analysis of the issues it is entitled to a sequestration order since the respondent cannot dispute his indebtedness on bona fide and reasonable grounds. Even assuming in his favour the disputed facts, the respondent can, nonetheless, not escape liability under the suretyship because it contains a so called non-variation clause in terms of which the surety may only be released from its provisions in writing signed by both parties.

[13] The respondent contends, however, that properly interpreted, the suretyship agreement permits the release of the surety or, put differently, the cancellation of the suretyship by the applicant, other than in writing. In the alternative it is contended that should any release from or cancellation of the suretyship be required in writing, certain documentation issued by the applicant amounted to a release in writing. In the further alternative, further defences raised by the respondent are that the applicant is estopped from relying on the deed of suretyship; it has waived its rights in terms of the deed of suretyship, that the respondent is entitled to ask for specific performance of the oral agreement, namely cancellation of the suretyship and having this recorded in writing by the applicant and signed by it; alternatively, that the respondent is entitled to rely on the fictional fulfilment of a self-created formality by the applicant and, finally, that it would be against public policy to enforce the deed of suretyship.

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE DEED OF SURETYSHIP

"for the due and punctual payment by the Debtor of all and any monies which the Debtor may now or from time to time in the future owe to Investec from whatsoever cause and howsoever arising ..."

and

"6.1. This Deed of Suretyship is in addition to and without prejudice to any other security or suretyship (including any suretyship signed by the Surety) now or hereafter to be held from or on behalf of the Debtor and shall remain in force as a continuing security for the whole amount now due or owing to Investec or which at any time hereafter may become due or owing to Investec by the Debtor, notwithstanding any intermediate settlement or fluctuation of account or novation.

"No variation or cancellation (whether oral, consensual or otherwise) of the terms of this Deed of Suretyship shall be of any force or effect unless it is reduced to writing and signed by the Surety and Investec. This Deed of Suretyship is and shall at all times remain Investec's property.

"According to the 'golden rule' of interpretation the language in the document is to be given its grammatical and ordinary meaning, unless this would result in some absurdity, or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument...
The mode of construction should never be to interpret the particular word or phrase in insolation (in vacuo) by itself...
The correct approach to the application of the 'golden rule' of interpretation after having ascertained the literal meaning of the word or phrase in question is, broadly speaking, to have regard:
1) to the context in which the word or phrase is used with its interrelation to the contract as a whole, including the nature and purpose of the contract...
2) to the background circumstances which explain the genesis and purpose of the contract, ie to matters probably present to the minds of the parties when they contracted.
3) to apply extrinsic evidence regarding the surrounding circumstances when the language of the document is on the face of it ambiguous, by considering previous negotiations and correspondence between the parties, subsequent conduct of the parties showing the sense in which they acted on the document, save direct evidence of their own intentions."

"Although a suretyship agreement requires writing and the surety's signature for validity, there are no formalities for a valid cancellation. A surety is also generally entitled to cancel by notice and unilaterally his future obligations under a continuing guarantee. If the agreement prescribes formalities for the amendment or determination of the suretyship, these are binding upon both parties. Lastly, a deed of suretyship must be interpreted restrictively and in favour of the surety. It does not mean that the agreement must not be interpreted sensibly.

"It protects the creditor. It enables the creditor to determine its rights with the reference to the document in its possession. The creditor does not have to rely on the memory of employees or ex-employees. It protects the creditor against spurious defences and unnecessary litigation."

"...where the creditor, as in the present case, is a large organisation comprising different divisions and employing a large number of people. The surety, on the other hand, is unlikely to be prejudiced. Institutions such as banks do not lightly release sureties while the debt of the principal debtor remains extant. If there is a release it is in the interests of both parties that it be readily capable of proof."

[26] In reaching this conclusion I take into account the provisions of the prior loan agreement with Dormell 260 which led to the various suretyships including that of the respondent's. In terms of that agreement a very substantial loan was made as security for which the applicant stipulated that it required the joint and several unlimited continuing suretyships of a number of companies within the Aslo Group as well as its key directors including the three Louw brothers.
[27] I hold then that, properly interpreted, the suretyship agreement as a whole and clause 16 in particular, precludes the release of the surety/ a general cancellation of the suretyship agreement by the creditor (the applicant) other than where such release/cancellation is reduced to writing and signed by it and the surety.

[28] It follows, therefore, subject to the respondent's further and alternative defences, that he is not entitled to rely on an oral agreement of cancellation of the suretyship to escape liability thereunder.
WAS THERE A TERMINATION IN WRITING?

"It may be explicit or implicit. But if the latter, the intention to release must be apparent from the writing on an ordinary grammatical construction of the words used or, stated differently, the release of the surety must be a necessary implication of the words used. It is therefore not permissible to import into the writing, whether by reference to background or surrounding circumstances or any other sources, an intention to release which is otherwise not ascertainable from the actual language of the document reliedupon. If the position were otherwise the very object of the requirement of writing would be frustrated."
[31] Having regard to the documents relied upon by the respondent it is clear that the high water mark of his case is simply the omission of his name as a surety in the restructured agreement and in the applicant's response in the email exchange. These words clearly do not expressly release the surety and, in my view, they fall far short of impliedly indicating any intention to release. The defence that the respondent was in fact released as a surety in writing cannot, for these reasons, be sustained.

WAIVER

"Courts have in the past, often on dubious of grounds, attempted to avoid the Shifren principle where its application would result in what has been perceived to be a harsh result. Typically, reliance has been placed on waiver and estoppel. No doubt in particular circumstances a waiver of rights under a contract containing a non-variation clause may not involve a violation of the Shifren principle, for example where it amounts to a pactum de non petendo or an indulgence in relation to previous imperfect performance ...

.. .But nothing like that arises in the present case. The appellants contend that they were released as sureties by virtue of the conduct of the bank, coupled with a consensual waiver of the provisions of clause 15. In my view, a factual basis for such a contention was not established on the evidence but even if it had been, it would have amounted, in the circumstances of the present case, to no more than a variation of clause 15 which was not in writing. This is precluded by clause 16. To hold otherwise, would be to render the principle in Shifren wholly ineffective."

ESTOPPEL

[37] The respondent's case is made no stronger given the terms of the original suretyship which he concluded. His withdrawal from the Aslo Group's business in favour of farming did not give him, nor anyone on his behalf, any right to be released from his obligations as security, which obligations were continuing and unlimited. Furthermore, had Dormell 560 not signed the 2009 loan agreement the pre-existing loan agreement would have remained in force together with the respondent's obligations as a surety. Consequently, whichever way one looks at it, the conduct of the applicant in omitting the respondent's name from the list of sureties in the 2009 agreement, coupled with the fact that it can for present purposes not dispute an oral agreement to release the respondent from his suretyship agreement, does not in my view come close to founding a basis for the defence of estoppel on the part of the respondent.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE ORAL AGREEMENT

PUBLIC POLICY

"Wat die rot van goeie trou betref, stem ons in wese saam met die siening van Profesor Hutchinson waar volgens goeie trou nie 'n onafhanlike, of te wel 'n 'free floating' basis vir die tersyde stelling of die nie toepassing van kontraktuele bepalings bied nie. Goeie trou is 'n grond beginsel wat in die algemeen onderliggend is aan die kontrakte reg en wat uiting vind in die besondere reels en beginsels daarvan."

[42] For these reasons all of the defences raised by the respondent are without merit, leaving only the counter application to be determined.

THE COUNTER APPLICATION

[43] All three respondents are party to the counter application as applicants challenging various provisions of the National Credit Act, 34 of 2005 ("the NCA"), the Insolvency Act, 24 of 1936 and the Companies Act, 71 of 2008. To this end they joined the Ministers of Trade and Industry and Justice and Constitutional Development as first and second respondents, the third respondent being the applicant in the three sequestration applications. All respondents opposed the application but in the event the challenges to the provisions of the Insolvency Act and the Companies Act were abandoned by the applicants following the liquidation of Dormell Properties, Aslo Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Rapriprop 135 (Pty) Ltd.

"4 Application of Act

1) Subjects to sections 5 and 6, this Act applies to every credit agreement between parties dealing at arm's length and made within, or having an effect within, the Republic, except:

a) a credit agreement in terms of which the consumer is -
i) a juristic person whose asset value or annual turnover, together with the combined asset value or annual turnover of all related juristic persons, at the time the agreement is made, equals or exceeds the threshold value determined by the Minister in terms ofs7(1); ...
2) for greater certainty in applying subsection( 1)-
a )...
b) ...

8 Credit Agreements

The underlined provisions are those which are impugned by the applicants.

[46] In the founding affidavit the applicants state that they object to the impugned positions of the NCA because they:

"...arbitrarily exclude(s) from the Act consumers who grant(s) a credit guarantee to a juristic person with an asset value or an annual turnover higher than R1m. The exclusion does not apply if a guarantee is granted to a natural person with a same asset value or annual turnover (or even higher), even if the guarantor of the credit guarantee is a juristic person."

They state further, however, that they:

The applicants complain thus that the NCA applies to and protects a natural person as a principal debtor but does not apply to a natural person who stands surety for a principal debt which is excluded from the NCA. This, it is argued, constitutes arbitrary differentiation between categories of natural persons.

"(a) Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose? If it does not then there is violation of s (8)(1). Even if it does bear a rational connection it might nevertheless amount to discrimination.
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two stage analysis;

If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be unfair, then there will be no violation ofs 8(2)
c) If the discrimination is to found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations clause (s 33 of the interim Constitution)".

"The setting of this standard does not mean that the courts can or should substitute their opinion as to what is appropriate for the opinions of those in whom the power has been vested. As long as the purpose sought to be achieved by the exercise of public power is within the authority of the functionary, and as long as the functionary's decision, viewed objectively, is rational, a Court cannot interfere with the decision simply because it disagrees with or considers that the power was exercised inappropriately. A decision that is objectively irrational is likely to be made only rarely but, if this does occur, a Court has the power to intervene and set aside the irrational decision."

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT DIFFERENTIATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED
[54] Assuming, however, that I have misconceived the position and the impugned provisions of the NCA do in fact constitute differentiation between two kinds of natural persons ie those who are principal debtors and those who are sureties of high worth juristic persons, the next step in the Harksen test is to determine whether the differentiation bears a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose. But first I deal with some preliminary points
[55] The respondents made a rather faint attempt to argue that a heightened level of scrutiny must be applied in the test for rationality previously enunciated by the Constitutional Court and which I have set out above. Needless to say I am bound by the existing law in this regard and thus any submission in this regard must be reserved for a higher court.

[56] The applicants also took issue with the fact that the third respondent rather than the Minister responsible for the NCA pressed many arguments favouring the proposition that the impugned provisions indeed reveal a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose and also that these factors or arguments were not enumerated in the opposing affidavits filed on behalf of the state. In my view it is open to any party to a matter who seeks to defend the constitutionality of impugned provisions to raise arguments tending to show such a connection. Moreover the fact that these arguments or factors are not contained in the Ministers' opposing affidavits is not decisive since they might be self-evident or appear from analysis of the legislation itself. It is the weight and cogency of the arguments to be evaluated by the Court which is most relevant.
[57] The most cogent arguments in regard to a rational purpose were those initially advanced by Mr Cockrell on behalf of the third respondent. He argued that the NCA clearly distinguishes between juristic and natural persons in that it applies only to a consumer which is a juristic person in limited circumstances, namely, where that entity's asset value or turnover is less than R1m and it enters into a small or intermediate agreements as envisaged in s 9(2) and s 9(3) read with s 7(1 )(b) of the Act. Even in those circumstances, where the NCA applies to a juristic person it does so to a limited extent, s 6 of the Act providing that a significant portion of the NCA does not apply to a credit agreement in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person. It is thus evident that the bulk of the protection to credit consumers applies to natural persons but not to juristic persons.

[59] These considerations, however, Mr Cockrell's argument proceeded, are unlikely to apply to the same extent in the case of juristic persons. The incorporation of a company, closed corporation or similar vehicle is itself indicative of a degree of sophistication and legal literacy. The use of such a vehicle carries with it the primary advantage of separate legal personality, namely, limited liability and if a credit consumer is financially sophisticated enough to use juristic personality for the conduct of his or her business it would appear that the NCA views such a person as being able to take care of his or her own interests. These observations must be read of course subject to the qualification that low worth juristic persons which conclude relatively low value credit agreements do enjoy at least some of the protections of the NCA.
[60] The same reasoning appears to underpin specific distinctions which the Act establishes between natural persons who stand surety for other natural persons or for low worth juristic persons in respect of smaller credit agreements. As was pointed out, a natural person ordinarily only provides a credit guarantee for a juristic person in which he or she has an interest, whether by ownership or control. This being so, the person providing the credit guarantee would not ordinarily have access to, or the means to pay for, advice to protect his or her interests and would thus be in much the same position as the high worth juristic person whose debts are being guaranteed and in respect of which the legislature appears to have taken the view that such entities have the ability to take care of their own interests, unprotected by the NCA.
[61] This rationale is neatly illustrated by the circumstances of the present matter. Each of the respondents, as a director, was a central figure in the sophisticated and extended construction and development business of which Dormell 260 was but a single component. No doubt when Dormell 260 entered into the principal loan agreement it had the benefit not only of the views of its directors but of accountants and legal representatives with specialist experience in the field of finance and law. The third respondent looked to the applicants for suretyships since they were key figures in the Aslo Holdings group and, before concluding their suretyship agreements, the applicants would have had access to exactly the same expertise as did Dormell 260 and its parent companies.
[62] In my view it is this rationale which lies behind the scheme of the relevant provisions of the NCA regarding which credit transactions or consumers enjoy its protection. Furthermore, whilst one may agree or disagree with this rationale or where the line is drawn, it cannot be said that any such differentiation (which I do no more than assume) is arbitrary and does not bear a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose. That being the case, even assuming that the respondents cleared the first hurdle in the Harksen test they do not succeed in establishing that differentiation has no rational connection to a legitimate government purpose.

potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner."

[64] In my view, in the light of the above analysis of the effect and purposes of the impugned provisions, the applicants have made out no case that their effect is to threaten their human dignity, thereby establishing discrimination. There can then be no question of unfair discrimination. It follows that the counter application must fail and the only outstanding issue is the question of costs which I shall address later.

MR DEWALD LOUW

[65] I turn now to consider the individual applications. Having found that there is no merit in the special defences raised by the respondent nor in the counter application it would appear that the applicant has made out a case for a provisional order of sequestration against the respondent. I am satisfied that the applicant has established that it is a creditor with an aggregated liquidated claim not less than R200.00 against the respondent, that he is factually insolvent and that there is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of the creditors if his estate is sequestrated.
[66] In this latter regard the applicant's case is that even on the respondent's version, on sequestration his creditors could expect a dividend of some 0.71c in the rand on the basis that he has assets of R1.3m as against liabilities of some R71m. It is further the applicant's case that there are indications that the respondent has disposed of assets by way of impeachable transactions and that an investigation by a trustee may reveal financial information which could lead to the setting aside of such transactions or the unearthing of other assets of respondent which he has failed to disclose. The respondent has chosen not to challenge, at this stage at least, that a sequestration order will result in an advantage to creditors. In the circumstances it appears to me the applicant has made out a proper case for a provisional sequestration order.

MESSRS ANTON AND JOHANNES LOUW

[67] I must now consider whether the applicant has made out a case for a similar order against Messrs Anton and Johannes Louw. It will be recalled that although both filed a full answering affidavit and also were applicants in the counter application, neither was represented at the hearing of this matter and nor did they appear in person.
[68] It follows from the findings which I have already made, the respondents' circumstances being similar in all material respects to that of Mr Dewald Louw, that they are unable to raise any defence to their liability to the applicant pursuant to the continuing unlimited suretyships which they concluded in favour of the applicant. Accordingly the only question to determine are whether, in each of their cases, their estates are insolvent and whether there is reason to believe that their sequestration will produce an advantage to creditors. I deal firstly with the matter of Mr Anton Louw.

MR ANTON LOUW

[69] According to the respondent his assets are valued at some R423 000.00 as against total liabilities of some R98m which includes liability towards the applicant reckoned at some R70m. Accepting the respondent's figures, this will produce a concurrent dividend of only 0.0739c in the rand based on a free residue of some R72 000.00 available for creditors.

[70] If this were the only advantage to creditors I would have serious doubt as to whether a sequestration order would be justified. It is not necessary for me to determine this question, however, since the applicant makes out a much stronger case for there being an advantage to creditors on a different score.

[71] By way of introduction I observe that the papers in each of these applications demonstrate that the respondents are sophisticated businessmen who created a complex web of corporate personalities and cross ownerships to conduct their dealings. The papers reveal, furthermore, that around the time that the Knysna property deal went sour, the respondents sold their primary residences to their spouses and disposed of their shareholding in various companies which were part of the Aslo Group, often at par value or for nominal sums. Many of their assets were transferred from their personal ownership into trusts of which they are either trustees or co-trustees together with members of their family or business associates. The applicant's main contention is, therefore, that a proper investigation of the respondent's affairs by a trustee is likely to bring to light further assets over and above those disclosed by the respondent. It further contends that a series of transactions concluded by the respondent during 2008 - 2011, in terms of which he disposed of several assets held by him in his personal capacity at no or nominal values, were designed to protect his assets against claims from creditors and may be impeachable in terms of the Insolvency Act.

[72]   Amongst the most important such transactions are the following:

[74] There are other aspects of the respondent's financial affairs which may warrant closer scrutiny by a trustee. These include indications that the respondent failed to declare or understated dividends which apparently accrued to him from JLK Project and Construction as well as remuneration from that company and JLK Plant. There is also the question of an unexplained erosion in the respondent's personal assets over the period 2008 -2011.
[75] In my view the applicant has made out a convincing case that there is reason to believe that there are various dispositions of assets and other aspects of the respondent's financial affairs which may yield a benefit for his creditors after investigation by a trustee.

"(t)the court need be satisfied only that there is reason to believe - not necessarily a likelihood but a prospect not too remote - that as a result of investigation and inquiry assets might be unearthed that will benefit creditors".

MR JOHANNES LOUW

[78] The applicant's case against the respondent is similar in all material respects to that against the other two respondents. However, Mr Johannes Louw has appreciably more assets, on his own version, namely R2.4m, as against liabilities, estimated by him to amount to some R87m.

[81] In any event the applicant also makes out a case that placing the respondent's estate into sequestration will have the further advantage for creditors that a trustee will be able to investigate a series of questionable transactions by the respondent with the possible result that such transactions may be set aside as dispositions without value or having been made by the respondent when he was insolvent or, indeed, further assets may be discovered.
[82] The affidavits reveal that the respondent, in similar circumstances to Mr Anton Louw, and at a time when Dormell 260 was unable to meet its obligations to the applicant, donated assets at a declared value of R3.2m to his wife. Although one such asset was apparently a vacant erf, it now appears to be the respondent's primary residence. The respondent's assertions that he was solvent at the time of the disposition are brought into question having regard to Dormell 260's dire financial position at the relevant time and to the principle in Millman's case (supra). Similar questions arise in relation to the respondent's sale to his wife in August 2011 of his half share in a sectional title unit in Wellington, known as The Piano.
[83] Just as Mr Anton Louw is alleged to have done, and around the same time, the respondent transferred his shareholding in two trading companies in the Aslo Group to a family trust at par or nominal value. The applicant raises the same concerns as to the respondent's valuation and disposition of the shares. It also makes out a case that the family trust utilised by the respondent in some of these transactions may be an alter ego trust used by him to shield his personal assets from creditors' claims and that, as such, his affairs could be the subject of fruitful inquiry by a trustee with a view to bringing further assets to light for the benefit of creditors.
[84] In the circumstances, apart from a likely dividend of 2.7c in the rand, a sequestration order could very well bring the further advantage to creditors of providing the means and mechanisms for a trustee to delve into the respondent's financial affairs with a view to recovering further assets or setting aside questionable transactions thereby ultimately enhancing the dividend payable to creditors.
[85] It follows that the applicant, having established that it has an aggregated liquidated claim of more than R200.00 and that the respondent is insolvent, a provisional sequestration order is warranted in this matter as well. In each of the three above matters there will be an order as set out in the annexures to the judgment.

COSTS IN THE COUNTER APPLICATION

[87] The respondents argued that in such event the applicants should nonetheless bear the costs. In support of their argument they point out that two legs of the counter application, namely the challenges to the Companies Act and the Insolvency Act, had simply been abandoned by the applicants at a late stage. In their defence the applicants retorted that a relatively small part of the opposing papers had been taken up with the issue of the abandoned constitutional challenges and that the respondents should themselves have realised that these challenges would not be pursued given that the various companies in the Aslo Group had been placed into final liquidation or had been the subject of unsuccessful business rescue applications by the time that the respondents were required to file their answering affidavits.

BOZALEK, J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN)
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BOZALEK
CAPE TOWN:

CASE NO: 21145/2011

In the matter between:

(Registration No. 1969/004763/06)

and

(I.D. No. )
(Address: 21 Bosman Street, Paarl)
(Marital status: married out of community of property in
terms of an antenuptial contract to CONCETTA
PAULINE LOUW, identity number )

(I.D. No. )
(Address: 21 Bosman Street, Paarl)
(Marital status: married out of community of property in
terms of an antenuptial contract to ANTON LOUW,
identity number )

ORDER

EDWARD NATHAN SONNENBERGS INC
C MORGAN
021 4102500
cmoraan@ens.co.za

IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The estate of the first respondent is placed under provisional sequestration.

2.1. the first respondent's estate should not be placed under final sequestration; and
2.2. the costs of this application should not be costs in the administration of the first respondent's insolvent estate.

3.1. the first respondent at 21 Bosman Street, Paarl, Western Cape;
3.2. the second respondent at 21 Bosman Street, Paarl, Western Cape;
3.3. the South African Revenue Service at 22 Hans Strijdom Avenue,
3.4. the employees of the first respondent, if any;
3.5. all registered trade unions representing the employees of the first respondent, if any.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
COURT REGISTRAR

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
(WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN) 
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BOZALEK 
CAPE TOWN :

CASE NO: 21143/2011

In the matter between:

(Registration No. )

and

(I.D. No. )
(Address: 10 Du Mont Street, Paarl, Western Cape)
(Marital status: married out of community of property in
terms of an antenuptial contract to CAROLA CECILE
LOUW, identity number )

(I.D. No. )
(Address: 10 Du Mont Street, Paarl, Western Cape) (Marital status: married out of community of property in terms of an antenuptial contract to JOHANNES ADRIAAN LOUW, identity number )

ORDER

EDWARD NATHAN SONNENBERGS INC
C MORGAN
021 4102500
cmorgan@ens.co.za
Box 123

Having heard counsel for the applicant and having read the papers filed of record:

IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The  estate  of the  first  respondent  is  placed  under  provisional sequestration.

2.1. the first respondent's estate should not be placed under final sequestration; and
2.2. the costs of this application should not be costs in the administration of the first respondent's insolvent estate.

3.1. the first respondent at 10 Du Mont Street, Paarl, Western Cape;
3.2. the second respondent at 10 Du Mont Street, Paarl, Western Cape;
3.3. the South African Revenue Service at 22 Hans Strijdom Avenue, Cape Town, Western Cape;

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

COURT REGISTRAR

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN) 
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BOZALEK 
CAPE TOWN : WEDNESDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 2012
CASE NO: 21144/2011

In the matter between:

(Registration No. 1969/004763/06)

and

(I.D. No. )
(Address: Klipdrif Farm, Robertson) (Marital status: married out of community of property in terms of an antenuptial contract to ANEL LOUW, identity number )

(I.D. No. )
(Address: Klipdrif Farm, Robertson) (Marital status: married out of community of property in terms of an antenuptial contract to DEWALD LOUW, identity number )

ORDER

EDWARD NATHAN SONNENBERGS INC
C MORGAN
021 4102500
cmorqan@nsco.za
Box 123

IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The estate of the first respondent is placed under provisional sequestration.

2.1. the first respondent's estate should not be placed under final sequestration; and
2.2. the costs of this application should not be costs in the administration of the first respondent's insolvent estate.

3.1. the first respondent at Klipdrif Farm, Robertson, Western Cape;
3.2. the second respondent at Klipdrif Farm, Robertson, Western Cape;

3.3. the South African Revenue Service at 22 Hans Strijdom Avenue, Cape Town, Western Cape;

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
COURT REGISTRAR